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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
“All glory comes from daring to begin.” 
(William Shakespeare, 1564-1616)
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1.1 INTRODUCTION
In daily life, most humans seem to behave in a coherent manner. Continuously, actions 
are performed that lead to certain goals, like getting an ice-cream from the freezer or 
driving a car from home to the office. The planning of such actions appears to be simple 
as it happens most of the time error-free and without much conscious awareness. 
However, the flow of input from the external world perceived through our senses is 
enormous and the required underlying functional processes likewise. In order to function 
appropriately, we constantly have to filter the input, shift our attention from one object or 
location to another (see for example Figure 1.1), and sometimes must adjust our strategy 
for processing the acquired information. This thesis focuses on levels of selective 
attention in action planning.
Figure 1.1. An example o f a situation in which (visual) attention has to shift quickly from 
one object to another and filter the incoming information in order to function 
adequately.
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1.2 ATTENTIONAL CONTROL
Although the senses respond to many stimuli simultaneously, selective attention permits 
only a few of them to gain access to deep levels of cognitive processing, where they can 
control overt responses or be stored in long-term memory (Johnston, McCann, & 
Remington, 1995). Some form of control is required to coordinate the associated 
cognitive processes, which may depend on the exact task that is being performed. In fact, 
flexible cognitive control over our behaviour is a key part of human intelligence (Herd, 
Banich, & O’Reilly, 2006). This ability of the human attention system to dynamically 
adjust itself to the changing environment in order to optimize performance is often called 
executive or attentional control (e.g., Allport, 1980; Posner & Raichle, 1994; Roelofs, 
2003).
Attentional control can be exogenous (i.e., detection driven by the external world, 
like noticing a red traffic light and adjusting ones behaviour accordingly) or endogenous 
(i.e., concentration driven by the observer, for example, attending to a particular stimulus 
on a screen as requested by the task instructions or internal motivations, cf. MacLeod & 
MacDonald, 2000; Monsell, 2003). Moreover, processing can be divided in ‘automatic’ 
and ‘controlled’ processing, where automatic processing develops with practice and 
requires only little attention, whereas controlled processing requires attention to perform 
less-practiced algorithms.
To study the selective attention mechanisms underlying attentional control, 
cognitive psychologists often use tasks that elicit problems in (maintaining) control. In 
the visual domain, one example is the Simon task (Simon, 1967), in which the subject is 
shown a simple object either left or right of a central fixation cross. The task is to 
respond to a specific object feature, like the shape of the object (e.g., if the target is a 
square press the left button, if it is a circle press the right button). It is a robust finding 
that responses are faster when the spatial location of the object corresponds to the 
response key (e.g., a square requiring a left button response, displayed left from the 
fixation cross) than when they do not match (a square on the right), even though this 
spatial position is not related to the response choice. This Simon effect shows that 
humans are not always capable of optimizing performance based on true restrictions.
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The phenomenon of selective attention has long been of interest to psychologists 
and has been investigated intensively over the past decades. In perceptually based 
responding, a central question has been whether selective attention operates at early or 
late stages in processing. As depicted in Figure 1.2, several functional steps can be 
distinguished when one has to respond to a visual stimulus (e.g., Pashler, 1998; Sanders, 
1998, Styles, 2006). First, even before the stimulus is presented, for some task 
requirements it might be possible to set a kind of cognitive restraint on the stimulus 
processing and activate certain task settings (cf. Altmann, 2003, 2004, 2006). For 
example, imagine a picture-word paradigm where a picture (e.g., a line drawing of a dog) 
is displayed with a word (e.g., CAT) superimposed on it. Depending on the specific task 
instruction (read the word versus name the picture) one could focus on either ignoring the 
picture or the letters. This is the preparation phase, in which control settings might be set 
based on task instructions. Next, when the stimulus appears, the task has to be 
remembered (task maintenance) during the further processing stages. The stimulus is
OUTPUT
Figure 1.2. Global processes involved in stimulus processing.
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perceptually processed in order to identify it (e.g., it is a red rectangle, a picture of a dog, 
the letters C, A, T). Then, depending on the task, a response is selected (e.g., “dog” for 
picture naming, “cat” for word reading). Finally, the accompanying motor response is 
prepared (i.e., the response programming phase), like making an articulatory program for 
overt responses or programming finger movements for button presses.
A very fundamental issue remains a matter of debate. Is selective attention in 
human performance accomplished at a single locus or instead at several distinct loci in 
the perception-to-response chain (cf. Johnston, McCann, & Remington, 1995; Posner & 
Petersen, 1990)? The next two paragraphs expand on these single-locus versus multiple- 
loci accounts of selective attention.
1.2.1 Single locus of attentional control
In the 1950s, psychologists assumed that there had to be one single control process 
operating at only one functional level. When attentional resources were consumed for a 
certain task, selective attention was supposed to be hampered for all other tasks that were 
simultaneously performed, like an early serial computer processor only capable of 
performing one set of computations at a time. Some investigators in the domain of 
human attention supposed that selective attention operates early, that is, in perceptually 
processing the objects for which a reaction was required (see Figure 1.2). In contrast, 
other researchers claimed that selective attention influences late stages, at the level of 
response selection (see Pashler, 1998; Styles, 2006, for reviews).
1.2.2 Multiple levels of attentional control
In the late 1960s, it was proposed that depending on the prevailing circumstances, 
selective attention may be operating early in one task setting and late in another. In 
specific, Broadbent (1970, 1971; Broadbent & Gregory, 1964) made a distinction 
between ‘stimulus set’ and ‘response set’. Stimulus set refers to selection on the basis of 
a perceptual attribute, such as color, shape, or spatial location. Response set refers to 
selection on the basis of the vocabulary of eligible responses, thus at the response 
selection level. After decades of debate about the location of the unified attention control 
process (early vs. late), the notion arose that there might instead be multiple levels on
12
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which the attention system operates, depending on the task requirements. Different 
attentional processes might exert their influence on various temporal stages in the route 
from stimulus identification to response execution. For example, Johnston, McCann, and 
Remington (1995) provided chronometric evidence that two distinct attentional 
processes, ‘input attention’ and ‘central attention’, operate at different temporal stages of 
processing, providing support for the existence of distinct attentional processes.
Before turning to the central research question that underlies this thesis (single 
locus versus multiple loci), the research paradigms employed will be discussed in the 
next section.
1.3 RESEARCH PARADIGMS
Besides the Simon task mentioned earlier, two other conflict-eliciting tasks are frequently 
used to study human attentional control mechanisms: The color-word Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935) and the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). As these tasks are 
repeatedly used in the experiments reported in this dissertation, they will be discussed in 
some detail in the next two paragraphs.
1.3.1 The color-word Stroop task
Stroop (1935) presented lists of either color words or strings of Xs (actually, he used 
swastika), written in various ink colors. The task of the participants was to name the 
colors as quickly and accurately as possible. Stroop observed that responses were much 
faster to the neutral condition (e.g., XXXXX in red ink) than to color words in which the 
ink color did not match the word identity (e.g., BLUE in red ink, the incongruent 
condition). A third condition -  the congruent condition in which the color word did 
correspond to the ink color -  was later added by Dalrymple-Alford and Budayr (1966), 
who were the first researchers presenting a series of individual items instead of printed 
cards with lists. It is a robust finding that color-naming latencies are shorter to such 
congruent stimuli than to neutral and incongruent stimuli. Figure 1.3 shows examples of 
the three conditions and the typical RT pattern observed with these color-word Stroop 
stimuli.
13
RED XXX BLUE
Distractor type
Figure 1.3. Typical RT pattern observed in the color-word Stroop task with congruent, 
neutral, and incongruent stimuli, and a stimulus example for each condition. 
f  = facilitation effect; i = interference effect.
The observed RT difference in naming the ink color of incongruent and congruent 
stimuli is called the Stroop effect. As illustrated in Figure 1.3, it can be divided into two 
components: an interference effect (i.e., the RT difference between the neutral and the 
incongruent condition) and a -  usually smaller -  facilitation effect (the RT difference 
between the neutral and the congruent condition). The Stroop effect is taken as a measure 
of the degree to which attentional control is required. Subsequent research has shown that 
the Stroop effect is even observed when participants were instructed specifically to 
ignore the word as much as possible and solely focus on the ink color, and also that the 
effect remains present after extensive training on the task (see MacLeod, 1991, for a 
detailed overview).
The locus where the Stroop effect originates has been a matter of debate for 
decennia. In the 1970s, the Stroop effect was considered to stem from a difference in the 
level of automaticity of word reading versus color naming. Due to its frequent use, 
reading might have become an automated process which is outside our conscious control. 
Stimuli evoke the tendency to perform tasks habitually associated with them despite a
14
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contrary intention (Monsell, 2003). Thus, even when instructed otherwise, as soon as we 
perceive letters we might start reading them. Since reading is a faster process than color 
naming, the word identity is then processed faster than the ink color and, as a result, in 
the incongruent condition the response selection is initially pushed towards the non-target 
word identity. The occurrence of an asymmetry in Stroop interference (that is, words 
interfere with color naming but ink colors do not interfere with word reading) suggests 
that reading words is indeed more automatic (more obligatory) than is naming colors. In 
fact, the Stroop effect might be regarded as automatic in at least three senses: (1) 
processing of the irrelevant stimulus appears to be involuntary and unavoidable; (2) 
Stroop-like effects can occur even if participants are not aware of the interfering 
stimulus; and (3) the strength of processing of the irrelevant stimulus -  as assessed by the 
magnitude of the Stroop effect -  seems to be adjusted to fit the situation automatically, 
that is, without strategic control (Klapp, 2007). Based on this difference in automaticity, 
the relative-speed-of-processing (or horse race) account proposed that the non-matching 
word information finishes first at the response selection stage and this causes conflict 
there, observed as a delay in response time and more errors compared with a congruent 
stimulus.
Although this serial view on the Stroop effect is intuitively appealing, it turned out 
to be hard to reconcile with later findings. First, the relative-speed-of-processing account 
predicts that when the ink color is presented some hundreds of milliseconds before the 
word onset, the color information should reach the response selection stage earlier than 
the word information and this should result in a reversed Stroop effect (i.e., the color 
interferes with word reading). However, experiments in which the stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA) was manipulated as described above showed that this is not the case 
because a reversed Stroop effect has not been observed (Glaser & Glaser, 1982; Roelofs, 
2010). Second, when the distractor words are written upside-down or backwards, and, 
consequently, word reading is much slower than color naming, nonmatching color words 
still interfere with naming the ink color.
In the 1990s, it was concluded that differences between the incongruent and 
congruent conditions in the Stroop task, had to be related to the attentionally mediated 
selection of cognitive processing between color naming and reading (e.g., Pardo, Pardo,
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Janer, & Raichle, 1990). In line with this idea, Cohen, Dunbar, and McClelland (1990) 
created a parallel distributed processing (‘connectionist’) model of performance in the 
Stroop task, one of the earliest and best known of such models. In their model, 
knowledge is realized as connections and patterns of activation across the units, which 
changes with experience over trials in a continuous, nonlinear fashion. Processing is 
‘bottom-up’, running strictly from input to output. Interference between color and word 
arises when two simultaneously active pathways produce conflicting activation at their 
intersection, whereas facilitation occurs when two pathways produce coinciding 
activation. Attention is realized as the modulation of the operation of processing units 
along a pathway, so that attention is intrinsic to the model, and not an external force 
applied to the model. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, another implemented model of the 
Stroop effect (the WEAVER++ model of Roelofs, 1992, 2003) will be discussed. Such 
models capture the idea that interference arises from the processing of the word and color 
in parallel. Importantly, the models account for the SOA effect.
The Stroop effect is probably the most often cited psychological observation 
(MacLeod, 1992). It elegantly shows that we humans cannot always perfectly restrain our 
attention to the relevant information for the task at hand, but instead tend to process 
irrelevant information to some degree as well. Put differently, the Stroop task indicates 
that attention is, fundamentally, a matter of the control and direction of cognitive 
processing, which is most visible in situations of conflict. Therefore, it proved to be a 
very useful tool in studying the conditions under which human attentional control is 
required (cf. MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000).
1.3.2 The Eriksen flanker task
The Stroop task described above introduced conflict between two different aspects of one 
visual stimulus: (word) identity versus (ink) color. In this section, the flanker task 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) will be described in which the conflict arises between spatial 
positions. In the original task, a letter string of seven characters was displayed on a 
screen. Participants had to respond manually to the identity of the central letter (‘H’ or 
‘S’). This target was surrounded by six identical distractors that could either match the 
target (e.g., HHHHHHH, the congruent condition) or match the alternative target option
16
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(e.g., SSSHSSS, the incongruent condition). Although only the central character is 
needed for response selection, responses are consistently found to be faster to congruent 
stimuli than to incongruent stimuli, as is illustrated in Figure 1.4.
RT
congruent incongruent
Distractor type
HHHHHHH SS S H S SS
Figure 1.4. Typical RT pattern observed in the Eriksen flanker task with congruent and 
incongruent stimuli and a stimulus example for each condition.
Also, in the incongruent condition, substantially more errors are made. This 
flanker effect indicates that, as in the Stroop task, our attentional system is not capable of 
focussing solely on the relevant information. The distractors interfere with the processing 
of the central target, but it is unclear to what extent this interference is caused by 
perceptual factors (i.e., focusing visual attention on a small spatial position) or response 
selection aspects (i.e., in the displayed stimulus, the distractor identity is present more 
often than the target identity, and therefore the response associated with the distractor is 
initially activated stronger than the response associated with the target character). 
Because spatial distance, letter size and shape (and therefore visual acuity) can be 
modified in a systematic manner, this flanker task provides another useful tool for 
studying the selective attention mechanisms underlying human attentional control.
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1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
When studying selective attention processes, two measures are important for establishing 
the amount of hinder that a certain distractor generates in a conflict task. First, 
circumstances with a higher degree of distraction will lead to prolonged responses. 
Second, conditions in which attentional control is required are more error-prone than 
conditions that do not need the involvement of control processes. Thus, comparing the 
response latencies and error percentages between carefully designed task conditions 
provides a method to study the processes involved in selective attention. In the series of 
experiments reported in this thesis, several response modalities were used for the color- 
word Stroop and the Eriksen flanker tasks. Vocal responding was measured using a voice 
key that detects the onset of the participants’ vocal response and manual responses were 
collected by recording presses on a button box. In addition, an eye tracking device was 
used to study the saccadic onset between two simultaneously presented stimuli. In some 
cases (i.e., Chapters 2 and 4), experimental data were compared with computer 
simulations run using the WEAVER++ model (Roelofs, 1992, 2003).
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTION
As was mentioned earlier, although the phenomenon of selective attention has been 
investigated intensively over the past several decades (e.g., Broadbent, 1971; Styles, 
2006; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Yantis & Johnston, 1990), a basic question remained 
unanswered: Is selective attention in human performance accomplished at a single locus 
in the chain from perceptual stimulus processing to response planning and execution, or 
does, instead, selective attention influence processing at multiple loci? This question has 
been the subject of much speculation (cf. Johnston & Dark, 1986, Posner & Petersen, 
1990), but remains controversial. This thesis aims at investigating this issue by studying 
selective attention processes that are presumed to underlie the various stages of 
responding to visual stimuli, both early (i.e., perceptually) and late (at the response 
selection and programming stages, see Figure 1.2).
18
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1.6 OUTLINE OF THESIS
Now that the general topic of attentional control has been outlined, we can proceed to 
give an overview of the rest of this thesis.
Chapter 2 provides a global overview of the literature on control of visual 
attention in Stroop-like tasks. Recent work that examined the attention system in object- 
naming and word-reading tasks will be discussed in relation to the visual domain and 
vocal responding, in particular the dependency of visual orienting on both visual 
processing and verbal response planning. Empirical data are compared to computer 
simulations run using the WEAVER++ model of spoken word production and its 
attentional control (Roelofs, 1992, 2003).
As shown in Figure 1.2, responding to a visual stimulus requires a number of 
steps to be performed. In my view, each of the associated processes needs to be 
monitored carefully and therefore I take the position that human attentional control may 
operate at multiple loci, both early and late in the processing stages. Four series of 
experiments (see Chapters 3-6) were carried out to investigate the underlying attentional 
mechanisms in processing a visual stimulus at different temporal loci. Each chapter can 
be read independently of the other chapters and will briefly be introduced in the next 
paragraphs.
In Chapter 3, a series of Stroop experiments will be discussed in which attention 
is studied at the level of perceptual processing. In particular, the relative merits of three 
explanations are examined for the observation that the Stroop effect diminishes when the 
target ink color is removed from a Stroop stimulus after 100 ms, the La Heij effect (La 
Heij, Van der Heijden, & Plooi, 2001). This early effect of disengagement of attention is 
evoked by the stimulus and lies outside the conscious awareness or deliberate control of 
the participant (i.e., it is an exogenous effect).
Chapter 4 presents another early selective attention effect, but one that is 
endogenous (i.e., not evoked by the stimulus but by internal goals or intensions) rather 
than exogenous. In the literature on attentional control, it has been shown that the amount 
of distractor interference is reduced in the trial following an incongruent stimulus 
(Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Kerns, et al., 2004), the Gratton
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effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). According to the influential conflict- 
monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), this preparation 
effect reflects attentional control adjustments evoked by experienced response conflict on 
incongruent trials. However, evidence from another brain imaging study (Milham et al., 
2001) suggested that attentional control is not always limited to situations in which 
competition is present at the response level. Since previous studies compared only 
incongruent and congruent conditions (thus, without a neutral baseline), it is presently 
unclear to what extent the trial-to-trial adjustments are driven by incongruent rather than 
congruent trials. Therefore, in Chapter 4, I included a neutral condition as well, and 
investigated the adjustments in selective attention with three different approaches: a 
flanker task, a Stroop task and a cue-stimulus paradigm. This way, the dependency of the 
Gratton effect on the actual presence of response conflict can be established.
In Chapter 5, another preparation effect in selective attention is discussed, but this 
time, the effect is hypothesized to be late, namely at the level of response selection. As 
mentioned in section 1.2.2, selective attention may be operating using a stimulus set or a 
response set. In the past few decades, attention research has intensively investigated 
aspects of stimulus set (e.g., Pashler, 1998; Styles, 2006), but response set seems to be 
ignored or its effect is considered to be minimal (e.g., Caramazza & Costa, 2000). Here, I 
tried to establish how response set membership contributes to the Stroop effect. Two 
experiments tested the assumption that participants can improve their performance on a 
Stroop task when the response set is pre-cued on a trial-by-trial basis.
In Chapter 6, a late effect of stimulus processing was investigated using an eye 
tracking device in a dual-task paradigm. In the last decade, neuroimaging studies of 
orienting of attention to visual stimuli have revealed the neural components involved in 
the orchestration of shifts of attention and the different roles that each specific area has 
within this network (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). However, 
a fundamental question about shifting attention remains a matter of debate. Is a gaze shift 
from one stimulus to another determined by response planning aspects for the first 
stimulus or not. Previous experiments using the go/no-go paradigm with manual 
responding (e.g., Sanders 1998) suggest that only perceptual factors are at play, whereas 
evidence from language production studies (e.g., Meyer, Roelofs, & Levelt, 2003;
20
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Roelofs, 2007) indicate that the start of a gaze shift is depending on vocal response 
planning aspects. To investigate this issue, I recorded manual, vocal, and gaze latencies 
in a dual-task and in a go/no-go paradigm.
Chapter 7 summarizes the main results of the experimental chapters and aims at 
putting these in a broader perspective. Finally, Chapter 8 provides the Dutch summary.
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CHAPTER 2
Modelling the Control of Visual Attention in 
Stroop-like Tasks
“The key to growing knowledge is the introduction of higher 
dimensions of consciousness into our awareness.” 
(Lao Tzu, founder of Taoism, 570 BC -  490 BC)
This chapter has been published as:
Roelofs, A., & Lamers, M. (2007). Modelling the control of visual attention in Stroop- 
like tasks. In A. S. Meyer, L. R. Wheeldon & A. Krott (Eds.), Automaticity and Control 
in Language Processing (Advances in behavioural brain sciences) (pp. 123-142). Hove, 
UK: Psychology Press.
Acknowledgements. We thank Glyn Humphreys and Kay Bock for helpful comments. The 
preparation of this article was supported by a VICI grant from the Netherlands Organisation for 
Scientific Research (NWO) to Ardi Roelofs.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
In naming one of several objects in a visual scene or in reading aloud one of several 
words in a text, a speaker has to perform a number of interrelated attentional tasks. The 
first major task is to select one particular object or word for further processing. This 
usually involves moving the gaze to the spatial location of the relevant object or word. 
Objects and words are multidimensional entities. For example, they usually have a colour 
and shape, and they consist of several parts (i.e., written words are made up of letters). 
The second major task is therefore to select the action-relevant dimension, such as the 
shape of the objects and words rather than their colour. For words, responding to the 
shape rather than their colour is the default. Finally, if the objects and words are spatially 
close together, the speaker has to plan and execute the appropriate action in the face of 
distraction by the other objects and words. This constitutes the third major task.
In a number of influential publications, Posner and colleagues (e.g., Posner, 1994; 
Posner & Peterson, 1990; Posner & Raichle, 1994) argued that the three major tasks 
described above are achieved by two different attentional systems. They postulated a 
perceptual attention system that controls the orienting of attention and gaze in order to 
select the appropriate input (the first major task). Moreover, they postulated an executive 
attention system that helps to achieve selective perceptual processing of the target 
dimension (the second major task) and that controls the selection of appropriate actions 
(the third major task). It was hypothesized that the executive system also controls the 
orienting of attention.
According to Posner and colleagues, directing attention from one location to 
another involves disengaging attention from the current location, moving attention to the 
new location of interest, and engaging it there. The disengage, move, and engage 
operations were associated with, respectively, the posterior parietal cortex of the human 
brain, the superior colliculus in the midbrain, and the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus. 
Executive attention was associated with the lateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate 
cortices. It was assumed that the allocation of attention to a spatial location causes 
modulatory changes in extrastriate visual areas involved in the analysis of stimulus 
features. Selection of a dimension is less specified than the allocation of spatial attention
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in Posner’s framework, but one presumes it is achieved through interactions between the 
anterior and posterior attentional networks (e.g., Posner & Raichle, 1994).
In this chapter, we provide an overview of recent work that examined these 
attentional systems in object-naming and word-reading tasks. We restrict ourselves to the 
visual domain and to vocal responding, in particular, the interplay between visual 
attention and vocal responding in Stroop-like tasks such as the classic colour-word Stroop 
task (MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 1935) and various picture-word versions of it (e.g., Glaser 
& Düngelhoff, 1984; Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Lupker, 1979; Smith & Magee, 1980). A 
major way to study attention is to introduce conflict. In the classic colour-word Stroop 
task (Stroop, 1935), participants are asked to name the ink colour of written colour 
words, such as the word RED in blue ink. Results have consistently shown that people 
are much slower in naming the ink colour of incongruent colour words than in naming 
the ink colour of a row of neutral Xs, an effect called Stroop interference, and people are 
fastest when colour and word are congruent (e.g., BLUE in blue ink), an effect called 
Stroop facilitation. The literature documents numerous manipulations of the basic Stroop 
interference and facilitation effects (reviewed by MacLeod, 1991), providing evidence on 
the nature of the attentional control systems.
A theory of attentional control is limited by the theories of the processes that are 
controlled. To know what attentional control does in Stroop-like tasks, it is essential to 
know what the subordinate processes of perception and vocal response planning do in 
these tasks. In the first section, we provide a short overview of a computationally 
implemented theory for vocal responding and its attentional control. The theory provides 
an account of the various processes underlying spoken word production and its relation 
with word and object/colour recognition (Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999; Roelofs, 1992,
1997) and an account of how attention controls word production and perception (Roelofs, 
2003). The theory has been computationally implemented in the WEAVER++ model. In 
the next section, we address the issue of how visual orienting, selective stimulus 
processing, and vocal response planning are related. In particular, is visual orienting 
dependent only on visual processing (e.g., D. E. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; Sanders, 1998) 
or also on verbal response planning? We describe recent work that suggests that visual 
orienting in Stroop-like tasks is jointly determined by visual processing and response
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planning. In the third section, we address the issue of selective perceptual processing in 
Stroop-like tasks. We review the literature on the role of space-based and object-based 
attention and on dimensional selection in the Stroop task. Moreover, we report on 
computer simulations of a paradoxical finding using WEAVER++. In the final section, 
we briefly discuss evidence on the neural correlates of executive attention in Stroop-like 
tasks.
2.2 AN OUTLINE OF WEAVER++
WEAVER++ is a computational model designed to explain how speakers plan and 
control the production of spoken words. The model falls into the general class of 
“hybrid” models of cognition in that it combines a symbolic associative network and 
condition-action rule system with spreading activation and activation-based rule 
triggering. The model plans spoken words by activating, selecting, and connecting 
(weaving together) types of verbal information. The model gives detailed accounts of 
chronometric findings on spoken word production (e.g., Levelt et al., 1999; Roelofs,
1992, 1997). Recently, WEAVER++ has also been applied to neuroimaging data 
(Roelofs & Hagoort, 2002).
In a classic paper, Norman and Shallice (1986) made a distinction between 
“horizontal threads” and “vertical threads” in the control of behaviour. Horizontal threads 
are strands of processing that map perceptions onto actions, and vertical threads are 
attentional influences on these mappings. Behaviour arises from interactions between 
horizontal and vertical threads. WEAVER++ implements specific theoretical claims 
about how the horizontal and vertical threads are woven together in planning verbal 
actions (Roelofs, 2003). A central claim embodied by WEAVER++ is that the control of 
verbal perception and action is achieved symbolically by condition-action rules rather 
than purely associatively (cf. Deacon, 1997; Logan, 1995).
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the problem of the directedness of 
thought, perception, and action was largely ignored. Starting with Aristotle and 
revitalized by Locke, the prevailing theorizing was largely associationistic. A major 
credit for introducing a directional notion into theorizing goes to Ach and Watt of the
27
Würzburg school (Ach, 1905; Watt, 1905), who experimentally investigated the effects of 
the task, or Aufgabe, and they demonstrated its vital importance in determining the course 
of associations (e.g., Mandler & Mandler, 1964). We refer to Humphrey (1951) for a 
thorough and sustained treatment of what the Würzburgers did, why they did it, and how 
they interpreted it.
Watt (1905) presented participants with written nouns and asked them to produce 
partially constrained associations, like producing a superordinate term (e.g., say the 
hyperonym “animal” in response to the word DOG) or a name for a part (e.g., say “tail” 
in response to DOG). Response times were measured. Watt observed that the speed of 
responding was determined independently by the type of task instruction (e.g., naming a 
superordinate vs. naming a part) and the strength of the association between stimulus and 
response given a particular task. For example, if in free word associations, “tail” was 
more frequently given than “neck” in response to DOG, the production latency was 
smaller for “tail” than for “neck” in producing a name of a part in response to DOG.
These findings led Watt to propose that the direction of our thoughts and actions is 
determined by associations among stimuli and goals (Aufgaben), on the one hand, and 
responses, on the other. In the 1910s, this view was firmly integrated within an 
associationist framework and fiercely defended by Müller (1913), whereas Selz (1913) 
held that mental rules rather than associations are critical in mediating between 
stimuli/goals and responses. All current theories are descendants of these ideas.
In the view that currently dominates the attention and performance literature (e.g., 
computationally implemented in GRAIN by Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001), goals associatively bias the activation of one type of response (e.g., colour naming 
in the Stroop task) rather than another (e.g., oral reading), following Müller (1913). 
WEAVER++ implements a third theoretical alternative (considered but rejected by Selz, 
1913), in which both rules and associations play a critical role. WEAVER++'s lexical 
network is accessed by spreading activation while the condition-action rules determine 
what is done with the activated lexical information depending on the task. When a goal 
symbol is placed in working memory, the attention of the system is focused on those 
rules that include the goal among their conditions. These rules ensure that colour naming 
rather than word reading is performed and that the irrelevant perceptual input is
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suppressed (Roelofs, 2003). Both GRAIN (Botvinick et al., 2001) and WEAVER++ have 
been applied to the colour-word Stroop task. Elsewhere (Roelofs, 2003; Roelofs & 
Hagoort, 2002), WEAVER++ is compared in great detail with GRAIN and other 
implemented models of attentional control in the Stroop task. However, to provide such 
detailed model comparisons for the modelling of visual attention in Stroop-like tasks is 
outside the scope of the present chapter.
CONCEPTS
LEMMAS
WORD FORMS
Figure 2.1. Fragment o f the lexical network o f WEAVER++ for colour terms (cf. Roelofs, 2003). 
adj. = adjective.
2
As indicated, to know what attentional control does, it is essential to know what 
the subordinate processes of perception and vocal response planning do. As concerns 
conceptually driven naming (e.g., object naming), the WEAVER++ model distinguishes 
between conceptual preparation, lemma retrieval, and word-form encoding, with the 
encoding of forms further divided into morphological, phonological, and phonetic 
encoding (Levelt et al., 1999). The model assumes that memory is an associative network 
that is accessed by spreading activation. Figure 2.1 illustrates the structure of the 
network. During conceptual preparation, concepts are retrieved from memory and flagged 
as goal concepts. In lemma retrieval, a goal concept is used to retrieve a lemma from 
memory, which is a representation of the syntactic properties of a word, crucial for its use
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in sentences. For example, the lemma of the word blue says that it can be used as an 
adjective. Lemma retrieval makes these properties available for syntactic encoding 
processes. In word-form encoding, the lemma is used to retrieve the morphophonological 
properties of the word from memory in order to construct an appropriate articulatory 
program. For example, for blue, the morpheme <blue> and the speech segments /b/, /l/, 
and /u:/ are retrieved, and a phonetic plan for [blu:] is generated. Finally, articulation 
processes execute the motor program, which yields overt speech. Perceived words (e.g., 
BLUE) may be read aloud by selecting a lemma (blue) and then encoding the 
corresponding word form (i.e., [blu:]) or by directly encoding a word form without first 
selecting a lemma (see Figure 2.1).
Let us assume that a participant in a colour-word Stroop experiment has to name 
the ink colour of the word RED in blue ink. This involves the conceptual identification of 
the colour based on the perceptual input and its designation as goal concept (i.e., 
BLUE(X)), the retrieval of the lemma of the corresponding word (i.e., blue), and the 
encoding of the form of the word (i.e., [blu:]). The final result is a motor program for the 
word “blue”, which can be articulated. Perceived words activate their lemmas and word 
forms in parallel.
It has been shown that WEAVER++ successfully simulates several classic data 
sets on Stroop, mostly taken from the review by MacLeod (1991), including response set, 
semantic gradient, stimulus, spatial, multiple task, manual, bilingual, training, age, and 
pathological effects (Roelofs, 2003). With only three free parameters taking two values 
each to accommodate task differences (colour naming, picture naming, word reading, and 
manual responding), the model accounted for 96% of the variance of 16 classic studies 
(250 data points). Moreover, WEAVER++ successfully simulated the human brain's 
blood-flow response during Stroop task performance in neuroimaging studies; in 
particular, thefunctional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) BOLD response in the 
anterior cingulate cortex, one of the classic brain areas involved with Stroop task 
performance (Roelofs & Hagoort, 2002).
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2.3 VISUAL ORIENTING
Visual acuity is best at the centre of eye fixation. By 5° from the centre, acuity has 
diminished about 50%. Therefore, to bring aspects of the visual world into the focus of 
attention, eye fixations are directed to those visual aspects that are of most interest. This 
makes a shift of gaze an overt sign of the allocation of attention (e.g., Kustov & 
Robinson, 1996), although attention and eye movements can be dissociated in simple 
signal detection tasks (e.g., Posner, 1980).
Over the past few decades, the control of eye movements has been intensively 
investigated for visual search and other cognitive tasks, such as problem solving, typing, 
and reading for comprehension. We refer to Rayner (1998) for an extensive review of the 
literature. However, the control of eye movements during the production of spoken words 
has only recently become a topic of interest. Whereas it has long been assumed that we 
look at aspects of the visual world just as long as is needed to identify them and that 
response factors play no role (D. E. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; Sanders, 1998), recent 
research suggests that when we want to respond vocally to the visual aspects, the gaze 
durations depend on the time to plan the corresponding words (e.g., Griffin, 2001; A. S. 
Meyer, Sleiderink, & Levelt, 1998). For example, when speakers are asked to name two 
objects in a row, they look longer at first-to-be-named objects with two- than with one- 
syllable names even when the object-recognition times do not differ (A. S. Meyer, 
Roelofs, & Levelt, 2003). The effect of the number of syllables suggests that the shift of 
gaze from one object to another is initiated only after the phonological form of the object 
name has been encoded.
In terms of the theory of Posner and colleagues, the effect of the number of 
syllables suggests that the endogenous visual orienting of attention is determined by 
response factors. This does not exclude, however, a role for factors related to visual 
processing. In order to examine the interplay between visual orienting, selective visual 
processing, and vocal response selection, we performed a series of Stroop-like 
experiments (Roelofs, 2007). The experiments examined what the trigger is for moving 
the eyes from fixated stimuli that cause more vs. less interference for vocal responding.
In all experiments, picture-word versions of the Stroop task were used. Instead of naming
31
colour patches with superimposed colour words, participants responded to pictured 
objects with superimposed distractor words.
Earlier research demonstrated that reading the word or naming the picture of a 
picture-word stimulus replicates the response time patterns known from colour-word 
Stroop experiments (e.g., Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984; Glaser & Glaser, 1989; see 
Roelofs, 2003, for a review). This suggests that the colour of a colour-word Stroop 
stimulus is the limiting case of a picture. As with colour-word stimuli, WEAVER++ 
assumes that pictures have direct access to concepts, whereas words have direct access to 
lemmas and word forms (see Figure 2.1).
In the eye-tracking experiments, speakers were presented with picture-word 
stimuli displayed on the left side of a computer screen and left- or right-pointing arrows 
(flanked by Xs on each side: XX<XX or XX>XX) displayed on the right side of the 
screen. Figure 2.2 illustrates the visual displays that were used in the experiments.
Figure 2.2. Illustration of the visual displays used in the eye tracking experiments.
The picture-word stimuli and the arrow were presented simultaneously on the 
screen. The participants’ task was to respond vocally to the picture-word stimulus, and to 
shift their gaze to the arrow stimulus in order to indicate the direction in which the arrow 
was pointing by pressing a left or right button. Eye movements were recorded. In 
particular, it was measured how long participants looked at a picture-word stimulus 
before they moved their gaze to the arrow. The manual task involving the arrow stimuli 
was given in order to be able to assess the gaze durations for the picture-word stimuli. 
Moreover, it is possible that the eyes remain fixated on the left picture-word stimulus 
while attention is covertly moved to the right side of the screen to allow processing of the
xx<xx
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arrows before a gaze shift. If this were the case, the gaze durations would not reflect the 
attention given to the left object. However, when the manual response latencies parallel 
the gaze durations (i.e., when the differences among the gaze durations are preserved by 
the manual response latencies), this would be evidence that preprocessing of the arrow 
has not taken place and that the shift of gaze corresponds to a shift of attention.
The experiments were run using three basic tasks used within the picture-word 
interference paradigm (e.g., Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984; Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Lupker, 
1979; Smith & Magee, 1980): picture naming, word reading, and word categorizing. 
These tasks were performed in the context of written distractor words (picture naming) or 
distractor pictures (word reading and categorizing). In all experiments, vocal response 
latencies, gaze durations, and manual response latencies were measured. The picture- 
word stimuli had varying types of relatedness between picture and word: semantic, 
unrelated, identical, and control. For example, participants said “swan” in response to a 
pictured swan (picture naming), while trying to ignore the word DOG (the semantic 
condition), the word VEST (the unrelated condition), the word SWAN (the identical 
condition), or a series of Xs (the control condition). The word-reading experiment used 
displays that were identical to those used for picture naming except for the control 
condition. The string of Xs of the control condition in picture naming was replaced by an 
empty rectangle (cf. Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984). The task for the participants was to 
read aloud the word while ignoring the picture and then to respond to the arrows, as in the 
picture-naming experiment. Finally, the word-categorizing experiment used the same 
displays as the word-reading experiment, while the vocal task was changed from word 
naming to word categorizing. That is, participants responded to the written words by 
categorizing them (i.e., producing hyperonyms) while trying to ignore the picture 
distractors. For example, they said “animal” in response to the word DOG, while trying 
to ignore the pictured swan (semantic), the pictured vest (unrelated), the pictured dog 
(identical), or the empty rectangle (control).
Previous research (e.g., Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984; Glaser & Glaser, 1989; 
Lupker, 1979; Smith & Magee, 1980) showed that participants are slower in naming a 
picture with an incongruent word superimposed (e.g., saying “swan” to a pictured swan 
with the written word DOG superimposed) than in naming the picture with a series of Xs
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superimposed in the control condition. Furthermore, participants are faster than control 
when picture and word agree in the congruent condition (e.g., saying “swan” to a pictured 
swan with the identical word SWAN superimposed). This corresponds to what is 
obtained with the colour-word Stroop task (e.g., MacLeod, 1991), where speakers are 
slower in naming a colour patch with an incongruent colour word superimposed (e.g., the 
word RED superimposed onto a blue patch of colour) than in naming a colour patch with 
a row of neutral Xs, and speakers are fastest when colour patch and word are congruent 
(e.g., the word BLUE superimposed onto a blue colour patch). In addition, a semantic 
effect is obtained with picture-word stimuli. Participants are slower in naming a picture 
(e.g., saying “swan” to a pictured swan) with a semantically related word superimposed 
(e.g., DOG) than with an unrelated word (e.g., VEST). When the task is to read aloud the 
words and to ignore the pictures, there is no interference from incongruent pictures or 
facilitation from congruent pictures relative to control, and there is also no semantic 
effect (e.g., Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984). However, when the words have to be 
categorized (e.g., saying “animal” to the word DOG), the response latencies with picture 
distractors are shorter in the semantic than in the unrelated condition, whereas the 
latencies in the semantic, identical, and control conditions do not differ (e.g., Glaser & 
Düngelhoff, 1984). The semantic, incongruency, and congruency effects were 
computationally modelled with WEAVER++ by Roelofs (Levelt et al., 1999; Roelofs, 
1992, 2003).
The results for the vocal response latencies in our eye-tracking experiments 
replicated earlier findings in the literature (e.g., Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984; Lupker,
1979; Roelofs, 2003; Smith & Magee, 1980). The gaze durations generally paralleled the 
vocal response latencies, but not always. This indicates that the signal to move the eyes is 
not simply the completion of the planning of the vocal response. The manual response 
latencies always paralleled the gaze durations, suggesting that the gaze shifts indexed 
attention shifts in the experiments.
Picture naming was slowed by semantically related compared to unrelated word 
distractors, whereas naming was facilitated by identical relative to control distractors.
The gaze durations and the manual response latencies closely followed this pattern. These 
results suggest that the response planning latency is a major determinant of gaze shift,
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unlike what has been previously suggested (D. E. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; Sanders,
1998). Why do the results implicate response planning (i.e., word planning including 
phonological encoding), as opposed to lemma retrieval or any other stage? It is generally 
assumed that Stroop-like effects reflect response selection processes (e.g., MacLeod, 
1991; Roelofs, 2003). Thus, given that the distractor effects on the naming latencies were 
reflected in the gaze durations for the pictures, gaze shifts must have been triggered after 
response selection (i.e., lemma retrieval in WEAVER++). Moreover, earlier research 
(e.g., A. S. Meyer et al., 2003) and (yet) unpublished picture-word interference 
experiments with written distractor words from our own laboratory showed that 
phonological effects in picture naming are reflected in the gaze durations. This suggests 
that gaze shifts are dependent on the completion of phonological encoding. To conclude, 
the results suggest that response-planning latencies are a major determinant of gaze shifts 
in picture naming.
In reading aloud the words while ignoring the pictures, participants moved their 
eyes from words with rectangles around them sooner than they moved their eyes from 
words with actual pictures around them, even though the vocal response latencies did not 
differ among conditions (see upper panel of Figure 2.3). This suggests an independent 
role for lower-level stimulus-related factors in determining the gaze shift. The data 
suggest that the actual pictures held the attention of the participants longer (in spite of 
their task irrelevance) than the rectangles, and so speakers could move their eyes away 
sooner with the rectangles. To conclude, Stroop-like stimuli appear to have attentional 
effects on reading that are reflected in the eye fixation durations but not in the vocal 
reading latencies.
In categorizing the word while ignoring the pictures (e.g., saying “animal” to the word 
DOG), vocal responding was slowed by unrelated picture distractors relative to the other 
distractors, and the gaze durations followed this pattern. Relative to the control condition, 
the effect of response-incongruent distractors (e.g., the unrelated picture of a vest 
activating the incongruent response “clothing”) and congruent distractors (e.g., the 
picture of a dog activating the response “animal”) was now the same for the vocal 
responses and the gaze durations. This is different from what was observed for reading 
the words. It seems that when the attentional demands of the task are high, as with word
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Figure 2.3. Mean effect sizes o f the semantic, unrelated, and identical distractors relative to 
the control stimuli for the vocal responses and gaze shifts in word reading (upper 
panel) and word categorizing (lower panel) obtained by Roelofs (2007). The 
error bars indicate the standard error o f the mean.
categorizing compared with word reading, the difference in effect between actual pictures 
and rectangles in determining the shift of gaze disappears. However, with word 
categorizing, the difference in effect between semantically related and unrelated pictures 
was much smaller for the gaze shifts than for the vocal responses (see the lower panel of 
Figure 2.3). Participants fixated the picture-word stimuli in the semantic condition much 
longer than to be expected on the basis of the vocal categorizing latencies. The difference 
in semantic effect between the gaze shifts and vocal responses again suggests that the 
signal to move the eyes is not simply a flag that the planning of the vocal response is 
completed. Rather, the dissociation implies an independent role for semantic factors. The
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data suggest that the picture-word stimuli held the attention of the participants longer in 
the semantic than in the unrelated condition, and so speakers could move their eyes away 
only later in the semantic condition. To conclude, Stroop-like stimuli appear to have 
attentional effects on word categorizing that are reflected in the eye fixation durations, 
but not in the vocal categorizing latencies.
OVERT SPEEC H
Figure 2.4. A model for the orienting o f attention and gaze in the picture-word interference 
paradigm.
The findings from the experiments support the following model of the orienting of 
attention and gaze in Stroop-like tasks (Figure 2.4). The model assumes that gaze shifts
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and attention shifts are closely related in Stroop-like tasks. An attention shift issues a 
gaze shift command to the saccadic gaze control system, which executes the saccade 
(e.g., Van Opstal, 2002). The critical assumption for explaining the described findings is 
that the decision to shift attention is based on input from both perception/conceptualizing 
and response planning, whereby the former biases only for an attention shift (i.e., lowers 
or heightens the threshold) and the latter actually triggers the shift (i.e., leads to an actual 
exceeding of the threshold). The findings suggest that a rectangle lowers the threshold for 
an attention shift relative to actual pictures in reading words. Consequently, gaze 
durations are shorter for rectangles than actual pictures, even when the word-reading 
latencies do not differ. The findings also suggest that semantically related pictures as 
distractors may heighten the threshold relative to other pictures and rectangles in word 
categorizing. Consequently, semantically related pictures are looked at longer than is to 
be expected on the basis of the vocal categorizing latencies. Therefore, the difference in 
effect between semantically related and unrelated pictures is smaller for the gaze shifts 
than for the vocal responses. Moreover, gaze durations are longer for semantically related 
than identical pictures and rectangles, even though the word-categorizing latencies do not 
differ.
To conclude, our findings suggest that the time it takes to prepare a vocal 
response is a major determinant of gaze shifts in Stroop-like tasks. However, the finding 
that the distractor effects on the gaze shifts and the vocal responding may dissociate 
suggests that the signal to move the eyes is not simply the completion of the planning of 
the vocal response. Instead, the shift of gaze is independently determined by stimulus- 
related factors. In all experiments, the distractor effects on the gaze shifts were 
propagated into the manual responses, indicating that gaze shifts index attention shifts in 
Stroop-like tasks.
2.4 SELECTIVE STIMULUS PROCESSING
In visual orienting, preattentive processes provide a map of spatial locations through 
which attention moves (i.e., from the location of the picture-word stimulus to the location 
of the arrow). In naming one of several objects in a visual scene or in reading aloud one
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of several words in a text, visual orienting may help to separate the target in one location 
from irrelevant distractors in other locations. However, selecting a spatial location does 
not separate the target and distractor in the Stroop task, because the word and colour are 
spatially integrated in a classic Stroop stimulus. Object-based attention does not help 
either. In object-based attention, preattentive processes segment the visual scene into 
figures and ground, whereby attention selects one of the figures for further processing 
(e.g., Kanwisher & Wojciulik, 2000). Object-based attention does not help to separate the 
word from the colour word in the Stroop task, because evidence for this type of attention 
suggests activation enhancement for all information within the spatial boundaries of the 
object. Rather than separating the word from the colour, space-based and object-based 
attention lead to a “Trojan horse effect” in the Stroop task (cf. Kahneman & Henik, 1981; 
Neumann, 1986). According to legend, the Greeks won the Trojan War by hiding in a 
huge, hollow, wooden horse to sneak into the fortified city of Troy. By attending the ink 
colour of a Stroop colour-word stimulus, the colour word also receives attention and 
sneaks into the word-production system. This is also evident from manipulations that 
increase the spatial distance between a colour patch and colour word and that make the 
colour and word part of different objects.
It has been shown that increasing the spatial distance between a colour patch and 
colour word reduces Stroop interference. Gatti and Egeth (1978) increased the spatial 
distance between colour and word from 1° to 5° and observed that interference 
diminished from 90 to 40 ms. Merikle and Gorewich (1979) observed no decrease of 
Stroop interference with increasing distance from 0.5° to 2.5° when letter size was 
increased to compensate for acuity loss. Brown, Gore, and Carr (2002) presented colour 
patches and words at different locations. Before stimulus onset, the location of either the 
colour patch or the word was cued. Manipulation of the locus of attention modulated the 
magnitude of Stroop interference. Stroop interference was larger when the locations of 
the colour and word were close together than when they were far apart (e.g., 13°) and 
attention was drawn to the location of the colour patch. To conclude, the manipulations of 
the spatial distance between colour and word show that increasing the distance reduces 
but does not eliminate Stroop interference. This supports the idea that the spatial
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integration of the colour and word in the classic Stroop stimulus leads to a Trojan horse 
effect.
It has been observed that making the colour and the word part of different objects 
also reduces Stroop interference. Kahneman and Henik (1981) presented colour-word 
Stroop stimuli and coloured colour-neutral words in a circle and square that were about 
9° apart on the screen. The task was to name the colour of the word in the circle, which 
could be the colour word or the neutral word. Stroop interference was much larger when 
the colour-word Stroop stimulus was part of the relevant object (the circle) than when it 
was not. Van der Heijden, Hagenaar, and Bloem (1984) replicated this result with a much 
smaller spatial distance between the objects (about 1°). In the experiments of Kahneman 
and Henik (1981) and Van der Heijden et al. (1984), object membership and spatial 
distance are confounded. Wuhr and Waszak (2003) controlled for spatial distance by 
having participants name the colour of one of two partly overlapping objects and ignore 
colour words that appeared in the relevant object, in the irrelevant object, or in the 
background. Words produced much larger Stroop interference in the relevant object than 
in the irrelevant object or background. Irrelevant objects and background did not differ in 
the magnitude of interference produced. To conclude, the manipulations of object 
membership suggest that Stroop interference is greater when the colour and incongruent 
word are part of the same object than when they are not. This supports the idea that the 
integration of the colour and word into one object in the classic Stroop stimulus leads to a 
Trojan horse effect.
Space-based and object-based attention lead to the selection of a location or object 
that contains the relevant information for performing the task, the colour-word stimulus 
in the Stroop task. Next, attention needs to be engaged to the task-relevant stimulus 
dimension (the colour) and disengaged from the irrelevant dimension (the word). In 
WEAVER++, this is achieved by a condition-action rule that blocks out the irrelevant 
input depending on the task. Consequently, the system receives perceptual input much 
longer for the relevant than for the irrelevant stimulus dimension.
Whereas the onset of an event (e.g., a flash of light or the appearance of an object 
or word) often attracts attention, the offset of a significant event may lead to a 
disengagement of attention. La Heij, Van der Heijden, and Plooij (2001) reported the
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paradoxical finding that an early removal of the Stroop stimulus from the screen reduces 
rather than increases Stroop interference. The interference was larger when the colour- 
word Stroop stimulus stayed on the screen until the response was made (the “continuous” 
condition) than when the stimulus was presented only briefly (the “short” condition) or 
the colour was replaced by neutral white colour after 120 ms (the “replaced” condition). 
This suggests that an early offset helped to disengage the space-based or object-based 
attention to the Stroop stimulus, thereby reducing Stroop interference. Interestingly, when 
the colour was replaced by neutral white after 120 ms while the word stayed on the 
screen until the response (the replaced condition), the Stroop interference was even less 
than when both colour and word were presented briefly (the short condition). This 
suggests that a temporal segregation of colour and word helps to disengage attention from 
the irrelevant dimension.
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Figure 2.5 The paradoxical colour duration effect in the Stroop task: Real data (means
across experiments; La Heij et al., 2001) and WEAVER++ simulation results.
2
0
41
In order to provide some form of test of this theoretical analysis (“a proof of 
principle”), we tested the effect of early stimulus offset in computer simulations with the 
WEAVER++ model. The simulations showed that the model correctly produced the 
paradoxical result. Reducing the duration of both colour and word input in the model 
reduced the magnitude of Stroop interference, as shown in Figure 2.5. The simulation of 
the continuous condition followed Roelofs (2003). Colour input was provided to the 
lexical network until response, whereas word input was given for 100 ms. The processes 
of colour and word perception were not included in the simulation. The duration of these 
processes is estimated to be around 100-125 ms (Roelofs, 2003). This means that 
attention disengaged around 200-225 ms after stimulus onset in the model. This 
corresponds to estimates of attention to colour between 150 and 350 ms after stimulus 
onset (e.g., Hillyard, Mangun, Woldorff, & Luck, 1995). In the replaced condition, the 
durations of both the colour and word input were set at 75 ms. This implies that attention 
in this condition disengaged early, namely, around 175-200 ms after stimulus onset.
2.5 NEURAL CORRELATES OF EXECUTIVE ATTENTION
Neuroimaging studies have revealed that colour-word Stroop performance engages the 
anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices for attentional control, the left 
lingual gyrus for colour processing, the left extrastriate cortex for visual word-form 
processing, and the left-perisylvian language areas, including the areas of Broca 
(posterior inferior frontal) and Wernicke (posterior superior temporal), for word planning 
(see Roelofs and Hagoort (2002) for a review). Much evidence suggests that the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex serves to maintain the goals in working memory (e.g., 
Miller, 2000). Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) involvement in attentional control agrees 
with the idea that attention is the principal link between cognition and motivation. For 
action control, it is not enough to have goals in working memory, but one should also be 
motivated to attain them. Extensive projections from the thalamus and brainstem nuclei 
to the anterior cingulate suggest a role for drive and arousal. Extensive reciprocal 
connections between the anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex suggest a 
role for working memory. The motor areas of the cingulate sulcus densely project to the
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spinal cord and motor cortex, which suggests a role of the anterior cingulate in motor 
control. Paus (2001) argued that the cingulate motor areas contain subregions controlling 
vocal responses, manual responses, and eye movements. However, based on a meta­
analysis of the existing literature and the results from a new neuroimaging experiment, 
Barch, Braver, Akbudak, Conturo, Ollinger, and Snyder (2001) argued that response 
conflict activates the rostral cingulate zone regardless of response modality (spoken, 
manual).
Previous neuroimaging studies showed that the presence of conflicting response 
alternatives increases ACC activity, indicating that the ACC is involved in attentional 
control. However, the exact nature of the ACC function is still under debate. The 
prevailing conflict detection hypothesis maintains that the ACC is involved in 
performance monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2001). According to this view, ACC activity 
reflects the detection of response conflict and acts as a signal that engages regulative 
processes subserved by lateral prefrontal brain regions. According to an alternative view, 
the ACC plays a role in regulation itself. For example, the ACC may be involved in the 
top-down regulation of response selection processes (e.g., Holroyd & Coles, 2001;
Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998, 2000; Posner & Raichle, 1994). Roelofs and Hagoort (2002) 
implemented a version of the regulative hypothesis about ACC function in WEAVER++. 
They showed that the model did a good job in fitting data on ACC activity derived during 
Stroop task performance.
It should be noted that assumptions about neural correlates (e.g., ACC function) 
are not a necessary part of functional models like GRAIN and WEAVER++. For 
example, it is not critical to the operation of WEAVER++ that the ACC be involved in 
regulation, and not in conflict detection. In order to apply a functional model like 
WEAVER++ to neuroimaging findings, new assumptions need to be made about how 
functional aspects of the model map onto aspects of brain functioning. Thus, models like 
WEAVER++ may be used to formalize hypotheses about brain function, but assumptions 
about neural correlates are not a necessary part of the model (see Roelofs (2005) for an 
extensive discussion).
To test between the conflict-detection and regulative hypotheses about ACC 
function, Roelofs, Van Turennout, and Coles (2006) conducted an fMRI experiment. A
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critical prediction made by the conflict-detection hypothesis is that ACC activity should 
be increased only when conflicting response alternatives are present (e.g., the word RED 
in blue ink). ACC activity should not differ between congruent trials (e.g., the word 
BLUE in blue) and neutral trials (e.g., XXX in blue), because competing response 
alternatives are absent on both trial types. In contrast, the regulative hypothesis predicts 
not only more ACC activity on incongruent than on neutral trials, but also less ACC 
activity on congruent than on neutral trials. More ACC activity is predicted for 
incongruent than for neutral trials, because more top-down regulation is required for 
incongruent than for congruent stimuli. Less ACC activity is predicted for congruent than 
for neutral trials, because the correct response is already activated by the distractor on 
congruent trials and therefore less regulation is required.
Participants were scanned while performing a manual arrow-word version of the 
Stroop task (e.g., Baldo, Shimamura, & Prinzmetal, 1998), in which they were presented 
with arrow-word combinations. The arrows were pointing to the left or right, and the 
words were LEFT or RIGHT. The participants indicated by a left or right button press the 
direction denoted by the word (word task) or arrow (arrow task). Trials were blocked by 
task. On incongruent trials, the word and the arrow designated opposite responses. On 
congruent trials, the word and arrow designated the same response. On neutral trials in 
the word task, a word was presented in combination with a straight line, so only one 
response was designated by the stimulus. On neutral trials in the arrow task, an arrow was 
presented in combination with a row of Xs; therefore, on these trials also only one 
response was designated by the stimulus. Congruent, incongruent, and neutral trials were 
presented rapidly, in a randomly intermixed order to prevent participants from 
anticipating and changing strategies for the different event types.
Reaction-time data showed that, consistent with earlier findings, responses to 
words were much slower on incongruent than on neutral trials, and fastest on congruent 
trials. Responses to arrows were only slightly slower on incongruent than on neutral and 
congruent trials, while no difference between neutral and congruent trials was obtained. 
FMRI data demonstrated that activity in the ACC was larger on incongruent than on 
congruent trials when participants responded to the words. Importantly, ACC responses 
were larger for neutral than for congruent stimuli, in the absence of response conflict.
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This result demonstrates that the ACC plays a role in regulation itself. WEAVER++ 
simulations, instantiating a version of the regulative hypothesis, showed that the model 
accounted for the empirical findings concerning response latencies and ACC activity. 2
2.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We discussed the issue of how visual orienting, selective stimulus processing, and vocal 
response planning are related in Stroop-like tasks. The evidence suggests that visual 
orienting is dependent on both visual processing and verbal response planning. We also 
discussed the issue of selective perceptual processing in Stroop-like tasks. The evidence 
suggests that space-based and object-based attention lead to a Trojan horse effect in the 
classic Stroop task, which can be moderated by increasing the spatial distance between 
colour and word and by making colour and word part of different objects. Reducing the 
presentation duration of the colour-word stimulus or the duration of either the colour or 
word dimension reduces Stroop interference. This paradoxical finding was correctly 
simulated by the WEAVER++ model. Finally, we discussed evidence on the neural 
correlates of executive attention, particularly the ACC. The evidence suggests that the 
ACC plays a role in regulation itself rather than only signalling the need for regulation.
45

CHAPTER 3
Role of Gestalt Grouping in Selective Attention: 
Evidence from the Stroop Task
“All you have to decide is what to do with the little time that is given to you.” 
(Gandalf the Grey in Lord of the Rings, J.R.R. Tolkien, 1954)
This chapter has been published as:
Lamers, M.J.M., & Roelofs, A. (2007). Role of Gestalt grouping in selective attention: 
Evidence from the Stroop task. Perception & Psychophysics, 69, 1305-1314.
3.1 ABSTRACT
Selective attention has been intensively studied using the Stroop task. Evidence suggests 
that Stroop interference in a color-naming task arises partly because of visual attention 
sharing between color and word: Removing the target color after 150 ms reduces 
interference (Neumann, 1986). Moreover, removing both the color and the word 
simultaneously reduces interference less than does removing the color only (La Heij, Van 
der Heijden, & Plooij, 2001). These findings could also be attributed to Gestalt grouping 
principles, such as common fate. We report three experiments in which the role of Gestalt 
grouping was further investigated. Experiment 1 replicated the reduced interference, 
using words and color patches. In Experiment 2, the color patch was not removed but 
only repositioned (< 2°) after 100 ms, which also reduced interference. In Experiment 3, 
tthhee ddiissttrraaccttoorr wwaass rreeppoossiittiioonneedd wwhhiillee tthhee taarrggeet rreemmaainneedd sstaatioonnaarryy, aaggaainn rreedduuccinngg 
interference. These results indicate a role for Gestalt grouping in selective attention.
Acknowledgements. The preparation o f this article was supported by a VICI grant from the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) to A.R. We thank Jos Olders for his 
help in collecting the data and Eliane Segers, Wido La Heij, and two anonymous reviewers for 
helpful comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.
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3.2 INTRODUCTION
To have control over our actions, our interactions with the external world require 
mechanisms that selectively designate part of the available sensory information. The fact 
that humans detect and identify visual objects that are not relevant for a task at hand, or 
that even disturb the processing of a target object, indicates that selective attention does 
not work perfectly. Previous research has often used the color-word Stroop task to study 
the way in which control is exerted and under what conditions control fails. In seminal 
experiments, Stroop (1935) showed participants cards with color words printed in 
different ink colors and cards with colored patches. When the participants named the 
colors, they had more difficulty in naming incongruent stimuli (e.g., saying “green” to the 
word RED in green ink) than in naming neutral stimuli (e.g., saying “green” to the patch 
of green). The response latencies were longer and more errors were made when the color 
and the word information did not match than in the neutral condition. This finding that 
the word input involuntarily interferes with naming the color is very robust and has been 
repeated numerous times (see MacLeod, 1991, for a review of the Stroop literature). The 
Stroop effect demonstrates that irrelevant information may influence selective attention 
mechanisms.
In the last 2 decades, variants of the standard Stroop task have been used to study 
the effects of varied exposure durations of target and distractor on selective attention 
mechanisms. Can separating object attributes, such as color and shape, in time help us 
ignore irrelevant aspects of a visual scene? This issue is addressed in the present article. 
First, we will summarize previous research on temporal segregation of target and 
distractor and will discuss different explanations for the major findings. Then, we will 
present three experiments that were designed to assess the relative merits of the different 
explanations. Finally, in the General Discussion section, we will consider the theoretical 
implications of our results.
In a seminal unpublished study, Neumann (1986) found that when a to-be-named 
color bar was removed shortly (i.e., 150 ms) after the onset of a color-word Stroop 
stimulus, the interference effect in naming the color was reduced. This seems 
counterintuitive: Although only the distractor word remained in the display, responses
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exhibited less interference from it, as compared with the more standard situation in which 
both the target and the distractor stayed present until response. Thus, removing the target 
from the screen helps people ignore irrelevant information.
In a series of experiments investigating color-color interference, La Heij, Kaptein, 
Kalff, and de Lange (1995) found similar, albeit somewhat contrary, results with regard 
to the reduced interference effect. They used a variation of the flanker task (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974), in which a target color bar presented at fixation point was enclosed by 
color bar distractors immediately to the left and right of the target. In the incongruent 
condition, the flanker colors were taken from the set of target colors, whereas in the 
control condition these distractors were white, which was never a target color. The first 
experiment showed a color-color interference effect for the incongruent stimuli, relative 
to neutral stimuli. In the next experiment, the target color was changed to white 160 ms 
after stimulus onset. The color change reduced the amount of color-color interference. In 
the last experiment, the target was completely removed from the screen 160 ms after 
stimulus onset. The color removal did not lead to a reduction in color-color interference, 
in contrast to the results of Neumann (1986).
Using color-word Stroop stimuli with words and color bars spatially separated, La 
Heij, van der Heijden, and Plooij (2001) found that in a color-naming task, the Stroop 
interference effect decreased when a target color bar was removed 120 ms after stimulus 
onset. The same applied to a situation in which the target color was changed to white 
after this exposure duration. In their second experiment, La Heij et al. (2001) showed that 
reducing the exposure duration of the color per se was not sufficient to obtain a reduction 
in interference. Stroop interference was larger when the distractor word and the color bar 
were removed simultaneously after a short delay than when the exposure duration of the 
color was not altered and only the distractor was removed after 120 ms. Their next two 
experiments used words written in an ink color -  henceforth, integral Stroop stimuli, 
having identical spatial positions for the color and the word. Although, with this kind of 
stimuli, attention cannot be attracted to the former position of the color (and away from 
the distractor) by the color offset, the results of these experiments showed that changing 
the color to white still reduced the magnitude of interference. The last two experiments of 
La Heij et al. (2001) compared Stroop interference in a situation in which both the target
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and the distractor were simultaneously removed after a short duration (the short 
condition) and a situation in which the target color was changed to white after the same 
duration (the color-replaced condition). A larger amount of interference was obtained in 
the short condition than in the color-replaced condition. Moreover, the interference in the 
short condition was less than in a condition in which the color and the word remained 
present until response (the continuous condition).
To summarize, the evidence suggests that removing or replacing the color of a 
color-word Stroop stimulus shortly after stimulus onset reduces interference. Removing 
both color and word simultaneously reduces interference less than does removing the 
color only.
Why do people experience less interference from a word distractor in a color- 
naming task when the to-be-named color target is removed from the display shortly after 
onset? We will discuss three alternative accounts for this paradoxical exposure duration 
effect, which stress the importance of (1) the increased spatial selectivity of input 
selection, (2) the reduced duration of input selection, or (3) the facilitation of attribute 
selection on the basis of Gestalt grouping principles.
3.2.1 Increased spatial selectivity of input selection
Both Neumann (1986) and La Heij et al. (1995) argued that when the target color is 
removed from a display with spatially separated targets and distractors, this abrupt color 
offset might draw attention toward the former spatial position of the target and away from 
the distractor word. In this way, the interference from a word would be reduced by 
redirecting the attentional spotlight (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Glaser & Glaser, 1982; 
Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) to another location. 
However, La Heij et al. (2001) found also a reduction in the interference effect with 
integral Stroop stimuli. Because the target and the distractor then occupy identical spatial 
positions, the obtained reduction in interference with these stimuli obviously cannot be 
explained in terms of relative spatial selectivity of input selection.
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3.2.2 Duration of input selection
Neumann (1986) proposed that a word’s interfering power depends on the amount of 
attention directed to the target color. In the case of integral color-word Stroop stimuli or 
the color-color flanker stimuli used by La Heij et al. (1995), the target and the distractor 
are positioned very close to each other in space. Neumann argued that the inability of the 
participants to focus attention solely on the target color is the critical factor that is 
responsible for the processing of the distractor up to the stage where interference is 
located. In other words, when the target and the distractor are physically located close to 
each other, as long as attention is focused on the target color, the interfering distractor 
input is also being processed unintentionally (we termed this the Trojan horse effect; see 
Roelofs & Lamers, 2007). This results in slower responses for incongruent stimuli than 
for neutral stimuli. However, as soon as the target color is removed from the display, the 
amount of attention directed to this target diminishes rapidly. Such a terminated input 
selection ends the parasitic attention sharing between the target and the distractor and, 
thus, reduces the Stroop interference. In the remainder of this article, we will refer to this 
account as the duration explanation.
The last two experiments of La Heij et al. (2001) provided some evidence against 
Neumann’s (1986) account in terms of the duration of input selection. The account 
predicts no difference between a situation in which both the target and the distractor are 
simultaneously removed after a short duration and a situation in which the target color is 
changed to white after the same duration (the color-replaced condition). Instead, La Heij 
et al. (2001) found a larger amount of interference in the short condition than in the color- 
replaced condition. Therefore, they concluded that the reduced interference effect does 
not stem solely from the target color offset. Instead, they proposed that the reduction is 
due to the breaking of Gestalt grouping.
3.2.3 Facilitation of attribute selection on the basis of Gestalt principles
According to Gestalt psychology (Wertheimer, 1923), there are several principles by 
which groups of stimuli organize themselves preattentively in perception. One of them is 
the principle of proximity, which states that spatially close objects tend to be grouped 
together (e.g., Han, Humphreys, & Chen, 1999). It is possible that for integral color-word
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Stroop stimuli such as those used by La Heij et al. (2001), where the color and the word 
share the same spatial location, the target and the distractor are perceived as constituting 
two attributes (color and word form) of the same object. If attention is given to a certain 
object, all features of that object are processed automatically (Blaser, Pylyshyn, & 
Holcombe, 2000; Duncan, 1984; Kahneman & Chajczyk, 1983; Kahneman & Henik, 
1981; O'Craven, Downing, & Kanwisher, 1999; Wuhr & Waszak, 2003). Thus, by 
directing attention to the Stroop stimulus for processing of the target color attribute, the 
word (form attribute) is processed as well. If the color is removed after a certain time 
interval, this Gestalt principle is broken, and the color and the word are no longer seen as 
belonging to one object, so that early attentional disengagement of the word occurs. 
Although only the distractor word remains in the display after the target color has 
disappeared, this information is no longer processed, and the interference effect in 
naming the color is reduced. We refer to this account as the Gestalt explanation. 
According to La Heij et al. (2001), “this account is rather speculative and in need of 
further empirical support” (p. 631).
The main objective of the present study was to further examine the Gestalt 
account of the reduction in Stroop interference. To differentiate between the duration and 
the Gestalt explanations, our approach was to compare performance in two color-word 
Stroop conditions: a more or less standard condition and a situation in which the Gestalt 
grouping is broken while target exposure duration is held constant. One way to create 
such a situation is by spatially separating the target and the distractor after a short delay. 
Wertheimer (1923) introduced the notion of a Gestalt principle o f  common fate: Elements 
that appear to move simultaneously in the same direction with the same speed are 
perceived as belonging to a single object (Han et al., 1999; Lee & Blake, 2001; Sturzel & 
Spillmann, 2004; Uttal, Spillmann, Sturzel, & Sekuler, 2000). If one element moves away 
while the other remains stationary, this breaking of the common fate will disturb a Gestalt 
grouping. The target exposure duration, on the other hand, is not altered by this operation, 
because the target does not disappear from the screen. Thus, when the color and the word 
are spatially separated, the duration account does not predict a reduction in interference, 
as compared with the situation in which both the color and the word remain stationary, 
whereas the Gestalt theory predicts less interference because the perceived attribute
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grouping is broken. However, the approach just described could not be followed with 
integral Stroop stimuli, because color and form then cannot be physically separated. 
Instead, in our experiments, we used color bars with a distractor word superimposed on 
it, which we will refer to as semi-integral.
We conducted three experiments to examine the role of Gestalt grouping 
principles in selective attention. The first experiment confirmed that by reducing the 
target presentation time, a decrease in Stroop interference effect is also obtained with 
semi-integral Stroop stimuli. The second experiment was designed to differentiate 
between the duration of input selection and the Gestalt accounts as explanations for the 
finding in Experiment 1. The third experiment tested and refuted a possible alternative 
explanation for the results of Experiment 2 in terms of automatic attention capturing by 
items that are moving.
3.3 EXPERIMENT 1
The first experiment was conducted to replicate the finding of La Heij et al. (2001, 
Experiment 1) that for incongruent color-word Stroop stimuli, responses are faster when 
the target is removed shortly after stimulus onset, as compared with a standard situation 
in which the target remains in the display together with the distractor. For the neutral 
stimuli, we predict no difference in mean reaction times (RT s) between these two 
exposure conditions.
3.3.1 Method
3.3.1.1 Participants.
Twenty-six students (21 of them female) from Radboud University Nijmegen volunteered 
to participate in the experiment. Their age varied from 18 to 33 years, with a mean of 23 
years. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The participants took part 
individually and were paid for their participation.
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3.3.1.2 Apparatus.
The experiment was conducted on two separate, connected microcomputers. The first 
computer generated the visual displays; the second computer collected the experimental 
data. A voice key measured the vocal naming latencies with an accuracy of 1 ms (1000 
Hz). The participants were seated in front of a color monitor connected to the first 
computer, at a viewing distance of approximately 70 cm. On a second monitor connected 
to the data collection computer, the experimenter observed the correct response and the 
participant’s response latencies.
3.3.1.3 Stimuli and design.
The displayed stimuli consisted of colored rectangular bars and written distractor color 
words. The stimuli were 21 x 61 mm (corresponding to 1.72° x 4.98° of visual angle at a 
viewing distance of approximately 70 cm). The stimuli consisted of red, green, and blue 
target bars and the following Dutch color words: ROOD (red), GROEN (green), and 
BLAUW (blue). The distractor words were superimposed in white uppercase letters on 
the color bar. The background of the computer screen was black.
Two distractor conditions were used: neutral and incongruent, each having three 
different stimuli. The neutral stimuli resulted from the three color bars with an X X X X X  
string superimposed on it. With the incongruent stimuli, for each color bar only one 
nonmatching distractor word was used (red patch-BLAUW, green patch-ROOD, and blue 
patch-GROEN).
Two exposure conditions were used: a continuous condition (both the target and 
the distractor remained present until the end of the trial) and a color-removed condition 
(the target color bar disappeared after 100 ms). In the experiment, each of these 12 trial 
combinations (6 stimuli x 2 exposure times) was presented 30 times, yielding a total of 
360 trials per participant (90 trials per condition). The presentation of the stimuli was 
randomized within a block of 12 trials, with a short break after every 72nd trial.
3.3.1.4 Procedure.
The participants took part individually in a dimly illuminated, quiet room. The instruction 
was given on paper and summarized vocally by the experimenter. Before the actual
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experiment started, the participants received 12 practice trials. Then, five experimental 
blocks followed. When the color-word Stroop stimulus appeared, the color had to be 
named aloud. The participants were encouraged to react as quickly and accurately as 
possible, while trying to ignore the distractor word.
A trial had the following structure. A semi-integral color-word Stroop stimulus 
appeared at the center of the screen. The distractor word always remained present until 
the participant made a vocal response or until a time-out occurred at 1,500 ms. The target
Stimulus onset
100 ms
(a) Continuous
Time
V A
BLUE BLUE
Response
(b) Color removed BLUE BLUE
(c)
Color
repositioned BLUE BLUE
(d) Word
repositioned BLUE
BLUE
Figure 3.1. Schematic examples o f the four exposure conditions used in the experiments. The 
gray bar represents a red colored patch (in the experiments, we used the colors 
red, green, and blue). In the continuous condition (Experiments 1-3), the initial 
display remained the same until a vocal response was given or a time-out 
occurred. In the color-removed condition (Experiment 1), the color bar 
disappeared after 100 ms. In the color-repositioned condition (Experiment 2), the 
color bar was relocated to a position a little above or below the distractor word.
In the word-repositioned condition (Experiment 3), the distractor word was 
relocated to a position a little above or below the color bar. In all the 
experiments, the distractor words were written in the participants’ native 
language (Dutch).
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color bar either stayed on the screen until response (in the continuous condition) or 
disappeared after 100 ms (in the color-removed condition). Rows a and b of Figure 3.1 
illustrate the conditions. When the response was made, the screen blanked for 1 s, after 
which the next trial started. The beginning of a break was indicated by the Dutch word 
PAUZE (pause) for 1,500 ms, whereas the next block was preceded by the word 
ATTENTIE (attention). An experimental session took about 30 min.
3.2.2 Results
The data of 2 participants were excluded from analysis, because they exceeded our 5% 
incorrect response criterion. For the data of the remaining 24 participants, the following 
data-trimming procedure was used: RTs longer than 1,500 ms, RTs shorter than 100 ms, 
RTs for trials on which the voice key malfunctioned or triggered inappropriately (in 
combination, 1.8% of the data), and RTs for trials on which the participant made an 
incorrect response (1.6% of the data) were discarded. The remaining RTs were used in 
calculations of means. T able 3.1 shows the mean RT s and error percentages obtained in 
the experimental conditions.
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the mean correct RT s, with 
distractor condition (incongruent vs. neutral) and exposure condition (continuous vs.
Table 3.1 Mean Reaction Times (RTs, in Milliseconds; With Standard Deviations), Error 
Percentages, and Stroop Interference Effects (Incongruent Minus Neutral) in the 
Distractor and Exposure Conditions in Experiment 1
Distractor
Expo;sure
Continuous Color removed
RT
E%
RT
E%M SD M SD
Incongruent 676 168 4.6 654 160 4.5
Neutral 590 133 2.3 584 126 2.5
Stroop effect 86 2.3 70 2.0
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color removed) as within-participants variables. The analysis showed a main effect of 
distractor condition [F(1, 23) = 134.3, M Se = 1,083, p  < .001, reflecting an average 
Stroop interference effect of 78 ms] and a main effect of exposure condition [F(1, 23) = 
16.4, M Se = 287, p  = .001] (mean response latencies were, overall, 14 ms shorter in the 
color-removed condition than in the continuous condition). The Stroop interference was 
larger in the continuous condition (86 ms) than in the color-removed condition (70 ms) 
[t(23) = 2.38, p  = .01, one-tailed].
Subsequent analyses were performed to further investigate this effect. As was 
predicted, for incongruent stimuli, responses were significantly faster in the color- 
removed condition than in the continuous condition [t(23) = 14.1, p  = .001]. In contrast, 
again as predicted, for neutral stimuli there was no difference in RT s between the two 
exposure conditions [/(23) = 2.0, p  = .17].
Although the number of incorrect responses was very small in this experiment, a 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed on them. Significantly more errors were 
made in the incongruent condition than in the neutral condition [F(1,23) = 12.61, p  = 
.002]. The number of errors in the continuous condition was equal to the number of errors 
in the color-removed condition (p > .90). The interaction between distractor condition 
and exposure condition also was not significant (p > .60). Thus, most errors were made in 
the slowest condition. We conclude that there was no speed-accuracy trade-off in the 
data.
3.3.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 confirms and extends the finding from Neumann (1986) and La Heij et al. 
(2001): Removing the to-be-named color from a color-word Stroop stimulus shortly after 
stimulus onset actually improves the participant’s ability to name that color. Thus, 
segregation of a target and a distractor in time seems to help visual attention. Apparently, 
this finding is not confined to separated color-word Stroop stimuli (La Heij et al., 2001, 
Experiments 1 and 2; Neumann, 1986) and integral color-word stimuli (La Heij et al., 
2001, Experiments 3-6; Neumann, 1986) but also applies to semi-integral stimuli (color 
word presented on top of a colored patch).
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3.4 EXPERIMENT 2
In all the experimental conditions of our first experiment, the distractor word stayed 
present on the screen until response and could exert its influence. Nevertheless, the 
participants responded more quickly and more accurately to a visual target when this 
target disappeared after 100 ms. What is the reason for this paradoxical exposure duration 
effect? According to the duration account, in the color-removed condition, the 
disappearance of the target terminates the parasitic attention sharing between the target 
and the distractor and, thus, reduces the interference from the word. Alternatively, the 
Gestalt account states that the offset of the target color breaks the Gestalt grouping, and 
as a result, participants no longer perceive the target and the distractor as belonging to a 
single object. Word form information is then not automatically processed together with 
the color attribute (Blaser et al., 2000; Duncan, 1984; Kahneman & Chajczyk, 1983; 
Kahneman & Henik, 1981; Kanwisher & Wojciulik, 2000; O'Craven et al., 1999), 
resulting in a reduction of Stroop interference in the color-removed condition. To test 
which of these two explanations is correct, the target exposure duration (and thereby, the 
amount of parasitic attention sharing) should be kept fixed, whereas at the same time the 
Gestalt grouping should be broken. This was done in Experiment 2 by letting the color 
bar and the distractor word move away from each other. To ensure that both components 
stayed in the same attention area, the movement was restricted to a very small (< 2°) 
visual angle (Gatti & Egeth, 1978; Hagenaar & van der Heijden, 1986; Wuhr & Waszak, 
2003).
Our hypotheses are as follows. If the reduction in Stroop interference in 
Experiment 1 was due to parasitic attention sharing between color and word during input 
selection, moving items around in the display should not influence the level of 
interference, as long as both the target and the distractor stay within the same attentional 
area and the stimuli letters are large enough to minimize the effect of reduced visual 
acuity (Merikle & Gorewich, 1979). The target exposure duration was kept constant in 
this second experiment. Therefore, the amount of interference should not differ between a 
situation in which the target moves away from the distractor after a short period (the
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color-repositioned condition) and the situation in which both the target and the distractor 
remain stationary (the continuous condition).
Alternatively, features that have a common fate in sharing the same motion 
direction are perceptually organized as one entity (Lee & Blake, 2001; Stürzel & 
Spillmann, 2004; Uttal et al., 2000). Physically separating the target and the distractor 
will break such a Gestalt grouping. Consequently, if the reduction in Stroop interference 
found in Experiment 1 arose from help in attribute selection, we predict that physically 
separating the two attributes will cause the distractor to be processed to a lesser extent.
As in Experiment 1, the amount of Stroop interference in the color-repositioned condition 
will then be smaller than that in the continuous condition.
In short, if the data from Experiment 2 show no difference in the amount of 
interference between the continuous and the color-repositioned conditions, breaking the 
common fate had no effect, and the duration explanation receives some extra support for 
being responsible for the effect in Experiment 1. In contrast, if a difference in 
interference between the two exposure conditions is found, the duration account cannot 
explain this finding, whereas the Gestalt account can.
3.4.1 Method
3.4.1.1 Participants.
Sixteen students (11 of them female) from Radboud University Nijmegen volunteered to 
participate in the experiment. Their age varied from 20 to 29 years, with a mean of 22 
years. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The participants took part 
individually and were paid for their participation. None of them had participated in the 
previous experiment.
3.4.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and design.
The apparatus, visual stimuli, and procedure used in this experiment were identical to 
those in Experiment 1. The design was similar to that in the previous experiment, except 
for the following difference: Instead of removing the target from the screen, in this 
second experiment the target was spatially repositioned. At the start of each trial, the
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target color bar and the distractor word appeared at the center of the screen. In the 
continuous condition, both of them stayed there until response. In the color-repositioned 
condition, the target was randomly relocated after 100 ms to a location a little above or 
below the central position, whereas the distractor word remained stationary. The center- 
to-center distance between the color bar and the (invisible) rectangle in which the 
distractor word was presented was 21 mm (1.72° at a viewing distance of approximately 
70 cm). Since the rectangles were presented adjacent to one another, the interstimulus 
distance approached to zero. Rows a and c of Figure 3.1 illustrate the conditions.
3.4.2 Results
RTs were treated in the same way as in Experiment 1. The 100-ms criterion, the 1,500-ms 
criterion, and the trials on which the voice key malfunctioned or triggered inappropriately 
accounted for 0.7% of the data. Also, RTs for trials on which the participant made an 
incorrect response (1.3% of the data) were discarded. The remaining RTs were used in 
calculations of means. Table 3.2 shows the mean RTs and error percentages obtained in 
the various experimental conditions in Experiment 2.
Table 3.2 Mean Reaction Times (RTs, in Milliseconds; With Standard Deviations), Error 
Percentages, and Stroop Interference Effects (Incongruent Minus Neutral) in the 
Distractor and Exposure Conditions in Experiment 2
Distractor
Expo;sure
Continuous Color repositioned
RT
E%
RT
E%M SD M SD
Incongruent 668 160 3.2 654 134 2.5
Neutral 585 120 1.2 607 119 1.0
Stroop effect 83 2.0 47 1.5
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A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the mean correct RT s, with 
distractor condition (incongruent vs. neutral) and exposure condition (continuous vs. 
color repositioned) as within-participants variables. The analysis showed a main effect of 
distractor condition [F(1,15) = 59.38,M Se = 67,048, p  < .001]. This reflects an average 
Stroop interference effect of 65 ms. There was no main effect of exposure condition (p > 
.4). Thus, overall, mean RTs were not significantly different in the continuous condition 
(627 ms) and the color-repositioned condition (631 ms). The Stroop interference effect 
was larger in the continuous condition (83 ms) than in the color-repositioned condition 
(47 ms) [t(15) = 4.19, p  = .001].
Subsequent analyses were performed to investigate this effect. For incongruent 
stimuli, responses differed significantly in the two exposure conditions [/(15) = 4.67, p  < 
.05]. The mean RT in the color-repositioned condition was 14 ms shorter than that in the 
continuous condition. For neutral stimuli, responses also differed significantly between 
the two exposure conditions [/(15) = 17.01, p  = .001]. The mean RT in the color- 
repositioned condition was 22 ms longer, as compared with the continuous condition.
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the incorrect responses. 
Significantly more errors were made in the incongruent condition than in the neutral 
condition [F(1,15) = 20.4, p  < .001], mirroring the RT pattern. The main effect of 
exposure condition and the distractor x exposure interaction were not significant (ps > 
.25). Thus, no trace of a speed-accuracy trade-off was found.
3.4.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 shows again a reduction in Stroop interference: When naming the color 
from a semi-integral color-word stimulus, participants suffer less interference from the 
distractor word when the target color bar was repositioned after 100 ms than when the 
stimuli remained stationary. Thus, a reduced interference effect was obtained by 
separating the target and the distractor not only temporally (Experiment 1), but also 
spatially (Experiment 2). This seems to rule out the possibility that duration was (solely) 
responsible for the faster responses in the color-repositioned condition. After all, the 
duration of target input was held constant between the two exposure conditions. The 
Gestalt account, on the other hand, can explain the results by stating that the physical
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separation of the color and the word broke the perceptual grouping, so that less attention 
was given to the word.
Considering the data, a second pattern is evident: In contrast to Experiment 1, the 
RT s in the neutral condition in the present experiment were not the same for the two 
exposure conditions. The mean response time for a neutral X X X X X  distractor was 22 ms 
longer in the color-repositioned condition than in the continuous condition. This indicates 
that the task in this second experiment was more difficult than that in Experiment 1. 
Repositioning the color bar somehow disturbed the perception process. If the 
repositioning of the color increased response latencies in the neutral condition, it seems 
logical that it also increased RTs in the incongruent condition. This suggests that for 
incongruent stimuli, the reduction in RT caused by the target-distractor separation was, in 
fact, even stronger but was partly undone by an RT increase caused by the extra task 
difficulty. The observed reduction of 14 ms in the incongruent condition could thus be 
the combined effect of two different sources -  namely, a 36-ms reduction caused by the 
stimulus segregation and a 22-ms increase caused by the perceptual difficulty.
To investigate our hypothesis that the response latencies for incongruent stimuli 
in the color-repositioned condition resulted from two sources with opposite effects, we 
examined the latency distributions of the responses. When the perceptual difficulty 
caused by the repositioning of the color prolonged the color-naming response (as 
indicated by the longer mean RT for neutral stimuli in the color-repositioned condition, 
as compared with the continuous condition), we expected this perceptual difficulty effect 
to be present across the whole latency distribution for both neutral and incongruent 
stimuli. Yet, for incongruent stimuli, the stimulus segregation had an opposite effect, 
causing the mean RT in the color-repositioned condition to be shorter than that in the 
continuous condition. Earlier research indicated that the interference effect in a conflict 
task varied with RT (De Jong, Berendsen, & Cools, 1999; Ridderinkhof, 2002b). For 
example, the amount of Stroop interference was often larger for slow responses than for 
fast responses. Therefore, it is conceivable that the interference reduction effect 
stemming from the Gestalt breaking had a larger influence for slow responses than for 
fast responses. Such opposite effects on task performance in the incongruent condition 
should be observable in plots of latency distributions.
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To obtain the latency distributions, we divided the rank-ordered response 
latencies for each participant into deciles (10% quantiles) and computed mean latencies 
for each decile, separately for incongruent and neutral stimuli and for continuous and 
color-repositioned conditions. By averaging these decile means across participants, so- 
called Vincentized cumulative distribution functions are obtained (Ratcliff, 1979). 
Vincentizing the latency data across individual participants provides a way of averaging 
data while preserving the shapes of the individual distributions. Figure 3.2 shows the 
distributional plots for the neutral and incongruent conditions.
EXPOSURE 
Continuous .......Color repositioned
LU
3
0
LU
01 
LI­
LLI 
>
LU
01
LU
>
3
RESPONSE TIME (ms)
Figure 3.2. Vincentized cumulative distribution curves for the color-naming latencies in 
response to semi-integral color-word Stroop stimuli for the neutral stimuli and 
incongruent stimuli in the continuous and color-repositioned conditions in 
Experiment 2.
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The two left-hand curves in Figure 3.2 show the latency distributions for the 
neutral stimuli in the continuous and color-repositioned conditions. The figure shows that 
the disturbance effect from repositioning the target color bar was present throughout the 
entire latency range. Statistical analysis revealed that there were effects of exposure 
condition [F(1,15) = 17.06, p  = .001] and decile [F(9,135) = 373.79, p  < .001]. Exposure 
condition and decile did not interact (p > .55), confirming that the disturbance effect was 
independent of latency.
The two right-hand curves in Figure 3.2 show the latency distributions for the 
incongruent stimuli in the continuous and color-repositioned conditions. The figure 
shows that up to the fourth decile, latencies are actually longer in the color-repositioned 
than in the continuous condition, which we attribute to the disturbance effect of the 
moving item. However, above the fourth decile, response latencies are shorter in the 
color-repositioned than in the continuous condition, which we attribute to the Gestalt- 
breaking process. Statistical analysis revealed that there were effects of exposure 
condition [F(1,15) = 4.66, p  < .05] and decile [F(9,135) = 336.74, p  < .001]. Importantly, 
exposure condition and decile interacted [F(9,135) = 11.33, p  < .001], which provides 
support for our hypothesis about two opposing effects.
To conclude, analyses of the latency distributions indicate that (only) for 
incongruent stimuli, two separate processes interact, which strongly suggests that the 
reduction of the distractor effect caused by the target-distractor separation was actually 
stronger than the mean RT s suggested. On the one hand, breaking the Gestalt reduced the 
amount of Stroop interference, an effect that became stronger with increasing response 
latency. On the other hand, responses were slowed down by the disturbance caused by a 
moving item in the display. This effect, which is independent of response latency, works 
against the Gestalt breaking effect.
3.5 EXPERIMENT 3
Although the results of our second experiment strongly favor the Gestalt account over the 
duration account, one could interpret the data in terms of another attentional process 
involved in (visual motion) perception. In our first experiment, both the target and the
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distractor remained static, whereas in the second experiment, one of the stimulus 
attributes (the color) moved in half the trials. Previous research has shown that moving 
items and abrupt onsets can capture attention in an automatic fashion (Brown, Gore, & 
Carr, 2002; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994; Hillstrom & Yantis, 1994; Miller, 1989; 
Tipper, Brehaut, & Driver, 1990; Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994). Therefore, in the color- 
repositioned condition, more attention could have been given to the moving item than to 
the stationary item. As the moving item was always the to-be-named color bar, this could 
also explain the reduced interference effect in the second experiment (but not in 
Experiment 1). Thus, to establish that it is really the breaking of a Gestalt grouping in 
attribute selection that causes the observed paradoxical exposure duration effect, we have 
to exclude automatic capture of attention by movement as a competing alternative.
We designed Experiment 3 for this purpose by simply changing the movement 
factor. In the word-repositioned condition, the target always remained stationary, 
whereas the distractor moved. As in Experiments 1 and 2, in the continuous condition, 
both the target and the distractor remained stationary. The rationale is straightforward: If 
the moving attribute (the word) automatically receives more attention than the static 
attribute (the color), more Stroop interference should be observed in the word- 
repositioned condition than in the continuous condition. In contrast, facilitation of 
attribute selection by breaking the Gestalt grouping process predicts results similar to 
those in Experiment 2: The word-repositioned condition should show a reduction in 
Stroop interference. If attributes are physically segregated, participants will no longer 
perceive them as belonging to a single object, regardless of which attribute is moving. 
Note that in this third experiment, there was again a moving item present in the display 
that could disturb the task at hand, thereby prolonging RTs in the word-repositioned 
condition.
3.5.1 Method
3.5.1.1 Participants.
Sixteen students (14 of them female) from Radboud University Nijmegen served as paid 
participants. Their age varied from 18 to 26 years, with a mean of 22 years. All had
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normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The participants took part individually, and none 
had participated in the earlier experiments.
3.5.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and design.
The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure used in this experiment were identical to those in 
Experiment 1. The design was very similar to that in Experiment 2. Only the movement 
factor was reversed. At the start of each trial, the target color bar and the distractor word 
appeared at the center of the screen. In the continuous condition, both of them stayed 
there until response. In the word-repositioned condition, 100 ms after stimulus onset, the 
distractor word was relocated to a location a little above or below the central position, 
whereas the target color bar remained stationary. As in Experiment 2, the center-to-center 
distance was 1.72° at a viewing distance of 70 cm, whereas the interstimulus distance 
was virtually zero (adjacent rectangles). Row a and d of Figure 3.1 illustrate the 
conditions.
3.5.2 Results
The data were treated in the same way as in the previous experiments. RTs longer than 
1,500 ms, RTs shorter than 100 ms, RTs for trials on which the voice key malfunctioned 
or triggered inappropriately (in combination, 0.6% of the data), and RTs for trials on 
which the participant made an incorrect response (1.7% of the data) were discarded. The 
remaining RTs were used in calculations of means. Table 3.3 shows the mean RTs and 
error percentages obtained in the experimental conditions.
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the mean correct RT s, with 
distractor condition (incongruent vs. neutral) and exposure condition (continuous vs. 
word repositioned) as within-participants variables. The analysis showed a main effect of 
distractor condition [F(1,15) = 145.29,M Se = 67,498, p  < .001]. This reflects an average 
Stroop interference effect of 65 ms. There was no main effect of exposure condition (p = 
.12). Thus, overall, mean RT s were not significantly different in the continuous condition 
(590 ms) and the word-repositioned condition (597 ms). The Stroop interference was 
larger in the continuous condition (71 ms) than in the word-repositioned condition (59 
ms) [t(15) = 1.80, p  = .05].
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Subsequent analyses were performed to investigate this effect. For incongruent 
stimuli, responses did not differ in the two exposure conditions (p > .70). For neutral 
stimuli, mean RT in the word-repositioned condition was 13 ms longer than that in the 
continuous condition [/(15) = 10.7, p  = .005].
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the incorrect responses. 
Significantly more errors were made in the incongruent condition than in the neutral 
condition [F(1,15) = 10.1, p  < .01], mirroring the RT pattern. The main effect of exposure 
condition and the distractor x exposure interaction were not significant (ps > .05). Thus, 
again, no trace of a speed-accuracy trade-off was found.
Table 3.3 Mean Reaction Times (RTs, in Milliseconds; With Standard Deviations), Error 
Percentages, and Stroop Interference Effects (Incongruent Minus Neutral) in the 
Distractor and Exposure Conditions in Experiment 3
Distractor
Expo;sure
Continuous Word repositioned
RT
E%
RT
E%M SD M SD
Incongruent 625 148 4.0 626 135 4.0
Neutral 554 112 1.4 567 111 1.4
Stroop effect 71 2.6 59 2.6
3.5.3 Discussion
Recall that in Experiment 2, we found a reduction in Stroop interference when the target 
color bar was repositioned shortly after stimulus onset, when compared with a situation in 
which both the target and the distactor remained fixated. We argued that this reduction is 
obtained by facilitation of attribute selection (the Gestalt account). Experiment 3 was set 
up to exclude a competing explanation according to which a moving item automatically 
attracts attention. If the target moves (Experiment 2), this should direct attention to the 
target and reduce interference from the distractor, whereas in the situation in which the
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distractor moves (Experiment 3), the extra attention given to the moving distractor will 
increase the interference. However, the present results show that even when it is the 
distractor attribute that moves after 100 ms, there is a trend toward a reduction in Stroop 
interference (the interference effect was 12 ms smaller in the word-repositioned condition 
than in the color-continuous condition). Therefore, we can safely exclude this alternative 
explanation in terms of automatic attentional capture for moving items. The Gestalt 
account can explain the results of all three experiments.
Note that the RT s in the neutral condition were 13 ms longer in the word- 
repositioned condition than in the continuous condition. This indicates that although the 
target always appeared at the center of the screen, the moving item again disturbed the 
color-naming task in the word-repositioned condition. Following our rationale from 
Experiment 2, this could mean that for incongruent stimuli, the obtained RTs again 
reflected a combined effect. On one hand, the response latencies were reduced by the 
target-distractor separation, but on the other hand, this reduction was undone by the 13- 
ms increase caused by the extra task difficulty. Although interesting, it is not important 
for the present purpose. The main point of Experiment 3 is that the Stroop interference 
was obviously not increased in the word-repositioned condition, as the to-be-excluded 
alternative account would predict.
3.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous research on color naming with Stroop-like stimuli has suggested that the 
distractor “steals” less attention when the target is removed from the display shortly after 
stimulus onset than when it remains on the screen until response (La Heij et al., 1995; La 
Heij et al., 2001; Neumann, 1986). Apparently, the human attentional control system 
performs better with such a temporal segregation of stimulus attributes. Three theoretical 
accounts have been proposed to explain this paradoxical exposure duration effect: the 
increased spatial selectivity of input selection, duration of input selection (parasitic 
attention sharing), and facilitation of attribute selection on the basis of Gestalt principles. 
In the present study, we set out to determine the relative merits of these explanations.
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Here, we will discuss our experimental results and their implications for our 
understanding of visual attention.
In earlier research, the paradoxical effect was obtained with color-color stimuli 
(La Heij et al., 1995), separated color-word Stroop stimuli (La Heij et al., 2001, 
Experiments 1 and 2; Neumann, 1986), and integral color-word stimuli (La Heij et al., 
2001, Experiments 3-6; Neumann, 1986). In our first experiment, we established that the 
paradoxical exposure duration effect could also be replicated with semi-integral color- 
word Stroop stimuli. Interference from the word distractor was less in the color-removed 
condition (the target color bar disappeared after 100 ms) than in the continuous condition 
(the target and distractor remained visible until the end of the trial). In our second 
experiment, we showed that this reduction in interference is also obtained when the target 
is spatially repositioned shortly after stimulus onset (a little above or below the starting 
position). The duration account cannot explain this, because the target remains present 
within the attended small spatial area (Gatti & Egeth, 1978; Hagenaar & van der Heijden, 
1986; Merikle & Gorewich, 1979). In contrast, the results are in accordance with the 
predictions from the Gestalt account: When the target and the distractor are separated, 
they are no longer perceived as one entity, and the distractor input is not automatically 
processed together with the target information. The results of our third experiment 
excluded the possibility that attentional capture by the moving item was responsible for 
the effect in Experiment 2. Even in a condition in which the distractor was moving, we 
observed that the amount of interference from that distractor was less than that in a 
situation in which both the target and the distractor remained stationary.
One might argue that the observed data patterns of Experiments 2 and 3 simply 
result from a difference in visual configuration, an artifact in the design. At the start of 
each experimental trial, color and word were presented at the same location. In half the 
trials, one of the features was repositioned after 100 ms to a new location, while the other 
feature remained at its initial position. If one holds the belief that the human attentional 
system is not performing any task during these first 100 ms, one might claim that the 
continuous condition represents a different class of Stroop stimuli (semi-integral) than do 
the color-repositioned and word-repositioned conditions (spatially separated Stroop 
stimuli). Previous research has suggested that increasing the spatial distance between a
70
word and a color bar reduces Stroop interference and that, therefore, a separated stimulus 
exhibits less interference than does a semi-integral stimulus (Brown, 1996; Brown, Roos- 
Gilbert, & Carr, 1995; Kahneman & Henik, 1981; MacLeod, 1998; Neumann, 1986, 
Experiments 2 and 3), similar to our data patterns in Experiments 2 and 3.
However, for the following reasons, we do not believe that the reduced 
interference effects in our experiments arose from such a difference in visual 
configuration. First, a possible deviation in visual configuration cannot explain the 
finding in Experiment 1, in which no separated Stroop stimuli were presented. Second, it 
is unlikely that our perceptual system idly waits for 100 ms before it starts interpreting 
the surrounding environment. Rather, as soon as a color-word stimulus appears in a 
display, the visual system starts by identifying the target color and separating the display 
into figures and ground. Earlier research has shown that relationships between objects are 
especially crucial within the first 100 ms after onset. For example, maximal impact of 
incongruent words in color naming is empirically observed when the words appear within 
100 ms of the colors (Glaser & Glaser, 1982). Moreover, our error patterns indicate that 
the target color is, in fact, very reliably visually identified on the basis of the sensory 
information available within the first 100 ms and that incorrect responses arise mainly 
from distractor interference.
Third, even when the visual system does not process the stimulus during the first 
100 ms and the distractor conditions do indeed correspond to different Stroop stimuli 
classes (integral in the continuous condition vs. separated in the movement conditions), 
the situation is unclear. As Blaser et al. (2000) stated, “location and ‘objecthood’ can be 
difficult to distinguish, as typically a single object occupies a single location” (p. 196). 
Indeed, with the present stimuli, it is hard to directly investigate to what extent such 
difference in visual configuration would contribute to the decrease in interference. After 
all, direct comparison of these two classes of Stroop stimuli confound visual 
configuration (location) with Gestalt grouping (two objects vs. one object).
In the Stroop literature with separated stimuli, a variety of different distances 
between color and word have been tested. Gatti and Egeth (1978) increased the spatial 
distance between the color and the word from 1° to 5°. They observed that interference 
diminished from 90 to 40 ms. However, they did not include a direct comparison with an
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integral stimulus. Moreover, the difference in distance (l°-5° measured from color bar 
edge to word edge) was much greater than ours (close to 0°). As was mentioned before, 
Merikle and Gorewich (1979) observed no decrease of Stroop interference with an 
increase in distance from 0.5° to 2.5° when letter size was increased to compensate for 
acuity loss. Their letters extended 0.57° of vertical angle at a distance of 2.5°, whereas 
our letter size is 1.72° at a distance close to 0°. Therefore, it seems implausible that the 
reduced Stroop interference in our color-repositioned condition simply stemmed from a 
reduced visual acuity in that condition (see also Hagenaar & van der Heijden, 1986).
MacLeod (1998) found decreased interference for separated stimuli, as compared 
with integral color-word stimuli. However, these stimuli (a row of colored asterisks 
appearing just above a color word in white) differed much from the ones we used. Brown 
et al. (2002) presented color patches and words at different locations. Before stimulus 
onset, the location of either the color patch or the word was cued. Manipulation of the 
locus of attention modulated the magnitude of Stroop interference. Stroop interference 
was larger when the locations of the color and the word were close together than when 
they were far apart (13°) and attention was drawn to the location of the color patch. Yet, 
again, the distances used were much greater than that in our study. Brown, Gore, and 
Pearson (1998) investigated differential visual half-field Stroop effects. They found that 
physical integration of the word and color stimuli was not necessary to the effect and that 
-  in contrast with many of the earlier findings -  Stroop effects were larger when color 
targets and color names were in different visual eye fields than when they were at the 
same location. Moreover, they stated that in all the studies in which increasing spatial 
separation between the word and the color target reduced Stroop interference, the color 
targets were presented at a fixated location known in advance to the participant and 
constant across trials. When target location is uncertain (as in our Experiment 2), 
increasing the interstimulus distance only marginally effects the level of interference.
In the Stroop literature, a variety of different distances between color and word 
have been tested, but the situation is complicated. We maintain that even in the unlikely 
case that the participants ignored the first 100 ms of stimulus presentation, it is not 
obvious that our data pattern resulted merely from a difference in visual configuration.
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We argued that separating the color and the word either in time or in space 
hampers their integration into a single percept according to Gestalt principles. Can 
feature binding into one object really be prevented within the short time frame of 100 
ms? We think it can, at least partly. Schoenfeld et al. (2003) combined event-related 
potentials, event-related magnetic fields, and functional magnetic resonance imaging data 
to study the time course of the rapid perceptual integration of multifeature objects 
(moving-dot arrays). On the basis of their findings, they concluded that “this 
spatiotemporal analysis found that an irrelevant feature (color) was activated in its 
specialized cortical module within a few tens of milliseconds after initial registration, 
rapidly enough to provide a mechanism for the binding and perceptual integration of the 
multiple features of an attended object” (Schoenfeld et al., 2003, p. 11806). They 
estimated that the time needed for feature selection and binding processes to be 
completed lies around 230-250 ms after stimulus onset. In our experiments, it is therefore 
likely that separating the color and distractor features after 100 ms disturbed the binding 
process.
To conclude, our results demonstrate a role for Gestalt grouping principles in 
selective attention. Our research replicated earlier observations that Stroop interference is 
reduced when the color is removed shortly after stimulus onset. This paradoxical 
exposure duration effect with semi-integral color-word stimuli appears to reflect 
facilitation of attentional selection. It cannot be accounted for by terminated input 
selection (the duration account), because even when the target was only repositioned 
while remaining perfectly visible, a reduction in Stroop interference was observed. The 
facilitation of attribute selection can explain all the present results by presuming that 
when the color and the word form are separated (either temporally or spatially), a 
grouping process based on Gestalt principles is disturbed. If the attributes are not seen as 
belonging to a single entity, the distractor input is not processed along with the target. We 
conclude that the human attentional system can exploit dynamic information changes 
during stimulus processing (causing early attentional disengagement) to guide and control 
attention in conflicting situations.
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CHAPTER 4
Attentional Control Adjustments in Eriksen and 
Stroop Task Performance Can Be Independent
ol' Response Conflict
“All fixed set patterns are incapable of adaptability or pliability. 
The truth is outside of all fixed patterns and the ability to modify 
ones behavior is essential for survival.” (Bruce Lee, 1940-1973)
This chapter has been accepted for publication as:
Lamers, M. J. M. & Roelofs, A. (in press). Attentional control adjustments in Eriksen and 
Stroop task performance can be independent of response conflict. Quarterly Journal o f  
Experimental Psychology (2010), doi:10.1080/17470218.2010.523792.
4.1 ABSTRACT
In the Eriksen flanker and colour-word Stroop tasks, the response time (RT) difference 
between incongruent and congruent trials is smaller following incongruent trials than 
following congruent trials, the “Gratton effect” (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). 
According to the prevailing conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, 
& Cohen, 2001), the Gratton effect reflects attentional control adjustment following 
response conflict on incongruent trials. However, because previous studies compared 
incongruent and congruent trials, it remains unclear to what extent the Gratton effect is 
driven by incongruent rather than congruent trials. To resolve this issue, we included 
neutral trials in addition to incongruent and congruent trials in the Eriksen (Experiment 1) 
and Stroop (Experiment 2) tasks. Participants responded manually and vocally in both 
tasks. Moreover, we assessed responding to Stroop stimuli that were preceded by neutral 
cues or by incongruent- or congruent-predicting cues (Experiment 3). In all three 
experiments, the RT difference between incongruent and congruent trials was larger for 
postcongruent trials than for postincongruent and postneutral trials. These findings 
suggest that control adjustments can be independent of response conflict, challenging 
conflict-monitoring theory.
Keywords: Attention; Conflict; Control adjustment; Expectation.
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4.2 INTRODUCTION
The human attention system seems to employ various strategies in filtering information 
from the environment (cf. Broadbent, 1958, 1971). A growing number of studies suggest 
that humans can switch dynamically between attention strategies if needed (e.g., 
Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Cohen, Botvinick, & Carter, 2000; 
Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; Logan, 1985). For example, imagine that you have to 
respond to the central letter in a letter string. Perhaps standard you would focus your 
attention in the middle of the string. But if on most trials, the other letters in the string are 
identical to the target, you could modify your strategy by widening your attention such 
that the other letters -  which are not competing for your response -  are also processed to 
some extent. Because the flankers activate the same response as the central letter, the 
average response time (RT) across trials is reduced.
In the last decade, researchers have made considerable progress in unraveling the 
various processes involved in this ability of the human attention system to dynamically 
adjust itself to optimize performance. This ability is often referred to as attentional 
control (e.g., Posner & Raichle, 1994; Roelofs, 2003). If we want to understand how 
people make strategic adjustments based on their own behaviour and on the specific type 
of information available at a particular time, it is crucial that we understand the different 
functions underlying attentional control in detail.
Much recent research of attentional control adjustments has been driven by the 
observation that the RT difference between incongruent and congruent trials is smaller 
following an incongruent trial than following a congruent trial, as observed in a seminal 
study by Gratton et al. (1992). Subsequent research referred to this finding as the 
“Gratton effect” (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Verbruggen, Notebaert, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2006). According to the prevailing account in the literature (e.g., 
Botvinick et al., 2001), the Gratton effect indicates attentional control adjustments 
following response conflict on incongruent trials. However, because previous studies 
compared incongruent and congruent trials, it has remained unclear to what extent the 
adjustments are driven by incongruent rather than congruent trials. The aim of the 
research reported in the present article was to examine this issue. We start by briefly
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reviewing the burgeoning literature on the Gratton effect and the different underlying RT 
patterns that give rise to the effect. Next, we present the results of three new RT 
experiments in which we employed neutral stimuli (Experiments 1 and 2) or cues 
(Experiment 3) to examine the role of response conflict. Finally, we discuss the 
consequences of our results for the conflict-adaptation view, and we present the results of 
computer simulations demonstrating the utility of a new two-factor account of the 
Gratton effect and the various underlying RT patterns in the literature and the present 
experiments.
4.2.1 Review o f the Gratton effect and underlying RT patterns
The Gratton effect is studied by using tasks that elicit conflict in responding, like the 
flanker task of Eriksen and Eriksen (1974). In the original version of this task, a string of 
seven characters was presented briefly on a screen, and participants had to manually 
indicate the identity of the central character (H or S) as quickly and accurately as 
possible. The six flankers were either identical to the target (a congruent trial, e.g., 
HHHHHHH) or different from the target and associated with the alternative response (an 
incongruent trial, e.g., SSSHSSS). Control efficiency in this task is indexed by the 
distractor effect, the performance decline on incongruent compared with congruent trials. 
Based on research using this flanker task, Gratton et al. (1992) suggested that the focus of 
visual attention is adapted by individuals on the basis of recent performance. More 
specifically, Gratton and colleagues (1992, Experiment 1) discovered that the 
compatibility of the preceding trial influenced the behaviour on the current trial. The 
distracting effect of the flankers was weaker on trials following an incongruent trial than 
on trials that followed a congruent one. In particular, on a congruent trial, RT was shorter 
when the preceding trial was also congruent than when the preceding trial was 
incongruent. Likewise, on an incongruent trial, RT was slightly shorter when the previous 
trial was an incongruent trial than when it was a congruent trial. Figure 4.1A shows this 
RT pattern. The key observation is that the difference in RT between incongruent and 
congruent trials was smaller following incongruent trials than following congruent trials. 
Gratton et al. (1992) distinguished between two types of attentional strategies for the 
flanker stimuli. First, with congruent stimuli in which no response conflict exists between
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target and flankers, participants may adopt a wide (also called parallel or open) 
processing strategy. All stimuli in the string are being processed simultaneously, without 
special focus on the target. Target identification is very fast, but also vulnerable to the 
influences of the distractors. Second, with incongruent stimuli, participants may adopt a 
narrow (sometimes also referred to as focused  or closed) processing strategy. Special 
attention is given to the processing of the central target while the processing of the nearby 
distractors is suppressed. This narrow strategy ensures that identification of an 
incongruent stimulus is highly accurate, but the processing time is usually longer than 
that for the wide strategy.
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Figure 4.1. Illustration o f  different response tim e (RT) patterns underlying the Gratton effect 
reported in the literature. (A) RT effects on both current-congruent and current- 
incongruent trials. (B) RT effect on current-congruent trials only. (C) RT effect 
on current-incongruent trials only. “p” = partial repetition, “f ’ = full repetition or 
alternation. c, C, con = congruent; i, I, inc = incongruent.
To explain their RT pattern, Gratton et al. (1992) proposed that participants 
expect each upcoming trial to be of the same type as the previous trial and adjust their 
attentional strategy likewise (the congruency “repetition expectancy account”, cf. Egner,
2007). Thus, after a congruent trial, participants select the wide strategy to process the
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stimulus on the next trial, whereas after an incongruent trial, participants use the narrow 
strategy. However, on an incongruent trial that follows a congruent trial, henceforth 
referred to as a cl trial, the wide strategy is in fact not suitable for that incongruent 
stimulus. Processing the flankers, switching back to the narrow strategy, or double­
checking the prepared response costs extra time. Consequently, the response time of a cl 
trial is delayed compared to an il trial (an incongruent trial that follows an incongruent 
trial). Similarly, on an iC trial (a congruent trial that follows an incongruent trial), the 
employed narrow strategy was not necessary for that congruent stimulus and increases 
the response time a little compared with that on a cC trial (a congruent trial that follows a 
congruent trial). Recently, further evidence for this repetition expectancy account was 
provided by an event-related brain potential (ERP) study. Bartholow, Pearson, Dickter, 
Sher, Fabiani, and Gratton (2005) showed that in a flanker task the correct response 
negativity (CRN), an ERP component associated with response selection, was larger to 
incongruent trials when congruent trials were expected and was larger to congruent trials 
when incongruent trials were expected. These authors proposed that the CRN signals the 
inappropriateness of the attentional strategy (wide vs. narrow) that was selected on the 
basis of probability information about the upcoming stimulus type (congruent vs. 
incongruent) and the need to switch to the other strategy.
Gratton and colleagues (1992) observed that the error rate was about 10% lower 
in il trials than in cl trials. However, the difference in response time between these 
conditions was found to be only 3 ms. Thus, the original Gratton RT pattern was almost 
exclusively determined by current-congruent trials (namely, faster responses on cC-trials 
than on iC-trials), as illustrated in Figure 4.1B. The illustrated pattern of RTs was also 
obtained by Ullsperger, Bylsma, and Botvinick (2005) and Freitas, Bahar, Yang, and 
Banai (2007) using a flanker task. This raises the question of why the widening of 
attention does not (much) increase RTs on cl trials (incongruent following congruent; 
wide attention) compared with il trials (incongruent following incongruent; narrow 
attention). A possibility is that responding is generally slowed following incongruent 
trials (slowing both iC and il trials) or hastened following congruent trials (speeding up 
both cC and cl trials) and that such a general slowing or speeding up offsets the effect of 
widening of attention on cl trials. For example, following incongruent trials, participants
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may be more cautious and adopt a more stringent response criterion (e.g., Meyer,
Roelofs, & Levelt, 2003) or engage in more extensive self-monitoring (e.g., Roelofs,
2004) after response selection. We take up this issue again in the General Discussion 
section of this article, where we present the results of computer simulations 
demonstrating the utility of this two-factor account.
Regardless of the cause of the absence of an RT effect on current incongruent 
trials, given that the first experiment of Gratton et al. (1992) did not include neutral trials, 
it is unclear whether the Gratton effect resulted from attentional widening following 
congruent trials, narrowing following incongruent trials, or both. Evidence in favour of 
attentional widening based on expected congruency came from another experiment 
reported by Gratton et al. (1992, Experiment 3a) using symbolic cues that predicted with 
20%, 50%, or 80% certainty that the upcoming Eriksen flanker stimulus would be 
congruent (as opposed to be incongruent). The difference in RT between incongruent and 
congruent trials was larger with the 80% congruent-predicting cues than with the 80% 
incongruent-predicting cues and neutral 50%-each cues (i.e., 50% congruent or 
incongruent), whereas the latter two cue types did not differ from each other in the 
magnitude of the distractor effect. Taken together, the data of Gratton et al. suggest that 
strategic control adjustments mainly arise from expecting congruent trials.
However, a decade ago another explanation for the Gratton effect was put 
forward, which also considers the sequential effect to be an indication for strategic 
adjustments in control settings, but supposes a different underlying nature of the 
processing strategy. Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, and Cohen (1999) obtained RTs 
in a brain imaging study using an arrow version of the classic Eriksen flanker stimuli. 
Participants were presented with strings of five arrow-heads (e.g., <<<<< or <<><<) and 
had to indicate manually the direction of the central character as quickly and accurately 
as possible. Behavioural data reflected the sequential effect reported by Gratton et al. 
(1992) in the sense that the distractor effect (incongruent minus congruent) was larger for 
trials following congruent trials than for trials following incongruent trials (unfortunately, 
mean RTs for the cC, cl, iC, and il trial types were not given). Responses on il trials were 
said to be faster than those on cl trials for 8 of the 11 participants. Botvinick et al. (1999) 
argued that “the most interesting implications of the Gratton effect relate specifically to
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incompatible trials” (p.179). Because in this study, adjustments in control seem to arise 
following experienced response conflict, Botvinick and colleagues stated that the Gratton 
effect reflects conflict adaptation following response conflict on incongruent trials, 
consisting of a narrowing of attention.
The idea that attentional control is triggered by response conflict was further 
elaborated and computationally modelled by Botvinick et al. (2001) and Yeung, Cohen, 
and Botvinick (2004). This conflict-monitoring model has become a dominant view in the 
literature on attentional control processes. It postulates that when mutually incompatible 
responses are simultaneously activated in the brain (e.g., when processing an incongruent 
stimulus), a conflict-monitoring mechanism (presumed to be located in the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex, ACC) signals the need for more attentional control (although conflict 
may arise at other levels of information processing, the model is centred around response 
conflict). A strategic control mechanism (presumed to be located in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex) aims to resolve this conflict by top-down biasing the processing of the 
task-specific dimension (i.e., the central character in the flanker task, see also Egner & 
Hirsch, 2005) and suppressing the task-irrelevant dimension -  namely, the distractors 
(e.g., Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002). Such conflict-driven 
adjustments result in a smaller distractor effect following an incongruent stimulus than 
following a congruent one: the Gratton effect.
Kerns et al. (2004) extended the conflict-monitoring theory by demonstrating that 
conflict adaptation is achieved not only with flanker stimuli, consisting of spatially 
separated targets and distractors, but also with spatially integrated stimuli -  namely, 
colour-word Stroop stimuli. In the original experiments of Stroop (1935; see MacLeod,
1991, for a review), participants had to name the ink colour of colour words or series of 
Xs. They were slower in naming incongruent stimuli (e.g., saying “red” to the word 
BLUE in red ink) than neutral stimuli (e.g., saying “red” to a string of Xs in red ink). 
Using congruent and incongruent colour-word Stroop stimuli, Kerns et al. observed the 
Gratton effect in manual RT s in a brain imaging experiment. The distractor effect was 
126 ms when the previous trial was congruent and only 70 ms when the previous trial 
was incongruent. Effects were only found on current-incongruent trials (i.e., il trials were 
56 ms faster than cl trials), as illustrated in Figure 4.1C. This suggests that following an
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incongruent trial, the attentional focus is narrowed more to the colour dimension. For 
current-congruent trials, it did not matter whether the preceding trial was congruent or 
incongruent. This provides further support for the conflict-monitoring theory’s base 
assumption that control adjustments are only evoked in response to incongruent trials.
The obtained RT pattern raises the question why the narrowing of attention does not 
increase RT s on congruent trials following incongruent trials (iC) compared with 
congruent trials following congruent ones (cC). Kerns et al. suggested that this is because 
congruent trials are simply not much affected by the width of attention.
Sequential effects on both current-congruent and current-incongruent trials were 
obtained by Egner and Hirsch (2005), matching the RT pattern depicted in Figure 4.1A. 
This brain imaging study used a face-word variant of the colour-word Stroop task, in 
which names of actors and politicians were superimposed on photos showing faces of 
famous actors or politicians. The face-name combinations formed congruent and 
incongruent stimuli. Depending on the task, participants had to manually categorize 
either the name or the face as “actor” or “politician”. In line with all previous studies, 
Egner and Hirsch obtained a Gratton effect: The distractor effect was larger following a 
congruent trial than following an incongruent trial. However, in this study the sequential 
effect manifested itself on both congruent and incongruent trials (see also Bartholow et 
al., 2005; Burle, Allain, Vidal, & Hasbroucq, 2005; Kunde, 2003; Nieuwenhuis & Yeung, 
2005; Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen, & Liefooghe, 2006). However, because neutral 
trials were lacking, it is unclear whether the RT pattern was the result of experienced 
response conflict, expected response facilitation, or both.
As outlined above, it is currently unclear what precise condition (incongruent, 
congruent, or both) triggers attentional control adjustments and thus whether the presence 
of response conflict is necessary. Recent studies complicate the picture further by 
suggesting that the Gratton effect does not emerge from strategic top-down adjustments 
in control settings, but instead result from retrieval advantages for specific stimulus- 
response pairs (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006; Notebaert, Soetens, & Melis, 2001). Note that when only two 
distractor conditions (congruent and incongruent) are used with just two different stimuli 
for each condition, exact stimulus repetitions will occur in about 50% of the cC and il
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trials and never in the cl and iC trials, which contain only partial stimulus repetitions. The 
occurrences of full stimulus repetitions are indicated by “f ’ in Figure 4.1 and partial 
repetitions by “p”. It is well known that stimulus-specific priming improves the 
processing of the stimulus and thus reduces the RT (e.g., Hamberger & Friedman, 1992; 
Kraut & Smothergill, 1978). Therefore, greater repetition priming effects for full than 
partial stimulus repetitions could explain why responses on cC trials (full repetition) are 
faster than those on iC trials (partial repetition) and why responses on iI trials (full 
repetition) may be faster than those on cl trials (partial repetition), as Botvinick et al. 
(1999) found. Indeed, using the standard Eriksen flanker task, Mayr and colleagues 
(2003) found that the Gratton effect completely disappeared when all exact stimulus 
repetition trials were removed from the RT data analyses (for similar findings, see 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006). These authors therefore claimed that the Gratton effect does 
not stem at all from modulations in attentional control, but are simply the result of 
stimulus repetitions.
However, evidence against this repetition priming account was provided by 
Ullsperger et al. (2005), who found a Gratton effect with arrow head flanker stimuli even 
when they controlled for priming effects by including only target-alternation trials in the 
data analyses. Other studies also obtained the Gratton effect while controlling for 
repetition effects (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004; Notebaert et al., 2006; Wühr & Ansorge,
2005). Furthermore, Freitas et al. (2007) demonstrated that control adjustments are also 
made between successive trials when flanker and Stroop tasks are alternated. Apparently, 
attentional modulations are not evoked by the stimulus features but by the distractor 
condition. Given these findings, it seems likely that both attentional adjustment and 
feature priming effects contribute to the Gratton pattern separately (cf. Egner, 2007; 
Notebaert & Verguts, 2007).
In the past few years, research into the Gratton effect has expanded enormously. 
Although Nieuwenhuis and colleagues (2006) suggested that conflict adaptation might be 
restricted to Stroop (Kerns et al., 2004) and Simon tasks (Fischer, Plessow, & Kiesel, 
2010; Ridderinkhof, 2002b; Stürmer et al., 2002; Wühr & Ansorge, 2005), the Gratton 
effect has been observed with a large variety of tasks, including a prime-target 
interference task (Kunde, 2003), a spatial cueing task (Jongen & Smulders, 2007), the
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SNARC (Spatial-numerical association of response codes) task (Notebaert & Verguts, 
2008), and other stimulus response compatibility tasks, where location was the relevant 
dimension (Stoffels, 1996). The Gratton effect is found to be item-nonspecific (Verguts 
& Notebaert, 2008), but may depend on the task that is used (Fernandez-Duque &
Knight, 2008). In a review of the literature, Egner (2008) suggests that the effects of the 
adjustment in control settings are probably mediated by multiple, independent conflict- 
control loops that can operate in parallel. However, the underlying mechanism that 
triggers the adjustments in control remains unclear (cf. Fernandez-Duque & Knight, 
2008). Egner (2007) argued that “the behavioural data show that neither conflict 
adaptation nor feature integration effects can account for all instances of the congruency 
sequence effect” (p. 388) and “even when controlling for feature integration effects, the 
interpretation of congruency sequence effects as reflecting conflict-driven control 
processes still hinges on the assumption that no other processes additionally impact this 
effect. This assumption may well be incorrect, and it is therefore crucial to identify 
possible additional contributors to this effect, such as expectancy-based control 
processes” (p.389). Nevertheless, the central idea in most research is that the control 
adjustment underlying the Gratton effect is driven by response conflict (for a review, see 
Mansouri, Tanaka, & Buckley, 2009), thereby ignoring the original observation by 
Gratton et al. (1992) that adjustments can be independent of response conflict, at least for 
the Eriksen flanker task.
4.2.2 Plan o f the present study
The central aim of the experiments reported in the present article was to investigate 
whether the presence or expectation of response conflict is necessary for adjustments in 
attentional control to be observed. To our knowledge, only two Gratton-type studies have 
used neutral stimuli (Kunde, 2003, with a prime-target interference task, and Wuhr & 
Ansorge, 2005, with the Simon task). Consequently, from most studies it is unclear 
whether the Gratton effect indicates a speed-up of responding on cC (or iI) trials or 
prolonged responding on cI (or iC) trials. We therefore included neutral trials in addition 
to congruent and incongruent ones in our experiments. We use the term neutral in a 
descriptive sense, indicating stimuli that do not evoke response conflict, like standard
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incongruent stimuli, or facilitate responding, like standard congruent stimuli. Given that 
recent research suggests that control adjustments may differ somewhat depending on the 
specific conflict task that is used (Magen & Cohen, 2007), we examined performance in 
both the Eriksen flanker task (Experiment 1) and the colour-word Stroop task 
(Experiment 2). Evidence from these two tasks has previously been taken as support for 
the conflict monitoring model (Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004). The targets in 
our Eriksen flanker task were the letters S and H, and the neutral distractors were Os, 
which were not mapped onto any response. The targets in our colour-word Stroop task 
were the colours red and green, and the neutral distractors were Xs, which were not 
mapped onto any response. We are not assuming that our neutral stimuli are completely 
free of conflict. Presumably, our incongruent and neutral stimuli require some attentional 
focusing to identify the target, which may not be required by congruent stimuli. 
Nevertheless, our neutral distractors do not activate any response and therefore may serve 
to assess effects of response conflict from incongruent stimuli or facilitation from 
congruent stimuli.
All Gratton-type studies used manual responding, except for three recent studies 
using vocal responding (Fernandez-Duque & Knight, 2008; Freitas et al., 2007; Magen & 
Cohen, 2007). However, these studies did not include neutral trials. As a consequence, it 
is at present unclear whether the Gratton effect can be independent of response conflict in 
vocal responding. Producing speech requires a complex form of action planning 
involving multiple processing levels (e.g., Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999; Roelofs, 
2003), and it is therefore well conceivable that response modality interacts with the 
attentional control systems investigated in the current study (cf. Magen & Cohen, 2007; 
for a similar account of response modality effects in Stroop task performance, see 
Roelofs, 2003). As a second objective, we therefore assessed the effect of response 
modality in the present study by having the participants respond manually and vocally in 
both tasks. Third, to address the issue of generalization of our findings, we not only 
examined trial-to-trial adjustments (Experiments 1 and 2), but also examined the effect of 
cue-based adjustments (Experiment 3), following Gratton et al. (1992). Participants were 
presented with neutral cues or congruent- or incongruent-predicting cues, and the Gratton 
effect following these cues was assessed. It is presently unclear whether such expectancy-
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based effects reflect the same type of strategic processing as the more thoroughly studied 
stimulus-driven effects (Egner, 2007). Wühr and Kunde (2008) stated that “it seems that 
preparation for stimulus or response conflict is a difficult task, and every demonstration 
of how to overcome this difficulty is welcome both for theoretical as well as for practical 
reasons” (p.883).
Our predictions for all three experiments were as follows: If the Gratton effect 
concerns adaptation based on response conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001), the distractor 
effect should be smaller for postincongruent trials than for postcongruent and postneutral 
trials, whereas the distractor effect for postneutral trials should resemble that for post­
congruent trials (after all, like congruent stimuli, a neutral stimulus is not associated with 
response conflict). In contrast, if the Gratton effect concerns an anticipation of upcoming 
response facilitation by widening attention, the distractor effect should be larger for 
postcongruent trials than for postincongruent and postneutral trials, whereas the distractor 
effect for postneutral trials and postincongruent trials should be the same (after all, a 
neutral stimulus does not predict an upcoming congruent stimulus). Finally, if the Gratton 
effect concerns a combination of widening of attention in anticipation of a congruent trial 
and narrowing of attention following incongruent trials, one might expect that the size of 
the distractor effect for postneutral trials lies somewhere in between the larger post­
congruent and the smaller postincongruent distractor effects.
4.3 EXPERIM ENT 1
The purpose of the first experiment was to assess the nature of the Gratton effect in the 
Eriksen flanker task by including neutral trials in addition to incongruent and congruent 
ones. The participants responded both manually and vocally to assess the effect of 
response modality.
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4.3.1 Method
4.3.1.1 Participants.
Sixteen students from Nijmegen University (13 of them female) volunteered to 
participate in the experiment. Their age varied from 18 to 25 years with a mean of 21 
years. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants took part individually 
and were paid for their participation.
4.3.1.2 Apparatus.
The experiment was conducted on two separate, connected microcomputers. The first 
computer generated the visual displays, and the second computer collected the 
experimental data. RTs were measured with an accuracy of 1 ms (1,000 Hz) by a voice 
key for the vocal responses and a button box with two buttons for the manual responses. 
The participants were seated in front of a colour CRT monitor connected to the first 
computer, at a viewing distance of approximately 70 cm. On a second monitor connected 
to the data collection computer, the experimenter was shown the correct response and the 
participant’s response latencies.
4.3.1.3 Materials and design.
The displayed stimuli mirrored those from Gratton et al.’s (1992) first experiment and 
consisted of 6 five-letter arrays. These white capital characters (18-points Arial) were 6 
mm high and 4.5 mm wide, corresponding to 0.5° by 0.4° of visual angle at a viewing 
distance of approximately 70 cm. The width of the entire string measured 25 mm (2° of 
visual angle). The background of the computer screen was black.
The character in the center of the five-letter array formed the target and was 
always either an H or an S. The four other characters (two on each side of the target) 
formed flanker letters. Three distractor conditions were used. In the congruent condition, 
the four flankers were equal to the target (SSSSS and HHHHH), whereas in the 
incongruent condition, the flankers were associated with the alternative response 
(HHSHH and SSHSS). In the neutral condition, the flankers were different from the 
target, but they were not associated with any possible response (OOHOO and OOSOO).
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The experiment consisted of 360 experimental trials, with a short break after 
every 90th trial. The presentation of the stimuli was pseudorandomized within a block of 
90 trials, under such constraints that each of the nine possible trial sequences (e.g., 
incongruent-congruent or neutral-incongruent) occurred equally often.
All participants responded manually in one half of the experiment and vocally in 
the other half. The order of the response modality was counterbalanced across 
participants.
4.3.1.4 Procedure.
The participants took part individually in a dimly illuminated, quiet room. The instruction 
for the first response modality (manual or vocal) was given on paper and was repeated 
orally by the experimenter. After 12 practice trials, 180 experimental trials followed, with 
a short break after the 90 th trial. Then, the instruction for the second response modality 
was given both written and orally. Again, 12 practice trials were followed by 180 
experimental trials, with a short break halfway. When the letter array appeared, the 
central character had to be identified. Participants were encouraged to react as quickly 
and accurately as possible. Incorrect responses in the vocal condition were classified 
online by the experimenter.
A trial went as follows: A visual cue (a small white asterisk) appeared at the 
center of the screen. After 1 s, this location cue disappeared, and a five-letter array was 
presented, with the position of the central character just above the previous cue. In the 
manual condition, the participants identified the central target (H or S) by pressing one of 
two buttons with the left and right index fingers (counterbalanced across participants). To 
make sure that response selection was as comparable as possible between the two 
response modalities, in the vocal condition participants had to identify the target 
character by saying aloud either “left” or “right” (counterbalanced across participants). 
After 1,500 ms the screen blanked for 1 s, and then the next trial started. The beginning 
of a break was indicated by the Dutch word PAUZE (pause) for 1,500 ms. The beginning 
of a block was preceded by the word ATTENTIE (attention) for 1,500 ms. An 
experimental session took about 30 min.
89
4.3.2 Results and discussion
The following data-trimming procedure was used: Trials for which RTs were longer than 
1,500 ms or shorter than 200 ms, trials in which the voice key malfunctioned or triggered 
inappropriately (in combination, 0.66% of the data), and the trials in which the participant 
made an incorrect response (1.18% of the data) were discarded. To reduce post-error 
slowing effects (Rabbitt, 1966) each trial immediately following an incorrect response 
was omitted from analyses. Also, as the first trial of each block by definition has no 
preceding trial, these four trials were omitted from the RT analyses. The remaining RTs 
(95.87%) were used in calculations of means. The upper panel in Figure 4.2A shows the 
mean RTs as a function of trial sequence for manual, vocal, and overall responses. The 
lower panel in Figure 4.2A shows the obtained error percentages (only incorrect response 
trials, not voice key errors and time-outs, based on all trials except the four block-starting 
trials) for the same conditions.
Three-way repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted 
on the mean correct RTs, with current trial (congruent, incongruent, neutral), previous 
trial (congruent, incongruent, neutral), and response modality (vocal, manual) as within- 
participants factors. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. The RT 
analysis showed main effects of current trial, F(2, 30) = 60.02,MSE = 1,130, p  < .001, an 
average distractor effect of 47 ms; previous trial, F(2, 30) = 7.22, MSE = 563, p  = .003, 
mean response latencies were overall longest for postincongruent trials; and response 
modality, F(1, 15) = 15.37, MSE = 28,331, p  = .001, indicating that manual responses 
were on average 78 ms faster than vocal responses. Current trial and previous trial 
interacted, indicating a sequential effect, F(4, 60) = 7.58, MSE = 935, p  = .001. Response 
modality interacted neither with current trial (p = .282) nor with previous trial (F < 1). 
Moreover, the interaction between response modality, current trial, and previous trial was 
not significant, indicating that response modality had no influence on the Gratton effect, 
F(4, 60) < 1. Therefore, in the remaining analyses we collapsed the data over the factor 
response modality.
Pairwise comparisons revealed that the distractor effect (incongruent minus 
congruent) was larger for postcongruent trials than for postincongruent, the classic 
Gratton effect. Post hoc comparisons showed that the distractor effect was smaller for
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(A)
P rev ious  tr ia l type
(B) (C)
P rev ious  tr ia l type Prev ious  tr ia l type
Figure 4.2. Results o f Experiment 1 with Eriksen flanker stimuli. (A) Mean response times
and incorrect response percentages as a function of current trial type and previous 
trial type for manual, vocal, and overall data. (B) Overall distractor effects 
(incongruent minus congruent) and the corresponding _p-values following 
congruent, incongruent, and neutral trials. (C) Overall distractor effects 
(incongruent minus congruent) and the corresponding _p-values when full 
stimulus repetitions are omitted from analyses to control for priming effects. 
con = congruent, inc = incongruent, neu = neutral.
postneutral trials than for postcongruent trials and that the distractor effect was similar for 
postneutral and postincongruent trials. Figure 4.2B shows the magnitudes of the 
distractor effects and the corresponding _p-values.
Further analyses were conducted to investigate the underlying RT pattern. In the 
literature on the Gratton effect, the distractor effect is always smaller following an
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incongruent trial than following a congruent trial. However, this Gratton effect resulted 
from an RT difference on current-congruent trials (Gratton et al., 1992), an RT difference 
on current-incongruent trials (Kerns et al., 2004), or a combination of both (Egner & 
Hirsch, 2005). In our experiment, paired comparisons showed that for current-congruent 
trials, responses were significantly slower following an incongruent trial than following a 
congruent trial, F(1, 15) = 19.47, MSE = 477, p  = .001, whereas for current-incongruent 
trials, the nature of the preceding trial had no influence on the RT, F(1, 15) = 0.613, MSE 
= 226, p  = .446.
As can be seen in Figure 4.2A, the error pattern resembled the RT pattern. Error 
rates were slightly lower in the faster conditions, suggesting that no speed-accuracy 
trade-off occurred in the data. As the number of errors was very low (1.18%), these were 
not further analysed.
In short, the results of Experiment 1 replicate and extend the finding of Gratton et 
al. (1992) obtained with Eriksen flanker stimuli. The distractor effect is smaller following 
an incongruent stimulus than following a congruent stimulus (i.e., the Gratton effect). 
Furthermore, the distractor effect is larger following congruent trials than following 
neutral trials, whereas the distractor effect does not differ following incongruent and 
neutral trials. As could be expected, RT s in the vocal condition were slower than those in 
the manual condition (on average 78 ms). However, the Gratton patterns were very 
similar. Therefore, we can safely conclude that the response modality (vocal versus 
manual) had no influence on the observed Gratton effect.
As mentioned in the introduction, an alternative account for the Gratton effect 
was proposed recently. According to this repetition account, the observed RT pattern 
would not indicate attentional adjustments, but simply result from priming effects due to 
exact stimulus repetitions (Mayr et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006). To ensure that 
the Gratton pattern in our experiment actually arose from modifications in attentional 
control, we reanalysed our data, this time excluding all trials for which the preceding trial 
had an identical stimulus. Note that this occurs only in the cC, il, and nN trials. After 
having removed the stimulus repetitions, the results were virtually identical to those 
obtained when the stimulus repetitions were still included (see Figure 4.2C). Most 
important, the interaction between current trial (con, inc, neu) and previous trial (con, inc,
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neu) was still significant, F(4, 60) = 7.69, MSE = 554, p  < .001. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the distractor effect was larger for postcongruent trials than for post­
incongruent and postneutral trials, whereas the latter two did not differ. See Figure 4.2C 
for the corresponding _p-values. To conclude, the Gratton effect observed in the present 
experiment is not caused by exact stimulus repetition priming.
The RT difference between incongruent and congruent trials was larger for post­
congruent trials than for postincongruent and postneutral trials. This pattern of results 
suggests that the adjustments were independent of response conflict, contrary to what the 
conflict-adaptation hypothesis holds. However, the RT patterns also do not agree with the 
expectation hypothesis. Expectation is a two-sided mechanism, with behavioural benefits 
when expected events occur and costs when unexpected events occur. The hypothesis 
explains why congruent-congruent trials (expected) were faster than incongruent- 
congruent trials (unexpected). However, the expectation hypothesis would also predict 
that congruent-incongruent trials (unexpected) should be slower than incongruent- 
incongruent trials (expected), but this is not what we observed. In the experiment, the 
RTs on incongruent trials were independent of the previous trial type. Thus, our data 
challenge both the conflict-monitoring and expectation hypotheses.
4.4 EXPERIMENT 2
After investigating the Gratton effect using flanker stimuli, the purpose of the second 
experiment was to assess the nature of the Gratton effect in the colour-word Stroop task 
while including neutral trials in addition to incongruent and congruent ones. Although 
response modality had no influence on the overall Gratton pattern with Eriksen flanker 
stimuli in the previous experiment, participants responded again both manually and 
vocally to assess a possible effect of response modality with Stroop stimuli.
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4.4.1 Method
4.4.1.1 Participants.
Thirty-two students from Nijmegen University (27 of them female) volunteered to 
participate in the experiment.1 Their age varied from 18 to 33 years with a mean of 22 
years. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The participants took part 
individually and were paid for their participation.
4.4.1.2 Apparatus.
The apparatus configuration used in this experiment was identical to that in Experiment 1.
4.4.1.3 Materials and design.
The displayed stimuli consisted of coloured rectangular bars and written distractor colour 
words. The stimuli were 49 mm x 17 mm (corresponding to 4° x 1.4° of visual angle at a 
viewing distance of approximately 70 cm). To minimize the differences between this 
experiment and Experiment 1 (in order to be able to generalize the results), we used only 
two different colours and colour words. The stimuli consisted of red and green target bars 
and the following Dutch colour words: ROOD (red) and GROEN (green). The distractor 
words were superimposed in white upper-case letters on the colour bar, forming semi­
integral Stroop stimuli (cf. Lamers & Roelofs, 2007). The background of the computer 
screen was black.
Three distractor conditions were used: congruent, neutral, and incongruent. The 
congruent stimuli consisted of the two matching colour bar -  colour name pairs (red bar- 
ROOD, green bar-GROEN). The incongruent stimuli were nonmatching colour pairs (red 
bar-GROEN, green bar-ROOD). The neutral stimuli resulted from the two colour bars 
with an XXXXX-string superimposed on it.
The experiment consisted of 360 experimental trials, with a short break after 
every 90th trial. As in Experiment 1, the presentation of the stimuli was pseudo-
1 After testing the planned 16 participants, we observed smaller distractor effects than we 
eppected. To increase; the statistical oower, we ocmbled the numbe r o f participants compared to 
the previuus experiment with flanke r stimuli.
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randomized within a block of 90 trials, with the boundary condition that the first-order 
sequential effects were equilibrated; that is, each distractor condition was followed by 
each other distractor condition the same number of times, and the maximum number of 
stimulus repetitions was set to three.
All participants responded manually in one half of the experiment and vocally in 
the other half. The order of the response modality was counterbalanced across the 
participants.
4.4.1.4 Procedure.
The procedure for this experiment resembled that in Experiment 1, except that the task of 
the participant was now to identify the colour of the rectangular bar, as soon as the 
colour-word Stroop stimulus appeared. The participants were encouraged to react as 
quickly and accurately as possible, while trying to ignore the distractor word.
A trial went as follows: A colour-word Stroop stimulus appeared at the center of 
the screen and remained visible for 1,500 ms. In the manual condition, the participants 
identified the colour by pressing one of two buttons with the left and right index fingers 
(counterbalanced across participants). In the vocal condition, the participants identified 
the target colour by saying aloud “red” or “green”. After 1,500 ms the screen blanked for 
1 s, and then the next trial started. The beginning of a break was indicated by the Dutch 
word PAUZE (pause) for 1,500 ms. The start of a block was preceded by the word 
ATTENTIE (attention) for 1,500 ms. An experimental session took about 30 min.
4.4.2 Results and discussion
The same data trimming procedure as that for Experiment 1 was used. The following 
trials were discarded from RT analyses: trials for which the RTs were shorter than 200 
ms, longer than 1,500 ms, or in which the voice key malfunctioned or triggered 
inappropriately (in combination, 1.12% of the data); trials in which the participant 
hesitated or made an incorrect response (1.13% of the data); the four block-starting trials; 
and the posterror trials. Mean RTs were calculated over the remaining trials (95.7%). The 
upper panel in Figure 4.3A shows the mean RTs as a function of trial sequence for
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manual, vocal, and overall responses for Experiment 2. The lower panel in Figure 4.3A 
shows the obtained error percentages for the same conditions.
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the mean correct RT s, with 
current trial (congruent, incongruent, neutral), previous trial (congruent, incongruent, 
neutral), and response modality (vocal, manual) as within-participants factors. An alpha 
level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. The RT analysis showed main effects of
(A)
P rev ious  tr ia l type
(B) (C)
P rev ious  tria l type Prev ious  tr ia l type
Figure 4.3. Results o f  Experim ent 2 w ith colour-word Stroop stimuli. (A) M ean response 
tim es and incorrect response percentages as a function o f  current trial type and 
previous trial type for m anual, vocal, and overall data. (B) Overall distractor 
effects (incongruent m inus congruent) and the corresponding _p-values following 
congruent, incongruent, and neutral trials. (C) Overall distractor effects 
(incongruent m inus congruent) and the corresponding _p-values w hen full 
stim ulus repetitions are om itted from  analyses to control for prim ing effects. 
con = congruent, inc = incongruent, neu = neutral.
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current trial, F(2, 62) = 26.26,MSE = 1,701, p  < .001, an average distractor effect of 23 
ms; of previous trial, F(2, 62) = 8.77, MSE = 362, p  = .001, mean response latencies were 
longest following an incongruent trial; and of response modality, F(1, 31) = 184.50, MSE 
= 10,604, p  < .001, manual responses were on average 116 ms faster than vocal 
responses. The interaction of most importance to our purposes, current trial by previous 
trial, was significant, F(4, 124) = 3.21, MSE = 513, p  = .025, an indication of a sequential 
effect. The three-way interaction between response modality, current trial, and previous 
trial was not significant, F(4, 124) = 1.12, MSE = 445, p  = .351, indicating that response 
modality had no influence on the Gratton effect, exactly as in Experiment 1. Therefore, in 
the remaining analyses we collapsed the data over the factor response modality.
Post hoc comparisons showed that the Gratton effect was obtained: The distractor 
effect was larger for postcongruent trials than for postincongruent trials. Furthermore, the 
distractor effect for postneutral trials was smaller than for postcongruent trials, but 
similar to that for postincongruent trials. Figure 4.3B shows the magnitudes of the 
distractor effects and the corresponding p -values. Further post hoc analyses showed that 
for current-congruent trials, responses were significantly slower for postincongruent trials 
than for postcongruent trials (p < .001), whereas for current-incongruent trials the nature 
of the preceding trial had no influence on the latencies (F < 1).
As can be seen in Figure 4.3A, the error pattern resembled the RT pattern, except 
that the error rate for il trials was extremely low for vocal responses. Overall, error rates 
were slightly lower in the faster conditions, suggesting that no speed-accuracy trade-off 
occurred in the data. As the number of errors was very low (1.1%), these were not further 
analysed.
To conclude, the results of Experiment 2 for colour-word Stroop stimuli confirm 
and extend the findings obtained with Eriksen flanker stimuli in the Gratton et al. (1992) 
study and the present Experiment 1. The Gratton effect is observed: The distractor effect 
is smaller after an incongruent stimulus than after a congruent stimulus. Furthermore, 
since the distractor effect is the same following incongruent and neutral trials, the data 
indicate that the sequential effect is not obtained because the participants make 
adaptations after response conflict, which is absent on neutral trials. The results also 
show that only for current-congruent trials are response latencies influenced by the
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compatibility of the preceding stimulus. As in Experiment 1, the response modality 
(vocal versus manual) had no influence on the observed Gratton effect, this time obtained 
with Stroop stimuli.
To investigate whether stimulus priming played a role in this experiment, as Mayr 
et al. (2003) suggested for the Eriksen flanker task, we reran the previous analyses on our 
data set, after removing all trials in which the stimulus was preceded by an identical 
stimulus (both colour and word). As shown in Figure 4.3C, when controlled for stimulus 
repetition effects, the interference effect for postcongruent trials was still larger than that 
for postincongruent and postneutral trials, whereas the latter two did not differ. Thus, the 
Gratton effect observed in the present experiment is not caused by repetition priming.
As in Experiment 1, the RT difference between incongruent and congruent trials 
was larger for postcongruent trials than for postincongruent and postneutral trials. This 
pattern of results suggests that the adjustments were independent of response conflict, 
contrary to what the conflict-adaptation hypothesis holds. However, the RT patterns also 
do not agree with the expectation hypothesis. The hypothesis predicts that congruent- 
congruent trials (expected) should be faster than incongruent-congruent trials 
(unexpected), as obtained. However, the hypothesis also predicts that congruent- 
incongruent trials (unexpected) should be slower than incongruent-incongruent trials 
(expected), but this is not observed. As in Experiment 1, the RTs on incongruent trials 
were independent of the previous trial type. Thus, our data challenge both the conflict- 
monitoring and expectation hypotheses.
4.5 EXPERIMENT 3
Our first two experiments indicated that the amount of interference in RT s is equal 
following an incongruent and a neutral trial, whereas the distractors have a larger 
influence following a congruent trial. This suggests that these control adjustments were 
not triggered by response conflict. However, our data also did not support the predictions 
of the expectation account. Still, many instances of cognitive control are prospective in 
nature, arising from expectancies based on explicit cues about the compatibility of the 
upcoming stimulus (Egner, 2008). Trial-to-trial (Experiments 1 and 2) and cue-based
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adjustments have sometimes been treated as equivalent instances of strategic processing, 
but they seem in fact to be based on somewhat different mechanisms (Egner, 2007). 
Indeed, recent research (Alpay, Goerke, & Stürmer, 2009; Fernandez-Duque & Knight, 
2008) presented evidence showing that the underlying processes may be quite different 
for these two instances of attentional control adjustment. Therefore, it is important to 
assess whether our finding from Experiments 1 and 2 (i.e., adjustments of attentional 
control can be independent of response conflict) can be extended to cue-based 
modulations (cf. Aarts & Roelofs, in press; Aarts, Roelofs, & Van Turennout, 2008). 
Experiment 3 was designed to investigate this issue empirically in the colour-word Stroop 
task, by using informative cues that were predictive of the upcoming compatibility 
(congruent vs. incongruent) or that were neutral regarding the upcoming stimulus. Also, 
as the modulations should be based on the cue instead of the preceding stimulus, 
repetition priming effect should be minimized, which was further enforced by increasing 
the stimulus set in the experiment. As the response modality had no effect in the first two 
experiments, we measured now only vocal responses to increase the statistical power.
4.5.1 Method
4.5.1.1 Participants.
Sixteen students from Nijmegen University (14 of them female) volunteered to 
participate in the experiment. Their age varied from 18 to 25 years with a mean of 20 
years. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The participants took part 
individually and were paid for their participation.
4.5.1.2 Apparatus.
The apparatus configuration used in this experiment was identical to that in Experiments 
1 and 2.
4.5.1.3 Materials and design.
Three white cues were used: a plus-sign, a minus-sign, and a zero, all fitting within an 
invisible box sized 6.1 mm x 6.1 mm (corresponding to 0.5° x 0.5° of visual angle at a
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viewing distance of approximately 70 cm). Furthermore, as in Experiment 2, the 
displayed stimuli consisted of coloured rectangular bars and written distractor colour 
words. The stimuli were 49 mm x 17 mm (corresponding to 4° x 1.4° of visual angle at a 
viewing distance of approximately 70 cm). Red, green, and blue target bars were used 
and the following Dutch colour words: ROOD (red), GROEN (green), and BLAUW 
(blue). The distractor words were superimposed in white upper-case letters on the colour 
bar. The background of the computer screen was black.
Two distractor conditions were used: congruent and incongruent. The congruent 
stimuli consisted of the three matching colour bar -  colour name pairs (red bar-ROOD, 
green bar-GROEN, blue bar-BLAUW). The incongruent stimuli were nonmatching 
colour pairs (red bar-BLAUW, green bar-ROOD, blue bar-GROEN).
Three cue conditions were used: A plus-sign indicated an 80% chance that the 
upcoming stimulus would be congruent (and thus only 20% chance on an incongruent 
stimulus). A minus-sign indicated the opposite: 80% chance on an incongruent stimulus. 
A zero-sign was noninformative: 50% chance on either a congruent or an incongruent 
stimulus.
The experiment consisted of 360 experimental trials (180 congruent and 180 
incongruent). The three cues were presented 120 times each, in such a manner that a plus- 
sign, a zero-sign, and a minus-sign were followed by a congruent stimulus in, respecti­
vely, 80%, 50%, and 20% of the trials. Within these constraints, the presentation of the 
stimuli was randomized within a block of 90 trials. All participants responded vocally.
4.5.1.4 Procedure.
The participants took part individually in a dimly illuminated, quiet room. The instruction 
was given on paper and was repeated orally by the experimenter. After a representative 
subset of 30 practice trials, 360 experimental trials followed, with a short break after 
every 90th trial. The task of the participants was to identify the colour of the rectangular 
bar, as soon as the colour-word Stroop stimulus appeared. They were informed that a 
zero-cue is noninformative, whereas a plus-cue indicates a high chance on an upcoming 
congruent stimulus, and a minus-sign indicates a high chance on an upcoming incon-
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gruent stimulus. The participants were encouraged to actively use this cue information in 
the stimulus processing and to react as quickly and accurately as possible.
A trial went as follows: A small white cue (+, -, or 0) appeared in the centre of the 
screen. After 250 ms, this cue disappeared, and the screen stayed blank for 1,250 ms. 
Then, a colour-word Stroop stimulus appeared at the centre of the screen and remained 
visible for 1,500 ms. The participants identified the target colour by saying aloud “rood”, 
“groen”, or “blauw”. Finally, the screen blanked for 1 s, and then the next trial started.
The beginning of a break was indicated by the Dutch word PAUZE (pause) for 1,500 ms, 
whereas the start of a block was preceded by the word ATTENTIE (attention) for 1,500 
ms. An experimental session took about 40 min.
4.5.2 Results and discussion
The same data-trimming procedure as before was used: RTs longer than 1,500 ms, 
RTs shorter than 200 ms, RTs for trials in which the voice key malfunctioned or triggered 
inappropriately (in combination, 2.2% of the data), RTs for trials in which the participant 
made an incorrect response (2.5% of the data), the four block-starting trials, and the post­
error trials were discarded from RT analyses. Mean RTs were calculated over the 
remaining trials (92.1%). The upper panel in Figure 4.4A shows the mean RTs as a 
function of cue and distractor type for previous-congruent, previous-incongruent, and 
overall responses for Experiment 3. The lower panel in Figure 4.4A shows the obtained 
error percentages for the same conditions.
Three-way repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the mean correct 
RTs, with cue (80% congruent-predicting, 50%-each, and 80% incongruent-predicting), 
current trial (congruent, incongruent), and previous trial (congruent, incongruent) as 
within-participants factors. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. The RT 
analysis showed a main effect of current trial, F(1, 15) = 49.68, MSE = 9,287, p  < .001, 
an average distractor effect of 98 ms. There were no significant main effects of cue and 
previous trial, nor was there an interaction between them (Fs < 1). Importantly, cue and 
current trial interacted, F(2, 30) = 15.99, M SE  = 1,525, p  < .001, an indication that the 
Gratton effect was obtained based on cues. Interestingly, current trial also interacted with 
previous trial, F(1, 15) = 6.97, M SE  = 852, p  = .019, the distractor effect was 22 ms
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smaller following an incongruent trial than following a congruent trial. This indicates that 
besides the cue, the Gratton effect emerged from a second source as well. However, when 
all exact stimulus repetitions were removed from analyses, this interaction was no longer
(B) (C)
con inc each con inc each
Figure 4.4. Results o f Experiment 3 with predictive cues and colour-word Stroop stimuli.
(A) Mean response times and incorrect response percentages as a function of 
current trial type and cue type (80% congruent-predicting, 80% incongruent- 
predicting, 50% each) for postcongruent, postincongruent, and overall data.
(B) Overall distractor effects (incongruent minus congruent) and the corres­
ponding _p-values for each cue condition. (C) Overall distractor effects 
(incongruent minus congruent) and the corresponding _p-values for each cue 
condition when full stimulus repetitions are omitted from analyses to control for 
priming effects.
102
significant (F < 1), suggesting that the trial-to-trial effect was a repetition priming effect 
and not a true attentional adjustment. The interaction between cue, current trial, and 
previous trial was far from significant [F < 1], indicating that the effects that cue and 
previous trial have on the current trial are not related. As our main interest here concerns 
effects of the cue, we collapsed the data over the factor previous trial in the remaining 
analyses.
Post hoc comparisons revealed that the distractor effect was larger for 80% 
congruent-predicting cues than for the 80% incongruent-predicting cues, whereas the 
distractor effect for 50%-each cues was in between the two other cue types. This 
corresponds to the RT patterns that Aarts and Roelofs (in press) observed using 
probabilistic cues in a manual arrow-word version of the Stroop task. Figure 4.4B shows 
the magnitudes of the distractor effects and the corresponding ^ -values. Figure 4.4C 
shows these overall distractor effects and the _p-values when exact stimulus repetitions are 
omitted from analyses to control for repetition priming effects. Inspection of Figures 4.4B 
and 4.4C confirms that the stimulus repetition effect has virtually no influence on the 
attentional adjustment based on the cue.
As can be seen in Figure 4.4A, the error pattern resembled the RT pattern, except 
that an 80% congruent-predicting cue that was followed by an incongruent stimulus led 
to a huge number of errors. More errors were made in the (slow) current-incongruent than 
in the current-congruent condition. Overall, error rates were lower in the faster 
conditions, suggesting that no speed-accuracy trade-off occurred in the data. Error rates 
were not further analysed.
The results of Experiment 3 show that the magnitude of the distractor effect 
depended on the expected compatibility of the upcoming stimulus. In particular, the 
distractor effect was 58 ms larger when a congruent stimulus was anticipated than when 
an incongruent stimulus was expected (i.e., the Gratton effect). The data provide evidence 
that the top-down modulations in attentional control do not necessarily have to be based 
on experienced response conflict. As a separate issue, it is interesting to see that the 
compatibility of the preceding trial also had an independent influence on the distractor 
effect, although this effect completely disappeared when all exact stimulus repetitions 
were omitted from data analyses. This indicates that repetition priming can contribute
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partly to the Gratton effect (Mayr et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006), but it is not 
sufficient to explain the results in Experiment 3 (compare Figures 4.4B and 4.4C; see 
Notebaert & Verguts, 2007, for a similar conclusion based on a multiple regression 
approach). Instead, the data of Experiment 3 indicate a role for top-down adjustments of 
control settings that cannot be accounted for by repetition priming effects.
We turn now to the effect of neutral cues. The analyses indicated that a neutral 
50%-each cue was associated with a smaller distractor effect than an 80% congruent- 
predicting cue. The difference in distractor effect for 50%-each cues and 80% 
incongruent-predicting cues was relatively small (13 ms), although significant (see Figure 
4.4B). Neutral cues are different from the neutral stimuli in Experiments 1 and 2 in the 
sense that after a neutral stimulus, participants may expect another neutral stimulus 
(neither help nor competition from distractors), whereas after a neutral cue, participants 
do not know whether to expect a congruent or an incongruent stimulus (but never a 
neutral stimulus in this experiment). It may be that they adopted a narrower attentional 
setting after 80% incongruent-predicting cues than after 50%-each cues. Regardless of 
the cause of this difference between experiments, the crucial observation is that 
Experiment 3 shows that attention is modulated by expectancies independent of repetition 
priming effects and that distractor effects are much larger in anticipation of a congruent 
stimulus than of an incongruent stimulus. Our finding is in line with a recent study by 
Wuhr and Kunde (2008), who observed a modulating effect of congruent-predicting cues, 
but not of incongruent-predicting cues in a three-choice Simon task. Also, in studying 
effects of probabilistic cueing in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, 
Aarts and Roelofs (in press) observed differential ACC activity to targets following 75% 
congruent-predicting cues, but not following 75% incongruent-predicting and neutral 
(50%-50%) cues. Thus, if expectations are explicitly manipulated by symbolic cues, 
again response conflict seems not to be the trigger for the control adjustments.
4.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION
Using the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), Gratton and colleagues (1992) obtained 
data suggesting that participants adjust their attention settings on a trial-by-trial basis,
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based on expectations that arise from the compatibility of the preceding trial. The effect 
of the flankers is smaller following an incongruent trial than following a congruent trial.
In the present study, we replicated this Gratton effect with flanker stimuli (Experiment 1), 
and we confirmed that the effect also occurs with colour-word Stroop stimuli 
(Experiment 2). Moreover, in both tasks, the RT difference between incongruent and 
congruent trials (i.e., the distractor effect) was larger for postcongruent trials than for 
postincongruent and postneutral trials, whereas the latter two yielded the same RT 
difference. These results were obtained regardless of response modality and were shown 
to be independent of exact stimulus repetition. This pattern of results suggests that the 
adjustments were independent of response conflict, contrary to what the conflict- 
adaptation hypothesis holds (Botvinick et al., 2001). However, the results also do not 
agree with the expectation hypothesis (Gratton et al., 1992). According to the expectation 
hypothesis, RT s should be shorter on congruent-congruent (expected) than incongruent- 
congruent (unexpected) trials, as observed. However, RTs should be longer on 
congruent-incongruent (unexpected) than on incongruent-incongruent (expected) trials, 
which was not supported by our data. Thus, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 challenge 
both the conflict-monitoring and expectation hypotheses.
In Experiment 3, we explicitly manipulated the expectancies about the upcoming 
stimulus condition (incongruent, congruent) by symbolic cues. Again, the distractor 
effect was largest when a congruent trial was expected, independent of upcoming 
response conflict. However, now RTs were shorter on congruent-congruent (expected) 
than incongruent-congruent (unexpected) trials, and RTs were longer on congruent- 
incongruent (unexpected) than on incongruent-incongruent (expected) trials, exactly as 
predicted by the expectation hypothesis. This suggests that expectations may drive 
attentional control adjustments, although expectancies seemingly did not do this in 
Experiments 1 and 2.
In the remainder of this article, we discuss two possible alternative accounts of 
our data, one in terms of feature priming (e.g., Hommel et al., 2004) and the other in 
terms of stimulus conflict evoked by our neutral stimuli (e.g., Verbruggen et al., 2006). 
We argue that the alternative accounts fail to account for critical aspects of the RT 
patterns that we observed. Next, we present a two-factor account of the Gratton effect and
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the underlying RT patterns in the literature and the present experiments, and we 
demonstrate the utility of this account through computer simulations. Finally, we discuss 
the consequences of our findings for the prevailing conflict-monitoring theory of the 
Gratton effect.
4.6.1 Two alternative accounts o f  the present findings
At first sight, two other explanations could be put forward for our data patterns, one 
concerning stimulus feature priming effects, and the second based on the neutral stimuli 
that we used. We discuss these alternative accounts below.
4.6.1.1 A feature-priming account.
Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that the RT distractor effect does not differ following an 
incongruent and a neutral trial, whereas the distractors have a larger influence following a 
congruent trial. To make sure that this Gratton effect did not in fact stem merely from 
bottom-up stimulus repetition priming effects, we reanalysed our data after removing all 
exact stimulus repetitions and showed that the Gratton pattern was still observed. 
However, we used a small stimulus set in both experiments (only two possible task­
relevant stimulus values). As a result of this, the findings obtained could in principle be 
explained by a more complex form of repetition priming at the level of stimulus features 
(e.g., Hommel et al., 2004; Notebaert et al., 2001). Note that when the distractor type was 
repeated in two successive trials (i.e., cC, il), either the complete stimulus was repeated 
(e.g., HHSHH ^  HHSHH), or both the distractors and the target were alternated (e.g., 
HHSHH ^  SSHSS). In contrast, when the compatibility was dissimilar in two successive 
trials (e.g., cl, iN, nC), the current stimulus contained always a partial repetition. That is, 
either the target was repeated combined with alternated distractors (e.g., HHHHH ^  
SSHSS), or the target was alternated, and the distractors were repeated (e.g., HHHHH ^  
HHSHH). Therefore, even when all exact stimulus repetitions are removed from 
analyses, as we did, the compatibility transitions in Experiments 1 and 2 are confounded 
with partial repetition/full alternation effects, and the two cannot be dissociated in the 
current set-up. Partial repetitions have been shown to be associated with relatively slow 
responses compared with full alternation trials (Hommel et al., 2004). Thus, the results of
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Experiments 1 and 2 cannot exclude the possibility that partial repetitions caused the 
responses to be slower for iC trials than for cC trials.
However, feature priming cannot account for the RT patterns that we observed. 
The feature-priming account predicts that RT s on trials with full alternations should be 
shorter than on trials with partial repetitions. Thus, the account correctly predicts our 
finding that RT s on cC trials (full alternation) were shorter than RT s on cl trials (partial 
repetition), which is also illustrated in Figure 4.1A. However, for the same reasons, the 
account also predicts that il trials (full alternation) should be faster than cl trials (partial 
repetitions), as illustrated in Figure 4.1A. However, this is clearly not what we observed, 
neither in Experiment 1 (Eriksen) nor in Experiment 2 (Stroop). Thus, feature priming 
cannot account for the complete set of RT patterns that we obtained. It should be noted 
that we observed the same RT patterns in Experiment 3, where the adjustments were 
driven by symbolic cues preceding the target stimulus. This finding confirms the 
conclusion from Experiments 1 and 2 that our RT patterns are independent of feature 
priming (see Fernandez-Duque & Knight, 2008, for the same rationale). This conclusion 
is in line with several studies that controlled for feature priming effects and observed that 
these bottom-up factors could not account for the Gratton effect (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004; 
Notebaert et al., 2006; Ullsperger et al., 2005; Verbruggen et al., 2006).
4.6.1.2 A stimulus conflict account.
A second alternative for our interpretation of the data in Experiments 1 and 2 involves the 
use of neutral stimuli. As pointed out by Eriksen and Eriksen (1974), the flanker task 
really entails two sources of conflict, one related to the stimulus itself (sometimes termed 
“stimulus conflict” or “perceptual conflict”, see, e.g., De Houwer, 2003; Notebaert et al., 
2006; Sanders & Lamers, 2002; Van Veen & Carter, 2005; Verbruggen et al., 2006) and 
one related to the responses (“response conflict”). In Experiment 1, the flankers within a 
neutral stimulus were not associated with an alternative response and should therefore not 
compete for target selection. But as the flankers were different from the central target 
character, they may indeed distract at a perceptual level, and it may well be that the 
stimulus conflict drives behavioural adjustments (Notebaert et al., 2006; Notebaert &
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Verguts, 2006; Verbruggen et al., 2006). Consequently, our neutral stimulus could be 
considered a “light variant” of an incongruent stimulus.
In examining effects of stimulus and response conflict in a flanker task, 
Verbruggen et al. (2006) had participants identify central target colour lines and ignore 
flanking colour lines by pressing corresponding response keys. Six colours were mapped 
onto three responses. Consequently, stimuli could be stimulus incongruent (i.e., central 
colour and flanker colours differed but were mapped onto the same response), response 
incongruent (i.e., central colour and flanker colours differed and were mapped onto 
different responses), or congruent (i.e., central colour and flanker colours were the same). 
Verbruggen et al. observed that the magnitude of response conflict (i.e., different targets 
and flankers mapped onto the same versus different responses) did not depend on 
previous trial type (stimulus incongruent, response incongruent, or congruent). In 
contrast, stimulus conflict was obtained after a congruent trial but not after the other trial 
types. These findings suggest that adjustments may be driven by stimulus conflict, 
independent of response conflict. Verbruggen et al. (2006) discussed the possibility that 
their findings were specific to the arbitrary stimulus-response mappings used in their 
experiment. According to them, when other kinds of mappings are used, “it could be the 
case that participants deal with response conflict in a different way” (p. 332). The present 
Experiments 1 and 2 extend the study of Verbruggen et al. by examining the Gratton 
effect in more commonly used tasks -  namely, Eriksen flanker and Stroop, and 
employing both arbitrary stimulus-response mappings (Eriksen flanker, manual Stroop) 
and nonarbitrary ones (vocal Stroop).
Possibly, the neutral condition in the present Experiments 1 and 2 was not really 
free of conflict but evoked stimulus rather than response conflict, like in the study of 
Verbruggen et al. (2006). The results of Experiments 1-2 would then provide converging 
evidence that in Eriksen and Stroop task performance, adjustments may be driven by 
stimulus conflict, independent of response conflict. It should be noted, however, that our 
neutral stimuli and the stimulus-incongruent stimuli of Verbruggen et al. (2006) differ in 
important respects, which complicates a direct comparison between studies. First, the 
flankers in the stimulus-incongruent condition of Verbruggen et al. occurred as targets on 
response-incongruent and congruent trials, which does not hold for the neutral stimuli in
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our Experiments 1-2. Second, the flankers in the stimulus-incongruent condition were 
mapped onto responses, whereas the Os (Eriksen task) or Xs (Stroop task) in our 
Experiments 1-2 were not.
Moreover, evidence suggests that our neutral stimuli (i.e., Os and Xs) do not 
really evoke (much) stimulus conflict. Roelofs, Van Turennout, and Coles (2006) had 
participants respond manually to the arrows or words of incongruent or congruent 
combinations of left- or right-pointing arrows and the words left or right in an fMRI 
experiment. Neutral stimuli consisted of arrows combined with Xs or words with empty 
rectangles. The experiment showed effects of response conflict in RTs and ACC activity 
in the word task, but no effects of stimulus or response conflict in the arrow task using Xs 
as neutral condition. This suggests that when distractors are not mapped onto responses, 
like the Xs, they do not yield conflict. Moreover, in a new experiment in our lab (Lamers 
& Roelofs, 2010) with 20 participants vocally responding in the Eriksen flanker task and 
the design of Verbruggen et al. (2006), we obtained evidence for response conflict (RT 
response-incongruent > RT stimulus-incongruent), t(19) = -6.25, p  < .001, but not for 
stimulus conflict (RT stimulus-incongruent ~ RT congruent), t( 19) = 0.19, p  > .85. Thus, 
it is plausible to assume that the neutral stimuli in the present Experiments 1 and 2 do not 
really evoke (much) stimulus conflict.
Still, the RT patterns of the present Experiments 1 and 2 resemble in several ways 
the data obtained by Verbruggen et al. (2006), suggesting that the adjustments in the 
present experiments may nevertheless have been driven by stimulus conflict induced by 
our neutral stimuli. There is, however, also an important difference in RT patterns 
between studies that creates difficulty for a stimulus conflict account of the present data. 
Whereas Verbruggen et al. obtained the RT patterns illustrated in Figure 4.1A, we 
obtained the RT patterns of Figure 4.1B. In the experiment of Verbruggen et al., RTs 
were shorter on cC than on iC trials, and longer on cI than on iI trials, whereas this was 
not the case in our Experiments 1 and 2. The RT patterns of Verbruggen et al. are readily 
explained by adjustments driven by stimulus conflict, but our data are not. The presence 
of stimulus conflict on stimulus-incongruent and response-incongruent trials in the 
experiment of Verbruggen et al. would lead to a narrowing of attention compared with 
congruent trials, and hence the distractor effect is smaller on the next trial. This explains
109
why RTs were longer on response-incongruent and stimulus-incongruent trials when they 
followed congruent trials than when they followed response-incongruent and stimulus- 
incongruent trials. However, in our Experiments 1 and 2, the RTs on incongruent and 
neutral trials were not affected by the previous trial type. Thus, adjustment driven by 
stimulus conflict would explain why RTs are shorter on congruent trials for post­
congruent than postneutral and postincongruent trials. But for neutral and incongruent 
trials, it would predict longer RTs on postcongruent than on postneutral and post­
incongruent trials, contrary to what is obtained. In short, whereas adjustment driven by 
stimulus conflict would explain the data of Verbruggen et al., it cannot explain the 
present findings. What, then, does explain the RT patterns in our Experiments 1 and 2?
A possible explanation is discussed next.
4.6.2 A two-factor account
The Gratton effect implies that the distractor effect is smaller for postincongruent trials 
than for postcongruent trials, but this effect can arise from several different underlying 
RT patterns, as illustrated in Figures 4.1A-4.1C. The canonical RT pattern obtained in 
several studies (e.g., Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Verbruggen et al., 2006) is shown by Figure 
4.1A. In our experiments, for current-incongruent trials, the compatibility of the 
preceding trial had no influence (i.e., response times for cl, il, and nl trials did not differ), 
which corresponds to Figure 4.1B. This data pattern was also obtained by Ullsperger et 
al. (2005) and Freitas et al. (2007) using a flanker task. Similarly, in a Simon task, 
Stürmer et al. (2002) found that the Simon effect occurs only following a congruent trial 
(but see Hommel et al., 2004, for a different interpretation of the results). In contrast, 
Kerns et al. (2004) observed that the response times on incongruent trials did differ 
following incongruent and congruent trials, whereas the compatibility of the preceding 
trial did not influence response times on congruent trials, as illustrated in Figure 4.1C. 
These differences among studies cannot be due to the fact that most studies used manual 
responding, because we obtained our data patterns regardless of response modality. Also, 
it is unlikely that the differences are due to the used task (Eriksen versus Stroop), because 
we obtained our data patterns regardless of the task.
110
It seems to us that the various RT patterns can only be explained by assuming that 
two factors are at work (cf. Ullsperger et al., 2005). One factor (i.e., attentional width) 
causes the Gratton effect, which we take to be an effect of expectation (cf. Aarts & 
Roelofs, in press; Aarts et al., 2008). The other factor causes responding to be generally 
slowed following incongruent trials (slowing both iC and il trials) or hastened following 
congruent trials (speeding up both cC and cl trials), which may fully or partially offset 
the effect of widening of attention on cl trials. For example, following incongruent trials, 
participants may be more cautious and adopt a more stringent response criterion (e.g., 
Meyer et al., 2003) or engage in more extensive self-monitoring (e.g., Roelofs, 2004) 
after response selection.
We tested the utility of this two-factor account (i.e., in terms of the factors 
attentional width and response caution) by running computer simulations using the 
WEAVER++ model of performance in Stroop-like tasks (e.g., Roelofs, 2003; Roelofs et 
al., 2006). The model assumes that colours and words activate corresponding information 
in an associative network. The impact of distractor words in colour naming in the model 
is determined by several factors, including the attentional width, which corresponds to the 
duration of distractor input to the associative network. Computer simulations reported in 
Roelofs (2003) revealed that WEAVER++ successfully accounts for several classic data 
sets on RT patterns in Stroop task performance, mostly taken from the review by 
MacLeod (1991). With only three free parameters, the model accounts for 96% of the 
variance of 16 classic studies (250 data points). Moreover, the model accounts for key 
findings on ACC activity in performing Stroop-like tasks, both with manual and with 
vocal responding (e.g., Roelofs & Hagoort, 2002; Roelofs et al., 2006).
The computational protocol in the present simulations was the same as that in 
previous WEAVER++ simulations of colour-word Stroop task performance (i.e., Roelofs, 
2003; Roelofs & Hagoort, 2002). The parameter values were fixed and identical to those 
in earlier simulations. The width of attention was simulated by manipulating the duration 
of distractor input in the model, which was set at 100 ms following congruent trials and 
50 ms following incongruent trials. The post-selection slowing caused by greater caution 
was set at 0, 25, or 50 ms. Figures 4.5A-4.5C shows the simulation results. The results of 
applying only the attentional width manipulation in the model (i.e., zero slowing) are
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displayed in Figure 4.5C. A Gratton effect is obtained, which occurs because RTs on 
incongruent trials are longer following congruent than following incongruent trials, 
whereas RTs on congruent trials are not affected by previous trial type. This pattern of 
results corresponds to what Kerns et al. (2004) obtained for Stroop task performance. 
Kerns et al. suggested that congruent trials are not much affected by the width of 
attention, which holds for the model.
The simulations showed that greater caution in responding following incongruent 
trials (e.g., a more stringent response criterion or more extensive self-monitoring after 
response selection) may fully or partially offset the effect of the width of attention on cl 
trials. The postselection slowing caused by greater caution was set at 50 ms in Figure 
4.5B and at 25 ms in Figure 4.5A. The RT patterns in Figure 4.5B correspond to those in 
the present Experiments 1 and 2, and the RT patterns in Figure 4.5A correspond to the 
canonical RT pattern. Note that the postselection slowing did not affect the Gratton effect 
(i.e., its magnitude is fully preserved), but only the underlying RT patterns.
To conclude, the simulation results demonstrate the utility of a two-factor account 
of the different patterns of RTs underlying the Gratton effect in the literature and the 
present experiments. The account assumes that expectations concerning upcoming trial 
types determine the attentional width (cf. Aarts & Roelofs, in press; Aarts et al., 2008), 
whose effect may be modified by differences in caution in responding depending on trial 
type.
4.6.3 Consequences for the conflict-monitoring hypothesis
Botvinick et al. (2001) took the Gratton effect as evidence for conflict adaptation in task 
performance. These researchers have built an extensive theory of attention adjustments 
around such conflict adaptation (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 
2004; Carter et al., 1998; Carter et al., 2000; Van Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, & 
Carter, 2001; Yeung et al., 2004), which has become the dominant theory in the 
literature. As mentioned earlier, the idea is that if participants detect response conflict on 
incongruent trials, they engage more attentional control to be prepared for conflict on the 
subsequent trial, which reduces the effect from the distractors. We questioned the idea 
that the presence of response conflict is really necessary for the Gratton effect to emerge
112
(likewise, recent expansions of the original conflict monitoring theory allow for the 
possibility that conflict may arise at other levels of information processing than response 
conflict, cf. Botvinick, 2007). Our data patterns of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that the 
effect that an incongruent stimulus has on the next trial is, in fact, not different from the 
effect that a neutral stimulus has. This strongly suggests that in these experiments the 
adjustments in attention were independent of response conflict. The observed absence of 
a difference in distractor effect for postincongruent and postneutral trials in the present 
study poses a challenge for the conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung 
et al., 2004).
Figure 4.5. The effect o f attentional width and response caution in WEAVER++ simulations.
Shown are the mean response times for incongruent and congruent trials as a 
function o f previous trial type (congruent, incongruent). Attention was set wider 
following congruent than following incongruent trials. Greater caution after 
incongruent trials was set to offset partially (A), fully (B), or not at all (C) the 
effect o f attentional width on incongruent trials following congruent trials.
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Our finding that sequential modulations of control can be independent of conflict 
in Eriksen and Stroop task performance is in line with other recent observations. Burle et 
al. (2005) measured electromyographic activity in the Simon task. On some congruent 
trials, activation of the incorrect response led to motor activity, and therefore these trials 
can be classified as response conflict trials. However, no adaptation effects were 
observed following such a trial. Moreover, Notebaert and Verguts (2006) demonstrated 
that not response conflict, but stimulus conflict may trigger the modulations. Together, 
these findings suggest that (a) response conflict is not necessary for adaptation effects to 
occur, and (b) response conflict is also not sufficient for such attentional control 
adjustments.
Recently, Botvinick (2007) suggested that control adjustments are driven by 
experienced or expected effort. Effort is greater for incongruent than congruent trials, 
explaining the control adjustments. However, an fMRI study in our lab (Aarts et al.,
2008) observed that control adjustments can be independent of expected effort based on 
cues. In the present experiment, experienced effort will have been larger following 
incongruent than following neutral trials, as is evident from the difference in RTs and 
errors. Still, the distractor effect did not differ following incongruent and neutral trials. 
Moreover, in Experiment 3, incongruent-predicting cues suggest more effort than neutral 
cues, but control adjustments did not differ between these cues types. Thus, effort-based 
adjustment cannot account for our data.
4.6.4 Conclusions
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that the RT difference between incongruent 
and congruent trials is larger after congruent trials than after incongruent and neutral 
trials, with the latter two yielding the same RT difference. This pattern of results suggests 
that control adjustments may be independent of response conflict, contrary to what the 
conflict adaptation hypothesis holds. Moreover, RTs on incongruent trials were not 
affected by the previous trial type, contrary to what the expectation hypothesis predicts. 
However, RTs on both congruent and incongruent trials were affected when expectancies 
were explicitly manipulated by symbolic cues in Experiment 3, indicating a role for 
expectations. We presented a two-factor account of the various RT patterns underlying
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the Gratton effect observed in the literature, including the RT patterns of the present 
experiments, and demonstrated the utility of this two-factor account using computer 
simulations. Theories of attentional control (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2004; Botvinick et al., 
1999; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Yeung et al., 2004) require modification to include 
consideration of our findings.
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CHAPTER 5
Selective Attention and Response Set in the 
Stroop Task
“Success depends upon previous preparation, 
and without such preparation there is sure to be failure.” 
(Confucius, 551 BC -  479 BC)
This chapter has been published as:
Lamers, Roelofs, A., & Rabeling-Keus, I.M. (2010). Selective attention and
response set in the Stroop task. Memory & Cognition, 38, 893-904.
5.1 ABSTRACT
Response set membership contributes much to the interference in the color-word Stroop 
task. This may be due to selective allocation of attention to eligible responses or, 
alternatively, to greater inhibition of distractors that are not responses. In the present 
article, we report two experiments that were designed to adjudicate between these 
accounts. In Experiment 1, membership was manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis by cuing 
the possible responses for each trial. Response time (RT) was longer for distractors that 
corresponded to a cued, eligible response than to an ineligible one. This cuing effect was 
independent of the number of different responses. In Experiment 2, the distractor was 
cued on half the trials. Cuing the distractor decreased RTs on both incongruent and 
congruent trials. Vincentile analyses in both experiments revealed that the effects were 
constant throughout the entire RT distributions. These results suggest that response set 
effects arise because of selective allocation of attention to eligible responses.
A cknow ledgem ents. The preparation o f  the article was supported by a VICI grant from  the 
N etherlands Organisation for Scientific R esearch (NW O) to A.R. W e thank two anonym ous 
reviewers for their useful com m ents on an earlier version o f  the manuscript.
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5.2 INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of modern attention research in the 1950s (e.g., Broadbent, 1958), the 
issue of whether attentional selection is early or late in perceptually based responding has 
played a central role in experimental research (for reviews, see, e.g., Pashler, 1998;
Styles, 2006). By the 1970s, it was generally accepted that attentional selectivity may be 
early or late, depending on the prevailing circumstances. This view was exemplified by 
Broadbent’s (1970, 1971; Broadbent & Gregory, 1964) distinction between “stimulus 
set” and “response set”. Stimulus set refers to selection on the basis of a perceptual 
attribute, such as spatial location, color, shape, or temporal order. Response set refers to 
selection on the basis of the vocabulary of eligible responses. Broadbent recognized that 
task performance may require one or both of these kinds of selective attention, depending 
on the situation. Whereas attention research in the past few decades has intensively 
investigated aspects of stimulus set (e.g., Pashler, 1998; Styles, 2006), response set has 
been much less examined.
One of the tasks that has demonstrated the importance of response set is the color- 
word Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). In a common version of this task, participants have to 
name the ink color of congruent or incongruent color words (e.g., the words GREEN or 
RED printed in green ink). Response time (RT) is typically longer in the incongruent than 
in the congruent condition (see MacLeod, 1991, for a review) -  a phenomenon 
henceforth called the Stroop effect. A major part of the interference caused by 
incongruent stimuli is specific to the members of the response set. In a classic study, 
Klein (1964) observed that color words that were eligible responses produced 
approximately two times more interference than did color words that were not used as 
responses in the experiment. For example, if the ink colors were red and green, color- 
naming responses were much slower for the word GREEN in red ink than for the word 
BLUE in red ink. This effect of response set has been replicated in several studies (e.g., 
Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Proctor, 1978).
In the present article, we examined two different explanations for the response set 
effect. First, the response set effect may be due to selective allocation of attention to 
eligible responses at the response selection level (see Broadbent, 1970, 1971; Deutsch,
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1977). In a prominent model of the Stroop task that was developed by Cohen, Dunbar, 
and McClelland (1990), attention to particular responses is achieved by placing eligible 
responses in a more responsive part of their activation curve. Likewise, in the 
WEAVER++ model of Roelofs (1992, 2003), selective allocation of attention at the 
response level is achieved by restricting the “selection space” to eligible responses. Only 
responses within this selection space are competing for selection. In this model, words 
that do not correspond to eligible responses may still yield some interference because 
they activate alternative responses in the selection space via conceptual links, but this 
interference is less than for words that are part of the response set. Second, response set 
effects may arise if noneligible responses are inhibited before trial onset or, alternatively, 
if noneligible responses are more strongly inhibited than eligible ones during target 
processing (see Aron, 2007; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Ridderinkhof, 2002a, 
2002b; Tipper, 2001; West & Alain, 2000). In either case, distractor words belonging to 
the response set will interfere more with the color-naming task than will the inhibited 
distractors that are not part of the response set. Selective allocation of attention to eligible 
responses or the inhibition of noneligible responses may arise either by instructions (i.e., 
by informing the participants of the stimuli to which they have to respond) or through 
experience with the stimuli in the course of the experiment itself.
Up to this point, we have used the term response set effect, but in fact, the 
response set influences response latencies in two different ways. In the remainder of the 
present article, we use the term membership effect for the finding that RTs are longer for 
incongruent distractors that correspond to eligible responses than for incongruent 
distractors that do not. At present, the exact factors that establish the membership effect 
are largely unclear (see MacLeod, 1991, 2005, for the color-word Stroop task, and 
Caramazza & Costa, 2001, and Roelofs, 2001, for the picture-word interference task). A 
major goal of the present article was to examine what mechanism is responsible for the 
effect of response set membership. In particular, we wanted to assess the relative merits 
of the attention allocation and inhibition accounts of this membership effect by using a 
modified Stroop task that includes cuing.
A second effect of response set that has been observed in the color-word Stroop 
task concerns the number of eligible responses. Evidence suggests that the number of
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allowed responses affects the difficulty of response selection (Cohen, Usher, & 
McClelland, 1998; see Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990, for a review), hereafter 
called the set size effect. For example, Sternberg (1969) found that the set size interacted 
with stimulus-response compatibility. Unlike the membership effect, the direction in 
which the set size influences Stroop task performance is unclear. For instance, Nielsen 
(1975) observed that the magnitude of Stroop interference increased with an increasing 
number of responses -  a finding that was replicated with the same set sizes by Kanne, 
Balota, Spieler, and Faust (1998). In contrast, Ray (1974) found that when the stimulus 
set size was increased, the overall RT s also increased, but that the Stroop effect was 
unaffected. To complicate the empirical picture further, La Heij, Van der Heijden, and 
Schreuder (1985) observed that increasing the response set led to a decreased Stroop 
effect. In his review of set size effects, MacLeod (1991) concluded that “although 
variations in response set size might be expected to affect interference, existing results 
are unclear” (p. 184) and that “until such discrepancies are resolved, it would be 
premature to offer a firm statement about stimulus set size effects” (p.177). Therefore, a 
second goal of the present study was to further examine this set size effect in Stroop task 
performance.
In the WEAVER++ model of Stroop task performance (Roelofs, 1992, 2003), 
membership and set size influence different aspects of the response selection process. 
Whereas membership determines which responses compete for selection, set size 
determines the momentary selection probability of a response after it has been designated 
as the response that will ultimately be given. In the model, this probability is a ratio of the 
activation of the target response and the sum of the activations of all other responses in a 
whole experiment or block of trials, regardless of response set membership (Roelofs,
1992, p. 118). The selection probability decreases with an increasing number of 
responses. Target designation and actual selection concern two temporally 
nonoverlapping phases of the response selection process in the model. Because 
membership and set size influence different aspects of response selection, their effects on 
RT should be additive.
We report two experiments that were designed to examine the relative merits of 
the attention allocation and inhibition accounts of membership effects and to investigate
121
the effect of set size on RTs and the magnitude of the Stroop effect. In Experiment 1, 
response set membership was manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis while keeping the 
number of responses (set size) within an experimental block of trials constant. This was 
achieved by cuing the specific response set for each upcoming trial. That is, a cue 
presented before the color-word Stroop stimulus informed the participants about the two 
eligible responses for that particular trial. Either the distractor word was a member of the 
response set for that trial, or it was not. Furthermore, the set size was manipulated by 
presenting either three or six colors within a block of trials.
Although both the inhibition and the attention allocation accounts predict a 
membership effect and a set size effect, the effects are predicted to be interactive or 
additive, depending on the account. In particular, as we will point out below, the 
inhibition account predicts an interaction, whereas the attention allocation account 
predicts additive effects of response set membership and set size. In Experiment 2, we 
tested the inhibition account more explicitly by cuing the distractor in 50% of the trials. 
According to the inhibition account, these cued distractors may be inhibited, which 
should diminish the interfering effect of incongruent distractors (speeding up responses 
on cued incongruent trials) but also diminish the facilitatory effect of congruent 
distractors (delaying responses on cued congruent trials) and thus reduce the magnitude 
of the Stroop effect. Importantly, RT s should be prolonged on cued as compared with 
uncued congruent trials. In contrast, if cuing the distractor allows for greater allocation of 
attention to eligible responses, this should reduce response latencies on both incongruent 
and congruent trials, as we will explain in more detail below.
Ridderinkhof (2002a, 2002b) argued that inhibition takes time to build up during 
target processing. Consequently, differences in inhibition should be largest in the tail of 
the RT distribution. Moreover, he assumed that the strength of the inhibition may be 
strategically adjusted depending on, for example, the previous trial type. Similarly, more 
inhibition may be applied to distractors outside than inside the response set. This predicts 
that the effects of response set membership (Experiment 1) and distractor cuing 
(Experiment 2) should be largest in the tail of the RT distributions. We tested these 
predictions by performing distributional analyses in both experiments.
122
5.3 EXPERIMENT 1
The main goal of the first experiment was to test the attention allocation and inhibition 
accounts of the membership effect in the Stroop task. On each trial, stimulus presentation 
was preceded by a display of two small, colored rectangles, one of which always 
corresponded to the upcoming target ink color. The distractor word either could 
correspond to a cued color or did not match a member of the momentary response set.
For example, assume that the possible colors in a block of trials are red, green, and blue. 
On a specific trial, a cue could indicate that the possible responses for that trial are “red” 
and “green”; that is, the upcoming target color is either red or green. The stimulus that is 
subsequently presented in red or green ink might then be, for example, the word GREEN 
(i.e., the distractor is in the response set) or the word BLUE (i.e., the distractor is not in 
the response set). In addition to the membership effect, we investigated the effect of set 
size. We therefore manipulated the number of eligible responses in a block of trials. 
Either three or six colors were used to create the color-word stimuli.
The two accounts make different predictions for the present experiment, 
concerning whether the effects of response set membership and set size are interactive or 
additive. According to the attention-allocation account instantiated by WEAVER++, a 
membership effect arises because of selective allocation of attention to eligible responses 
at the response selection level. A distractor that matches a cued response is inside the 
selection space for that trial and therefore interferes more with the response selection 
process than does a distractor that is outside the selection space. Moreover, an effect of 
set size should arise because the selection ratio (instantaneous selection probability) 
decreases with an increasing number of responses in a block of trials, increasing the RTs 
in the large set size as compared with the small set size condition. Importantly, since the 
membership effect in this view depends on the distractor type (i.e., distractor either inside 
or outside the response set) and the set size effect depends on the number of responses in 
a block of trials, the effects are predicted to be additive. Alternatively, according to the 
inhibition account, advance knowledge of the two eligible responses on a trial allows for 
inhibition of the other responses, which also should yield a membership effect. For 
instance, suppose that the colors red, green, and blue are used. A trial starting with a red-
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green cue could never have “blue” as response and might thus lead to the inhibition of 
this response. As a result, less interference should be observed for incongruent stimuli in 
which BLUE is the distractor word (e.g., BLUE in red ink), than for incongruent stimuli 
in which either RED or GREEN is used as distractor word (e.g., GREEN in red ink). 
Additionally, the inhibition of individual responses may be more difficult as the number 
of eligible responses increases, which should yield an effect of set size. Since, according 
to the inhibition account, the response “blue” (in the aforementioned example) will be 
inhibited less if the number of responses in a block of trials increases, the account 
predicts an interaction between the membership effect and the set size effect.
5.3.1 Method
5.3.1.1 Participants.
Twenty-four Dutch students from Nijmegen University (20 of them female) volunteered 
to participate in the experiment. Their ages varied from 18 to 26 years, with a mean of 21 
years. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants either were paid or 
received course credit for their participation.
5.3.1.2 Materials and design.
The displayed stimuli consisted of written color words (capital letters, Arial font size 24 
pt) in various ink colors. The stimuli words were centrally placed in an invisible rectangle 
that was 42 mm x 11 mm (corresponding to 3.4° x 0.9° of visual angle at a viewing 
distance of approximately 70 cm). The distractor words were the following Dutch color 
words: ROOD (red), GROEN (green), BLAUW (blue), GEEL (yellow), BRUIN (brown), 
and PAARS (purple). The ink colors used in the experiment consisted of the six 
corresponding colors. The background of the computer screen was black.
There were 12 Stroop stimuli that were divided into two stimulus sets. The first 
stimulus set consisted of 3 congruent stimuli (ROOD in red ink, GROEN in green, 
BLAUW in blue) and of 3 incongruent stimuli (ROOD in blue, GROEN in red, BLAUW 
in green). The second stimulus set consisted of 3 other congruent stimuli (GEEL in
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yellow, BRUIN in brown, PAARS in purple) and of 3 other incongruent stimuli (GEEL 
in purple, BRUIN in yellow, PAARS in brown).
There were 12 cues, 6 for each of the two stimulus sets. The 6 cues for each set 
consisted of all possible pairwise combinations of colors in the set. For example, for the 
first stimulus set, the cues were red-green, red-blue, green-red, green-blue, blue-red, 
and blue-green. In a similar manner, the six cues for the second stimulus set consisted of 
all combinations of the colors yellow, brown, and purple. Each cue was made up of two 
colored bars, each measuring 42 mm x 11 mm (corresponding to 3.4° x 0.9° of visual 
angle at a viewing distance of approximately 70 cm), placed vertically adjacent to each 
other with 1 pixel (about 0.5 mm) interspace.
There were three distractor conditions: congruent (CON), incongruent with the 
distractor word in the response set (INC-in), and incongruent with the distractor word not 
in the response set (INC-out). Furthermore, two set size conditions were used. In the 
small set size condition, stimuli consisted of only three colors (both distractor word and 
ink color), either the first or the second stimulus set described above. Thus, there were 
only three different responses in the small-set condition. The large set size condition 
employed all six colors from both stimulus sets together, resulting in six different 
responses in the large set size condition.
As was mentioned previously, we used a design in which each distractor word 
was written in only one nonmatching ink color and in which the cues and stimuli were 
divided into two subgroups. This was done for the following two (statistical) reasons. 
First, we wanted to have an equal number of congruent and incongruent stimuli while 
keeping the frequency of stimulus presentations equal. We achieved this by displaying, 
for example, ROOD in blue ink and never in green ink. Otherwise, if each distractor word 
were matched with each color, either keeping the stimulus frequency equal would lead to 
two thirds of the trials being incongruent, or presenting an equal number of congruent 
and incongruent trials would lead to displaying the ROOD-in-red stimulus twice as often 
as the ROOD-in-green and ROOD-in-blue stimuli. Second, we wanted to have an equal 
number of INC-in and INC-out trials. However, without our one-distractor-word-per-ink- 
color implementation, in the large set size condition with 36 stimuli (6 words x 6 ink 
colors), the two color bars in the cue would create one sixth CON trials, one sixth INC-in
125
trials, and four sixths INC-out trials. In short, our present design makes it possible to have 
50% CON trials, 25% INC-in trials, and 25% INC-out trials, while minimizing the 
chance of a confound with item repetition effects.
All of the participants were given both the small and large set size conditions. The 
order of set size conditions was counterbalanced across participants. Half of the 
participants started with the small set size, and the other half started with the large set 
size. The stimulus set in the small set size condition was randomly assigned to 
participants, with 12 participants receiving the first stimulus set and 12 participants 
receiving the second stimulus set.
Note that in this design, each cue can be followed by exactly four stimuli: two 
congruent and two incongruent ones. For example, a red-green cue can precede ROOD 
in red (CON), GROEN in red (INC-in), BLAUW in green (INC-out), and GROEN in 
green (CON) stimuli. Thus, 24 possible cue-stimulus combinations (6 cues x 4 stimuli) 
were formed for the small set size condition, and 48 combinations (12 cues x 4 stimuli) 
for the large set size condition.
An experimental session consisted of 48 practice trials and 480 test trials. The 
presentation of the 24 (in the small set size condition) or 48 (in the large set size 
condition) cue-stimulus combinations were pseudorandomized, with the following 
restrictions to reduce stimulus feature and response priming effects: A cue was never 
immediately repeated, and stimuli, distractor conditions, and responses were never 
repeated more than twice in a row.
5.3.1.3 Apparatus.
The experiment was conducted on a microcomputer that was connected to two color 
monitors. The software package Nijmegen Experimental Setup Utility (NESU) Version
2004.12.1 was installed on the computer, which generated the visual displays and 
collected the experimental data. Vocal responses were measured with an accuracy of 1 
ms (1000 Hz) by a voice key. The participants were seated in front of a color monitor at a 
viewing distance of approximately 70 cm. On a second monitor, the experimenter was 
shown the correct response and the participants’ response latencies.
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5.3.1.4 Procedure.
The participants took part individually in a dimly illuminated, quiet room. The instruction 
for the first set size condition (small or large) was given on paper and was repeated orally 
by the experimenter. After 24 practice trials, 240 test trials followed, with a short break 
after the 120th trial. Then, the instruction for the second set size condition was given both 
written and orally. Again, 24 practice trials were followed by 240 test trials, with a short 
break halfway. When the color-word Stroop stimulus appeared, the ink color had to be 
named aloud. Participants were strongly encouraged to use the information about the 
upcoming target color that was provided by the cue and to react as quickly and as 
accurately as possible to the stimulus.
Each trial took 4.5 s and went as follows. An empty screen was presented for 500 
ms. Then a visual cue (two small color bars on top of each other) appeared at the center 
of the screen. After 250 ms, the cue disappeared, and the screen remained blank for 1,250 
ms. Next, a color-word Stroop stimulus was displayed, also at the center. Incorrect 
responses and voice key errors were registered online by the experimenter. Although the 
stimulus disappeared after 1 s, participants could respond for another 1,500 ms. Then the 
next trial started. The beginning of a break was indicated by the Dutch word PAUZE 
(“pause”) for 1,500 ms. The beginning of a block was preceded by the word ATTENTIE 
(“attention”) for 1,500 ms. Also, the start and the end of each set size condition were 
indicated by a short sentence such as EINDE DEEL 1 (“end of part 1”). An experimental 
session lasted about 1 hour.
5.3.1.5 Data analyses.
The following data-trimming procedure was used: Trials in which RTs were longer than 
2,000 ms or shorter than 200 ms, trials in which the voice key malfunctioned or was 
triggered inappropriately (in combination, 1.10% of the data), and trials in which the 
participant made an incorrect response (1.37% of the data) were discarded. Also, to 
reduce posterror slowing effects (Rabbitt, 1966), each trial immediately following an 
incorrect response was omitted from analyses. To reduce start-up effects, the first three 
trials from each block were also discarded. The RTs of the remaining trials (93.6%) were 
used in calculations of means. The mean RTs were subjected to a two-way repeated
127
measures ANOVA, with set size (small vs. large) and distractor condition (CON, INC-in, 
INC-out) as within-subjects factors. For the specific membership x set size contrast, as 
formulated in the predictions, the congruent condition should be omitted, and therefore, 
only the incongruent distractor conditions (INC-in and INC-out) were included in the 
analyses. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. The error rates given 
correspond to incorrect response trials only, not to voice key errors and time-outs. 
Because of the small number of errors, error rates were not further analyzed.
w
£
CD
E
'-4—'
CDWcoŒW
CD
tr:
o
UJ
700 -,
650 -
600 -
550 J
Set size condition
large 
--o-- small
Distractor Condition
Figure 5.1. Results o f  Experim ent 1. M ean response tim es and incorrect response
percentages as a function o f  distractor condition for the small and the large set 
size conditions. The w ithin-subjects 95%  confidence interval for the latencies is 
± 31 ms. CON, congruent; IN C-in, incongruent w ith distractor w ord in the 
response set; INC-out, incongruent w ith distractor word outside the response set.
5.3.2 Results and discussion
The upper panel in Figure 5.1 shows the mean RT s as a function of distractor type for the 
small and large set size conditions. The lower panel in Figure 5.1 shows the obtained 
error percentages for the same conditions. The figure shows that RTs were longer in the
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INC-in than in the INC-out condition and that responding in both conditions was slower 
than in the congruent condition. Moreover, RT s were longer in the large than in the small 
set size conditions on incongruent trials, but not on congruent trials. This set size effect 
appears to be independent of response set membership.
These observations were confirmed by the statistical analyses. A significant main 
effect of set size was observed [F(1,23) = 5.21, p  = .032], indicating that responses in the 
small set size condition (611 ms, SE = 19) were faster than those in the large set size 
condition (630 ms, SE = 17). The main effect of distractor condition was also significant 
[F(2,22) = 53.46, p  < .001]. Pairwise comparisons showed that congruent trials (571 ms, 
SE = 15) were faster than both types of incongruent trials (ps < .001) and that responses 
in the INC-in condition were slower than those in the INC-out condition (653 ms with SE 
= 21, and 638 ms with SE = 18, respectively, p  = .010). This indicates that we observed a 
membership effect.
In addition, a two-way interaction between set size (small vs. large) and distractor 
condition (CON, INC-in, and INC-out) was observed [F(2,22) = 8.21, p  = .002]. Post hoc 
tests revealed that for congruent trials, no difference in RT was observed between the 
large and small set size conditions (p = .33), whereas responses in the large set size 
condition were slower than responses in the small set size condition for the INC-in 
condition (p = .007) and the INC-out condition (p = .04). In other words, increasing the 
set size increases response latencies for incongruent stimuli, but not for congruent ones. 
Specific contrast analyses showed that the RT difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials was more pronounced in the large set size than in the small set size for 
both the INC-in condition (Stroop effects of 93 ms in the large and of 72 ms in the small 
condition, p  = .001) and for the INC-out condition (Stroop effects of 74 ms in the large 
and of 61 ms in the small condition, p  = .02). Thus, a set size effect is observed: The 
magnitude of the Stroop effect becomes larger with an increasing number of responses.
As was mentioned above, to investigate the relationship between the membership 
effect and the set size effect, the congruent trials should be excluded from analyses. 
Without the congruent trials, the difference in RT between INC-in and INC-out trials was 
the same for the small and the large set size conditions (membership effects of 19 ms in 
the large and of 11 ms in the small condition, p  = .198), indicating that the magnitude of
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the membership effect is unaffected by the set size. This result agrees with the predictions 
of the attention allocation account.
Ridderinkhof (2002a, 2002b) maintained that effects of differential inhibition are 
most prominent in the tail of RT distributions. To evaluate this claim, we examined the 
whole RT distributions. To obtain the latency distributions, the rank-ordered latencies for 
each participant were divided into five equal bins (20% quantiles), and mean latencies 
were computed for each bin, separately for the RTs of the six combinations of distractor 
condition and set size. By averaging these means across participants, Vincentized 
cumulative distribution curves (Ratcliff, 1979) were obtained. Vincentizing the latency 
data across individual participants provides a way of averaging data while preserving the 
shapes of the individual distributions (for a similar approach, see Lamers & Roelofs, 
2007; Roelofs, 2008; Schneider & Verbruggen, 2008).
Figure 5.2 gives the distributional plots for the three distractor conditions per set 
size. The figure shows that the membership effect remains constant throughout the 
latency range for both the small and large set sizes, whereas the Stroop effect generally 
increases with bin.
Distractor Condition —  CON INC-out —  INC-in
SMALL SET SIZE LARGE SET SIZE
E3o
Response Time (ms) Response Time (ms)
Figure 5.2. V incentized cum ulative distribution curves for the three distractor conditions for 
both set size conditions in Experim ent 1. CON, congruent; INC-in, 
incongruent w ith distractor word in the response set; INC-out, incongruent with 
distractor w ord outside the response set.
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The distributional latencies were subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA with 
the within-subjects factors of set size (small vs. large), distractor condition (CON, INC- 
in, and INC-out), and bin (1-5). As with the overall RT analyses, the effects most 
important to the purpose of our study were both significant: A membership effect was 
observed in that responses in the INC-in condition were slower than those in the INC-out 
condition (p = .012), and a set size effect was observed in that the magnitude of the 
Stroop effect was larger for the large set size than for the small set size (p = .001 for the 
INC-in condition and p  = .023 for the INC-out condition). The other main effects and 
their interactions also closely resembled the analyses reported above on the mean RTs; 
therefore, only the results pertaining to the relative speed of responding are mentioned 
below.
The two-way interaction between distractor condition and bin was significant 
[F(8,16) = 10.32, p  < .001]. Post hoc tests revealed that the difference between INC-in 
and INC-out trials was similar for each bin (p > .05), but that the difference between 
congruent trials and the two types of incongruent trials increased with bin (both ps < 
.001). Put differently, the Stroop effect becomes larger with increasing response 
latencies, whereas the observed membership effect (the difference in RT between INC-in 
and INC-out trials) is unaffected by the relative speed of responding. The interaction 
between set size and bin was not significant [F(4,20) < 1], showing that the magnitude of 
the difference in RT between the small and the large set size conditions was constant 
throughout the latency range.
As with the mean RT analyses, when focusing on the relationship between the set 
size (small vs. large) and the membership effect (INC-in vs. INC-out), the RT difference 
between INC-in trials and INC-out trials was equal for the small and the large set size 
conditions (p = .216). Thus, both response set membership and set size increase the 
Stroop effect, but these effects are additive instead of interacting. The three-way 
interaction between set size, distractor condition (INC-in vs. INC-out), and bin was not 
significant [F(4,20) = 1.20, p  = .34], indicating that the additivity of membership and set 
size effects holds for every bin.
Let us summarize the findings above. First, a membership effect was obtained: 
The distractor word interfered more with color naming when this distractor belonged to
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the response set for the current trial (INC-in) than when it did not correspond to an 
eligible response in that trial (INC-out). This membership effect was observed in both the 
small and the large set size conditions, and the effect was unaffected by the relative speed 
of responding. Second, the results show a set size effect: The magnitude of the Stroop 
effect increased with increasing response set size. In particular, RTs in the incongruent 
condition (both INC-in and INC-out) were longer for the large set size than for the small 
set size, whereas RTs in the congruent condition were not influenced by set size. Third, 
membership and set size produced additive effects on RT, and the additivity was present 
along the entire RT distribution range.
Ridderinkhof (2002a, 2002b) argued that differential inhibition is most prominent 
in the tail of RT distributions. The membership effect was constant across the entire RT 
distributions in the present experiment. This suggests that the effect of membership is not 
caused by greater inhibition of distractors outside than inside the response set.
Whereas an effect of set size was present on incongruent trials, it was absent on 
congruent trials. In WEAVER++, alternative responses will be activated less on 
congruent than on incongruent trials. Consequently, the influence of the number of 
responses (set size) on the selection ratio will be less on congruent than on incongruent 
trials. This may explain why the effect of set size depended on distractor condition.
Note that we assumed that the inhibition of individual responses may be more 
difficult as the number of eligible responses increases. Although this seems intuitively 
correct, an alternative conclusion of Experiment 1 might be that inhibition is, in fact, not 
more difficult as the set size increases. In Experiment 2, we investigated the inhibition 
account in a different manner.
To conclude, an effect of response set membership and an effect of set size were 
observed, and the effects were additive. This corresponds with the predictions from the 
selective allocation of attention account and challenges the inhibition account. To further 
test the attention allocation and inhibition accounts, Experiment 2 was designed.
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5.4 EXPERIMENT 2
In the second experiment, we tested the two different accounts of the response set 
membership effect further by cuing the distractor word rather than the possible responses. 
Is Stroop task performance improved by having advance knowledge of the distractor 
word? Each color-word Stroop stimulus was preceded by one colored rectangle, which 
either matched the upcoming distractor word (the cued condition with a 100% valid 
distractor cue) or was an uninformative white (the uncued condition). For example, a cue 
could indicate that the distractor on the trial would be the word GREEN without 
providing any information about the possible responses (e.g., “red”, “green”, or “blue”). 
An equal number of congruent and incongruent trials was presented; thus, the cue gave 
no information about the upcoming target color (unless there is a learning effect, on 
which we focus in the General Discussion section). As in Experiment 1, participants were 
strongly encouraged to use the information provided by the cue to reduce the amount of 
Stroop interference.
If membership effects arise because noneligible responses are selectively 
inhibited, then, in the incongruent condition, knowing the distractor word and the 
corresponding noneligible response in advance should help color naming. However, the 
inhibition of the response corresponding to the cued distractor word may also have a 
detrimental effect on responding in the present experiment, because congruent Stroop 
stimuli are present as well. Consequently, the inhibition of the cued distractor response 
would reduce not only the interference from incongruent stimuli, but also the facilitation 
from congruent stimuli. Thus, for cued as compared with uncued trials, RTs for 
incongruent trials will be shorter, RTs for congruent trials will be longer, and the 
resulting Stroop effect will be smaller. The slowing of responding on cued congruent 
trials because of their inhibition may be offset somewhat by a facilitatory effect from the 
color cue on recognizing the target color. Still, the Stroop effect (incongruent vs. 
congruent) is expected to be smaller for cued than for uncued trials. Moreover, if cuing 
allows for a greater inhibition of distractors and inhibition takes time to build up 
(Ridderinkhof, 2002a, 2002b), the effect of cuing on the Stroop effect should be largest in 
the tail of the RT distributions.
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The predictions by the attention allocation account are different. As discussed by 
Cohen and Huston (1994), it is likely that bottom-up effects of attentional capture play a 
role in the Stroop task. The word may temporarily draw attention away from the color 
and thereby slow the response. Attentional capture is especially strong when stimuli are 
salient or unexpected (see, e.g., Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Thus, distractor words may 
attract less attention when they are known in advance on the basis of the cue than when 
they are unknown in the uncued condition. Consequently, in the cued condition, more 
attention may be allocated to response selection, which should speed up responding on 
both incongruent and congruent trials. In addition, the speeding up of responding on cued 
congruent trials may be augmented somewhat by a facilitatory effect from the color cue 
on recognizing the target color. If so, the Stroop effect should be larger for cued than for 
uncued trials. Moreover, an effect of set size is predicted, as in Experiment 1.
Note that the assumption of attention capture is an addition to WEAVER++. 
However, this assumption is sensible, because it has been previously proposed in the 
literature and it utilizes manipulations of attention, similar to the other aspects of 
WEAVER++. Attention capture may also be assumed by the inhibition account.
However, the inhibition of the cued distractor response would still reduce the interference 
from incongruent stimuli and the facilitation from congruent stimuli. Thus, the resulting 
Stroop effect would be smaller, regardless of attentional capture.
To summarize, the inhibition account predicts slower responding on congruent 
trials and faster responding on incongruent trials in the cued as compared with the uncued 
condition. The influence of cuing on the Stroop effect should be largest in the tail of the 
RT distributions (Ridderinkhof, 2002a, 2002b). In contrast, according to the attention 
allocation account, responding should be faster on both incongruent and congruent trials 
in the cued as compared with the uncued condition.
5.4.1 Method
5.4.1.1 Participants.
Twenty-four Dutch students from Nijmegen University (20 of them female) volunteered 
to participate in the experiment. Their ages varied from 18 to 28 years, with a mean of 21
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years. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The participants took part 
individually and either received course credit or were paid for their participation. None of 
the participants had taken part in Experiment 1.
5.4.1.2 Materials and design.
The displayed color-word Stroop stimuli were identical to the ones used in Experiment 1. 
As in the first experiment, the 12 stimuli were divided into two sets. Seven cues were 
used, consisting of one single, filled rectangle that measured 42 x 11 mm (corresponding 
to 3.4° x 0.9° of visual angle at a viewing distance of approximately 70 cm). In the small 
set size condition, red, green, blue, and white cues were used for the first stimulus set, 
and yellow, brown, purple, and white cues were used for the second stimulus set. In the 
large set size condition, all seven cues were used. As in Experiment 1, the background of 
the computer screen was black.
There were two distractor conditions: congruent (CON), in which the six stimuli 
for which ink color matched the distractor word, and incongruent (INC), in which the six 
stimuli for which ink color did not match the distractor word. Two cuing conditions were 
used. In the uncued condition, an uninformative white color bar preceded the Stroop 
stimulus. In the cued condition, a 100% valid color bar cue was presented that 
corresponded with the distractor word. As in Experiment 1, two set size conditions were 
used: a small set size (three colors) and a large set size (six colors).
An experimental session consisted of 48 practice trials and 480 test trials. The 
small set size condition consisted of 12 cue-stimulus combinations (3 x CON-cued, 3 x 
INC-cued, 3 x CON-uncued, 3 x INC-uncued), whereas in the large set size condition, 
these numbers were doubled. These cue-stimulus combinations were pseudorandomized 
within a block of 24 trials, with the restriction that cues, stimuli, distractor conditions, 
and responses were never repeated more than twice in a row, to minimize stimulus 
feature and response priming effects. Because the initial item frequency in this 
experiment was not equally balanced (e.g., 50% of the trials used an uninformative cue), 
we controlled for the potential hazard of biases in these pseudorandomized item lists (see 
French & Perruchet, 2009).
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5.4.1.3 Apparatus and procedure.
The apparatus configuration used in this experiment was identical to that in Experiment
1. Also, the procedure for this experiment closely resembled that in Experiment 1, except 
that the cue now gave information about the upcoming distractor word instead of the 
target color. The participants were encouraged to actively use this information to 
decrease the Stroop interference and to react as quickly as possible to the stimulus while 
retaining accuracy.
5.4.1.4 Data analyses.
The same data-trimming procedure was used as in the first experiment. Outliers and voice 
key errors accounted for 1.0%, and incorrect responses accounted for 1.66% of the data. 
After removing the posterror trials and the first three trials of each block, the RTs of the 
remaining trials (93.2%) were used in calculations of means. Mean RTs were subjected to 
a repeated measures ANOVA with set size (small vs. large), distractor condition 
(congruent vs. incongruent), and cue condition (uncued vs. cued) as within-subjects 
factors.
5.4.2 Results and discussion
The upper panel in Figure 5.3 shows the mean RTs as a function of cue condition for the 
congruent and incongruent stimuli in both set size conditions. The lower panel in Figure
5.3 shows the obtained error percentages for the same conditions. The figure shows that 
RTs were longer on incongruent than on congruent trials, longer on uncued than on cued 
trials, and longer in the large than in the small set size condition.
Significant main effects were observed for all three factors. Responses in the 
small set size condition were overall 43 ms faster than those in the large set size condition 
[F(1,23) = 41.79, p  < .001], congruent trials were on average 122 ms faster than 
incongruent trials [F(1,23) = 304.1, p  < .001], and responses in the cued condition were 
46 ms faster than those in the uncued condition [F(1,23) = 50.64, p  < .001].
All two-way interactions were found to be significant. They will be described in 
more detail below. The three-way interaction between set size, distractor condition, and 
cue condition did not reach significance (p > .05).
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Figure 5.3. Results o f  Experim ent 2. M ean response tim es and incorrect response 
percentages as a function o f  cue condition (cued vs. uncued) for the two 
distractor conditions (CON , congruent; INC, incongruent) in the small and the 
large set size conditions. The w ithin-subjects 95%  confidence interval for the 
latencies is ± 30 ms.
A significant interaction between set size and distractor condition was observed 
[F(1,23) = 16.67, p  < .001], The magnitude of the Stroop effect was larger in the large set 
size condition (139 ms) than in the small set size condition (105 ms); thus, the data 
indicate a set size effect. Post hoc tests showed that for both congruent and incongruent 
trials, responses were faster in the small set size condition than in the large set size 
condition, but this effect of set size was more pronounced for incongruent trials (a 
difference of 59 ms, p  < .001) than for congruent trials (a difference of 26 ms, p  < .001). 
This corresponds to the differential effect of set size on congruent and incongruent trials 
observed in Experiment 1.
A significant interaction between set size and cue condition was found [F(1,23) = 
4.59 , p  = .043]. Post hoc tests revealed that for both small and large set size conditions, 
responses in the uncued condition were slower than those in the cued condition (p s < 
.001), but that this difference in RT between uncued and cued conditions was larger for
137
the large set size condition (a cue effect of 54 ms) than for the small set size condition (a 
cue effect of 38 ms). In other words, the facilitatory effect on RTs from the cue becomes 
stronger with an increasing number of eligible responses.
Also, the interaction between distractor condition and cue condition was 
significant [F(1,23) = 17.04, p  < .001]. Post hoc tests showed that for both the cued and 
the uncued conditions, responses in the congruent condition were faster than those in the 
incongruent condition (ps < .001), but the magnitude of this Stroop effect was larger for 
the cued condition than for the uncued condition (136 and 108 ms, respectively). This 
corresponds to the prediction of the attention allocation account and disagrees with the 
prediction of the inhibition account.
Note that these results clearly indicate that the cue indeed modified the response 
latencies. Theoretically, since the cue preceded a congruent Stroop stimulus in half of the 
trials and an incongruent Stroop stimulus in the other half, participants could have chosen 
to ignore the cue as being uninformative about the target response. In that case, the cued 
and uncued conditions should have been similar, running opposite to the observed results.
As in Experiment 1, the predictions derived from the view on inhibition of 
Ridderinkhof (2002a, 2002b) were tested by performing distributional analyses. A 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed with set size (small vs. large), distractor 
condition (congruent vs. incongruent), cue condition (cued vs. uncued), and bin (1-5) as 
within-subjects factors. Figure 5.4 shows the distribution plots per set size. As indicated 
by the figure, the effect of the cue is present throughout the latency range in both the 
congruent and incongruent conditions and in the small and large set size conditions.
Again, only the results pertaining to the relative speed of responding will be 
reported here. For the factors of set size and distractor condition, significant interactions 
with bin were observed [F(4,20) = 3.07, p  = .04, for the interaction between set size and 
bin, and F(4,20) = 13.30, p  < .001, for the interaction between distractor condition and 
bin]. The effect of set size was significant for each bin, but the difference between small 
and large set size was somewhat larger for the outer bins. The effect of distractor 
condition was significant for all bins, but the difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials (i.e., the Stroop effect) increased with increasing bin. The interaction 
between cue condition and bin was not significant [F(4,20) = 1.95, p  = .14].
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Figure 5.4. V ineentized cum ulative distribution curves for the distractor (CON , congruent;
IN C , incongruent) and cue conditions for both set size conditions in Experim ent
2.
The significant interactions between set size and distractor condition, between cue 
condition and distractor condition, and between set size and cue (as also observed in the 
mean RT analyses) were similar for all bins, as was indicated by the nonsignificant three­
way interactions with bin (allps > .05). In other words, for the entire latency range, the 
Stroop effect was larger for the large set size than for the small set size and was larger for 
the cued condition than for the uncued condition. Similarly, the four-way interaction with 
bin was not significant [F(4,20) = 1.71, p  = .188]. Thus, the predictions for the inhibition 
account derived from Ridderinkhof (2002a, 2002b) are not supported by the data.
To summarize, the results indicate that cuing the distractor speeds up responding 
on both congruent and incongruent trials in both set size conditions. In addition, the 
Stroop effect was larger for the cued condition than for the uncued condition. These 
results support the attention allocation account and challenge the inhibition account. If 
membership effects arise because noneligible responses are selectively inhibited, then 
knowing the distractor word and the corresponding response in advance should help color 
naming by inhibition of the response corresponding to the distractor. In the present 
experiment, responding on incongruent trials was indeed faster when the distractor was
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cued as compared with when it was not. However, responding was also faster on cued 
congruent trials than on noncued ones, even though inhibition should have diminished the 
facilitation from congruent trials. This suggests that the inhibition account cannot explain 
the cuing effect. In contrast, the results confirm the predictions that were derived from the 
attention allocation account.
5.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION
A major part of the interference observed in the color-word Stroop task is specific to the 
members of the response set (e.g., Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Klein, 1964; Proctor, 1978). 
This membership effect may be due to selective allocation of attention to eligible 
responses or to a greater inhibition of distractors that are not eligible responses. Two 
experiments were reported, in which we examined the relative merits of these two 
accounts. In Experiment 1, response set membership was manipulated on a trial-by-trial 
basis by cuing two possible responses for each trial. A membership effect was observed: 
Distractors that corresponded to a cued response yielded longer RT s than did distractors 
that did not, independently of the relative speed of responding. Moreover, the 
membership effect was independent of set size. In Experiment 2, on each trial, either the 
distractor was cued or the cue provided no advance information. Cuing the distractor 
decreased color-naming latencies on both incongruent and congruent trials. The decrease 
of RTs on congruent trials suggests that knowing the distractor does not result in greater 
inhibition. Taken together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that 
response set membership effects arise because of selective allocation of attention to 
eligible responses. Furthermore, the manipulation of response set size in both 
experiments indicated that the Stroop effect increases with increasing set size and that 
this mainly results from increases in RT s for incongruent stimuli.
In Experiments 1 and 2, we employed a cuing paradigm. In contrast, such cues are 
not used in normal Stroop experiments. This raises the question of how the findings from 
the present cuing experiments relate to normal uncued Stroop task performance. In his 
classical study on membership effects using cards with 80 printed items, Klein (1964) 
found that the Stroop effect was twice as large for distractor words that corresponded to
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eligible responses than for distractor words that were outside the response set. In the 
present Experiment 1, the response set membership effect was much smaller. However, 
these studies differ on many points that likely influence the magnitude of the membership 
effect. The most prominent difference is that Klein used highly frequent color words for 
the distractors corresponding to the response set (red, green, yellow, and blue) and less 
frequent color words for the distractors outside the response set (tan, purple, gray, and 
black), whereas color name frequency was more balanced in our experiment. Klein 
already observed that the magnitude of the Stroop effect increases with word frequency. 
Indeed, when the stimuli were controlled for word frequency and association, Proctor 
(1978) observed a 24- to 30-ms increase in RT for words in the response set (INC-in) 
compared with words that were not (INC-out). Likewise, using a picture-word variant of 
the Stroop task, La Heij (1988) observed membership effects of 13-27 ms. These 
magnitudes resemble our results in Experiment 1. The simplest explanation for the 
similarity in effects between normal uncued Stroop experiments (La Heij, 1988; Proctor, 
1978) and the present cued experiment is that the cued and uncued response set effects 
are caused by the same mechanism -  namely, selective allocation of attention to eligible 
responses in response selection.
Previous studies have painted no clear picture on the set size effect (see MacLeod, 
1991). Studies with a varying number of possible responses found that when the set size 
was increased, the amount of Stroop interference increased (Kanne et al., 1998; Nielsen, 
1975), remained unaffected (Ray, 1974), or decreased (La Heij et al., 1985). A possible 
explanation for this discrepancy in findings might be found in the particular range of 
response set sizes that was used for each study. Adamson, Foster, and McEwan (2000) 
demonstrated that for memory tasks (in particular, the delayed-matching-to-sample task), 
an increasing set size led to decreased task performance for small set sizes only. For 
larger set sizes, increasing the response set size had no effect. The same could hold for 
Stroop performance. Kanne et al. and Nielsen used set sizes 2, 3, and 4; Ray had three 
versus five eligible responses; and La Heij et al. varied the set size from 2 to 12. Thus, 
one could speculate that increasing the number of eligible responses within the lower 
boundaries of the set size range (2-4) results in an increase of interference; for 
intermediate set size levels (4-5), it has no effect; and, for large set size ranges (6 and
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up), increasing the set size is accompanied by a reduction in Stroop effect. Yet the exact 
boundaries are not clear. In our experiments, we found that the Stroop effect increased 
with increasing set size, corresponding to the findings of Nielsen, but with set sizes more 
closely resembling those of Ray. To vary set size parametrically was beyond the scope of 
the present study, however.
In Experiment 1, two eligible responses were cued for each trial, making up the 
momentary response set for that trial. We stated that the inhibition account predicts that 
perceiving the two cued colors can lead participants to inhibit the other responses within 
a set size condition. Thus, in the small set size condition, one out of three responses can 
be inhibited, whereas in the large set size condition, four colors can be inhibited as being 
ineligible. In Experiment 2, we predicted that participants might be able to inhibit the 
distractor word when it was cued before the stimulus appeared. The predictions 
concerning RT depend on how long such inhibition lasts. We assumed that it would last 
for a couple of seconds and, therefore, be more or less restricted to one trial (lasting 4.5 
s). Indeed, for inhibition of return effects (i.e., the suppression of processing of targets 
that have recently been the focus of attention), Samuel and Kat (2003) demonstrated, in a 
meta-analysis of its time course, that the effect of inhibition was robust for approximately 
3 s and that it appeared to taper off after this point. However, the hypothetical inhibition 
process referred to in the present article might have other underlying dynamics, and it is 
possible that the cue-based inhibition effect in our experiments remains present for a 
longer period and therefore influences later trials as well. Moreover, we assumed that 
inhibiting ineligible responses (Experiment 1) depends on the same process as inhibiting 
a known distractor (Experiment 2), but that does not have to be the case. However, 
regardless of the inhibition dynamics and differences between ineligible responses and 
known distractors, our present experiments suggest that inhibition is not the mechanism 
causing the response set effects.
In Experiment 2, we used a color patch instead of a word to cue the upcoming 
distractor. We did this to minimize the design difference between the two experiments. 
One might argue that a color cue could also perceptually prime the upcoming ink color, 
even though participants are explicitly told that a congruent stimulus appears in only 50% 
of the trials. In congruent trials, this would lead to faster responses in the cued condition
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than in the uncued condition, as we observed. However, in that case, more interference 
should be observed for incongruent stimuli in the cued condition than in the uncued 
condition.2 As Figure 5.3 illustrates, the opposite pattern was found.
In Experiment 2, we observed that the response latencies were shorter in the cued 
than in the uncued condition, even for congruent stimuli. We argued that this RT pattern 
is the result of the allocation of attention to the target and away from the distractor. 
However, there is an alternative explanation that is based on a possible learning effect. As 
was previously pointed out, in order to avoid creating an unbalanced number of INC-in 
and INC-out trials in Experiment 1, we decided to divide the six colors into two 
subgroups and to use only one nonmatching color word for each of the six incongruent 
stimuli. Especially those participants who started with the small set size condition (that 
used only one subgroup with three colors) could have learned the color-word 
combinations for the incongruent stimuli (e.g., the word ROOD can be presented in red 
or blue ink, but never in green ink). In that case, accidently, the target cue in Experiment
1 also gave information about the upcoming distractor word (e.g., a red-green cue gives 
50% chance of the word GROEN and a 25% chance each of ROOD and BLAUW and 
cannot be followed by the distractor words BRUIN, GEEL, and PAARS). This probably 
has no significant effect on the findings of Experiment 1, since the results of Experiment
2 indicate that even 100%o valid information about the upcoming color word does not lead 
to inhibition of the distractor. However, in Experiment 2, such learned color-word 
relations could have improved overall RTs in the cued condition. For example, a red cue 
indicates then not only that the distractor will be ROOD, but also that the ink color will 
be either red (congruent) or blue (incongruent). Consequently, the distractor cue could 
selectively allocate attention to these two responses, thereby decreasing response 
llaatteenncciieess ffoorr bbootthh ccoonnggrruueenntt aanndd innccoonnggrruueennt sstimmuuli inn thhee ccuueedd ccoonndditioonn, inn aaccccoorrdd wwithh 
oouurr ffinnddinnggss. NNootee thhaat thhiss aalteerrnnaativvee eexxpplaannaatioonn ffoorr tthhee ffinnddinnggss iinn Exxppeerrimmeennt 22 
involves some extra processing steps to be performed: (1) to infer during the experiment 
the various ink color-distractor word relations and store this information in memory;
2 N ote that for prim ing o f  the cue color to produce slower responses, cross-m odal prim ing is 
needed. Ifp rim in g  i s only w ithin vision, then the congruent condition w ould b e facilitated add 
the incongruent condition unchanged. H ow ever, the re suits ind icate that: for incongruent trials, 
the cue leca to faster responses.
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(2) to perce i've the color bar that indicates the upcoming distractor word and, uni ess this 
cue is white, retrieve from memory the nonmatching ink; c olor that is linke d to this 
distractor; (3) to allocate attention to both the color response that ‘was cued (in case the 
upcoming stimulus ‘will be congrusnt) and the colo r response that wa s retrieved from 
memory (in cpse the upcoming ttimulus ‘will be incongruent).
To mvestigate whetdsi iuch a isarning effect was pdssent an Expsrimsnt 2, we 
ieanalyzsd tds data. We hypoihesized ihat dsspnnse latensiss fod cced-congruent trials 
wncid diffsi mnrs from idose for unsued-congrcsnt trials (e.g., showing a larged learnang 
sffest) wden padiicipants dad mnrs oppnrtcniiy tn learn tds soior-wnrd reiaiinni, either 
by davang iiaiied wiih ths smaii sst sizs sondition od ihrough assumulatave svidsnss 
gathering during tds sxpsrimsnt. Ws performed a rspeaied meascdei ANOVA waid set 
sazs (imall vs. iargeS, sue condition (susd vs. uncced), and block dalf (firit haif vs. 
sesnnd daif wiihin a csdtain set size snndiiion) as witdin-subjects fastnds, and the odder of 
ids isi sazs conditinn (smail-iarge vs. large-smallS ai a bstween-subjscii fastnr. The 
rssults showed tdat nsiihed ths interastion betwesn scs and nddsd (p = . 134S nor ids 
intsrasiion between cce and blnck half (F < 1) wsrs significant. Thus, no iuppndt fnd tde 
isarning dypotdeiai wai found.
Still, the fact that; the se two interactions were not significant could s imcid be due to a 
inck os stati itical power. Theredore, we performed a se cond analysis on the data of 
Expsdimsni 2 in ssadcd of a pnisible learning effeci cnncedning ink cnlnd-distdacior wnrd 
dsiaiions. Fnr ihe 12 padticipants whn iiarted with the imall ssi iaze condition, we divaded 
ids tdiaii fdom tds ladgs iet size condition into twn data ists -  ons waid ide “old” stimuli 
tdat wsre uisd before in the smail set size snnditinn, and one wath ihe “nsw” iiimuli ihai 
had noi been prssenied bsfnde to thsse participants (i.e., ihe thdee solods from the sesond 
subssi). If the obiedved cuing effssts in Expedimeni 2 (see Fagcds 5.3) wers in fact cacsed 
by learned associations, tdsn lngkially, ihsse cus effects shocld bs iargsr for the old 
itimcli than fod the new siimcli. Tde resclts shnwed ncmsrisaliy ihe nppoitie: In ths 
snngrusnt cnndition, the sce dscreased ihs RTi by 61 mi for the oid stimuii and 69 ms 
fod ths new stimuli Similarly, an the mcongrcsnt sondition, tds cue desdeased ihs RT i by 
26 mi fnd ths nld itimcli and by 30 ms fod tds new iiimcli. Thii provadss stdong svidence
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against an alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 2 based on learned 
associations.
To summarize, when response set membership is manipulated on a trial-by-trial 
basis, a membership effect arises, independently of set size and relative speed of 
responding. Moreover, cuing the distractor decreases color-naming RT s on both 
incongruent and congruent trials. The observation that RTs on congruent trials are shorter 
and the Stroop effect is larger in the cued condition suggests that knowing the distractor 
does not result in greater inhibition. Taken together, these results provide evidence that 
response set effects arise because of selective allocation of attention to eligible responses. 
Increasing set size from three to six leads to an increase of RTs, more so for incongruent 
than for congruent stimuli. Thus, the present findings support Broadbent’s (1970, 1971) 
assumption that attention can be selectively allocated to eligible responses, as 
implemented in the WEAVER++ model.
5
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CHAPTER 6
Attention and Gaze Shifting in Dual-Task and 
Go/No-Go Performance With Vocal Responding
“Focusing is not implanting eyes, for they exist already; 
but giving them a right direction, which they have not” 
(Plato, 438/427 BC -  348/347 BC)
This chapter has been accepted for publication as:
Lamers, M. J. M. & Roelofs, A. (in press). Attention and gaze shifting in dual-task and 
go/no-go performance with vocal responding, Acta Psychologica (2010), 
doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.12.005.
6.1 A B ST R A C T
Evidence from go/no-go performance on the Eriksen flanker task with manual responding 
suggests that individuals gaze at stimuli just as long as needed to identify them (e.g., 
Sanders, 1998). In contrast, evidence from dual-task performance with vocal responding 
suggests that gaze shifts occur after response selection (e.g., Roelofs, 2008a). This 
difference in results may be due to the nature of the task situation (go/no-go vs. dual task) 
or the response modality (manual vs. vocal). We examined this by having participants 
vocally respond to congruent and incongruent flanker stimuli and shift gaze to left- or 
right-pointing arrows. The arrows required a manual response (dual task) or determined 
whether the vocal response to the flanker stimuli had to be given or not (go/no-go). Vocal 
response and gaze shift latencies were longer on incongruent than congruent trials in both 
dual-task and go/no-go performance. The flanker effect was also present in the manual 
response latencies in dual-task performance. Ex-Gaussian analyses revealed that the 
flanker effect on the gaze shifts consisted of a shift of the entire latency distribution.
These results suggest that gaze shifts occur after response selection in both dual-task and 
go/no-go performance with vocal responding.
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6.2 IN T R O D U C T IO N
The measurement of eye movements has a long tradition in experimental psychology (see 
Woodworth, 1938, for a review of the early literature). Whereas it has long been assumed 
that eye gaze durations do not reflect much about ongoing psychological processes, since 
the mid-1970s it has become increasingly clear that gaze durations and psychological 
processes are tightly linked (e.g., Rayner, 1998, for a review). Consequently, research 
into psychological processes has used gaze durations as an index of the duration of 
underlying psychological processes in various information processing tasks, such as 
reading, visual search, and scene perception. Moreover, research has shown that gaze 
shifting and orienting of attention are tightly linked (see Wright & Ward, 2008, for a 
review). While individuals can shift the focus of attention without an eye movement, they 
cannot move their eyes to one spatial location while paying full attention to another 
location (i.e., shifts of eye position require shifts of attention). Thus, a gaze shift indexes 
a shift of attention (Wright & Ward, 2008).
Assumptions about attention and gaze shifts in relation to underlying psycho­
logical processes play a central role in theories of human attention and performance (e.g., 
Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; Sanders, 1998). However, although researchers have found 
agreement on the link between attention and gaze shifts, controversy exists on exactly 
when these shifts occur in relation to stimulus identification, response selection, and 
motor programming during the course of planning actions. In particular, researchers 
disagree on whether attention and gaze shifts occur before or after response selection.
The research reported in the present article addresses this issue in order to resolve the 
controversy.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We start by describing the 
two different accounts on gaze shifts in relation to response selection together with 
corresponding empirical evidence. In particular, evidence from go/no-go performance on 
the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) with manual responding suggests that 
gaze shifts occur before response selection, whereas evidence from dual-task 
performance with vocal responding suggests that gaze shifts occur after response 
selection. This difference in results may be due to the nature of the task situation (go/no-
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go vs. dual task) or the response modality (manual vs. vocal). Next, we report the results 
of a new eye tracking experiment that was designed to adjudicate between these two 
accounts. Finally, we discuss the theoretical consequences of our results.
According to a prominent account, gaze remains focused on a certain object just 
as long as is necessary to identify that object, after which the gaze moves away to other 
places or objects of interest (e.g., Sanders, 1998). Sanders and colleagues (Sanders, 1998; 
Sanders & Lamers, 2002; Sanders & Van Duren, 1998; Van Duren & Sanders, 1995) 
obtained empirical evidence in a number of studies that gaze shifts may occur before 
response selection. In experiments conducted by Sanders and Lamers (2002), participants 
were presented with Eriksen flanker stimuli displayed on the left side of a computer 
screen and a go-symbol displayed on the right side of the screen on some of the trials.
The flanker stimuli consisted of the target letter A or B flanked by two incongruent As or 
Bs, congruent As or Bs, or neutral distractor letters (Xs) on each side, making up 
incongruent (e.g., BBABB), congruent (e.g., AAAAA), or neutral (e.g., XXAXX) 
stimuli. Participants responded to the target letter A by pressing a left response key and to 
the target letter B by pressing a right response key. Previous studies showed that response 
times (RTs) are longer on incongruent than congruent trials, which is taken to reflect the 
ease of response selection (e.g., Lamers & Roelofs, in press; see Sanders, 1998, for a 
review). Whether a response was actually executed in the study of Sanders and Lamers
(2002) depended on the presence of a go-symbol. The response to the flanker stimulus 
was withheld while the participant made a shift of gaze away from the flanker stimulus to 
the location of the go-symbol. In 80% of the trials, a single dot (the go-signal) was 
presented, indicating that the manual response to the flanker stimulus should be executed. 
A flanker effect was present in the manual RTs, but the latencies of the gaze shifts from 
the flanker stimuli to the go-symbol did not differ among congruent, incongruent, and 
neutral flanker trials. This finding suggests that the gaze shift was initiated before 
response selection.
In line with Sanders and colleagues, D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a, 1997b) 
hypothesized that gaze shifts are generally initiated before response selection. Such early 
gaze shifting was implemented in their strategic response-deferment model of dual-task 
performance (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a). In one of the experiments simulated by the model,
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participants vocally produced the words red or green in response to the letters H or N (the 
primary task) and made manual key-press responses to digits (the secondary task). The 
letters and digits were presented at different spatial locations, so that participants had to 
make a gaze shift between the locations of the two stimuli. In the simulations of 
performance in this experiment, the eyes were instructed to move from the letter to the 
digit when the perceptual processing of a letter had progressed far enough to identify it as 
an H or N, similar to what Sanders and colleagues assumed (Sanders, 1998; Sanders & 
Lamers, 2002; Sanders & Van Duren, 1998; Van Duren & Sanders, 1995). The 
simulations showed that the model provided an excellent fit to the empirical data. 
However, the assumption of early gaze shifting in the model was speculative, because 
evidence on the actual eye movements was not available from the simulated dual-task 
experiment.
Whereas D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a) assume that gaze shifts occur before 
response selection in vocal responding, eye tracking studies of dual-task performance 
with vocal responding suggest that gaze shifts occur after response selection. Roelofs 
(2007) presented picture-word combinations on the left side of a computer screen and 
left- or right-pointing arrows on the right side of the screen. The pictures and words could 
be semantically related (e.g., a pictured cat with the word dog superimposed) or unrelated 
(e.g, the word house superimposed), among other relations. Participants named the 
pictures and shifted their gaze to the arrow to indicate its direction by pressing a left or 
right button. The latencies of the vocal responses, gaze shifts, and manual responses were 
longer in the semantic than the unrelated condition. Similarly, Roelofs (2008a) observed 
that a phonological manipulation of vocal response planning was reflected in the vocal 
response, gaze shift, and manual response latencies (cf. Meyer, Roelofs, & Levelt, 2003). 
These results suggest that gaze shifts occur after response selection in vocal responding, 
different from what D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a) assumed.
In summary, whereas empirical evidence suggests that gaze shifts occur before 
response selection in go/no-go performance with manual responding (e.g., Sanders,
1998), recent evidence suggests that gaze shifts occur after response selection in dual­
task performance with vocal responding (e.g., Roelofs, 2007, 2008a). This difference in 
results may be due to the nature of the task situation (go/no-go vs. dual task) or the
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response modality (manual vs. vocal). Roelofs (2007) provided evidence that the moment 
of gaze shifting in dual-task performance depends on the attentional demands of the 
primary task. For example, word reading is faster and requires less attention than picture 
naming, and gaze shifts occurred earlier for word reading than picture naming relative to 
articulation onset. D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a) observed that manual responding to 
the letters N and H was faster than vocal responding. Similarly, Lamers and Roelofs (in 
press) observed shorter RTs for manual than vocal responding in the Eriksen flanker and 
color-word Stroop tasks. The shorter RTs for manual than vocal responding may 
correspond to a difference in attentional demand. That is, manual responding may require 
less attention than vocal responding. If so, attention and gaze may shift earlier from one 
stimulus to another in a manual than a vocal task. In short, it may be that Sanders and 
colleagues (Sanders, 1998; Sanders & Lamers, 2002; Sanders & Van Duren, 1998; Van 
Duren & Sanders, 1995) obtained evidence for gaze shifting before response selection 
because of the manual responding in their experiments, whereas Roelofs (2007, 2008a) 
obtained evidence for gaze shifting after response selection because of the vocal 
responding.
We examined whether a difference in response modality provides sufficient 
explanation for the difference in results between earlier studies by having participants 
vocally respond to congruent and incongruent flanker stimuli (presented on the left side 
of a computer screen) and process left- or right-pointing arrows (presented on the right 
side of the screen). We employed an arbitrary stimulus-response mapping, as in the 
experiments of Sanders and colleagues (Sanders, 1998; Sanders & Lamers, 2002; Sanders 
& Van Duren, 1998; Van Duren & Sanders, 1995) with manual responding. The flanker 
stimuli contained target letters requiring the words red or green as vocal response, like in 
the experiment simulated by D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a). The target letters in our 
experiment were flanked by two congruent or incongruent letters on each side. The 
arrows consisted of the characters < and > The spatial distance between flanker stimuli 
and arrows was larger than 20°, requiring a gaze shift from flanker stimulus to arrow. To 
make sure that the arrows were properly fixated and to minimize the chance that 
participants might identify the direction of the arrows by their peripheral vision while 
fixating elsewhere, the arrows were flanked by two Xs on each side, yielding XX<XX
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and XX>XX as stimuli. The arrows required a manual response (dual task) or determined 
whether the vocal response to the flanker stimuli had to be given or not (go/no-go). 
Participants were instructed to process the left (flanker) stimulus first, and then move 
their gaze to the right (arrow) stimulus. Note that, theoretically, in the dual-task 
condition, the responses to the flanker stimuli could be executed while the eyes shift, 
whereas in the go/no-go condition, the response has to be withheld until the go/no-go 
stimulus is perceived after a gaze shift.
If the nature of the task situation (dual task vs. go/no-go) is responsible for the 
difference in results between Sanders and colleagues (Sanders, 1998; Sanders & Lamers, 
2002; Sanders & Van Duren, 1998; Van Duren & Sanders, 1995) and Roelofs (2007, 
2008a), then gaze shifting should reflect the flanker effect in dual-task performance 
(replicating Roelofs, 2007, 2008a) but not in go/no-go performance (replicating Sanders 
& Lamers, 2002). However, if the response modality (vocal vs. manual) provides 
sufficient explanation for the difference in results between studies, then gaze shifting 
should reflect the flanker effect in both dual-task performance (replicating Roelofs, 2007, 
2008a) and go/no-go performance (contrary to what Sanders & Lamers, 2002, observed 
for manual responding).
Although it has been generally assumed that the flanker effect arises in response 
selection (see Sanders, 1998, for a review), recent research has suggested that flanker 
stimuli may yield effects at both the level of stimulus identification and response 
selection (e.g, Verbruggen, Notebaert, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2006). In 
examining effects of stimulus- and response-conflict in a flanker task, Verbruggen et al. 
(2006) had participants identify central target-color lines and ignore flanking color lines 
by pressing corresponding response keys. Six colors were mapped onto three responses. 
Consequently, stimuli could be stimulus-incongruent (i.e., central color and flanker colors 
differed but were mapped onto the same response), response-incongruent (i.e., central 
color and flanker colors differed and were mapped onto different responses), or stimuli 
could be congruent (i.e., central color and flanker colors were the same). Verbruggen and 
colleagues observed RT differences among all three conditions, suggesting that the 
stimuli yielded effects at both the level of stimulus identification and response selection. 
To verify that the flanker effect in the present experiment arises at the level of response
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selection, we included two types of conflicting stimuli in our experiment, one to assess 
stimulus conflict (i.e., central and flanker letters differed but were mapped onto the same 
vocal response) and one to assess response conflict (i.e., central and flanker letters 
differed and were mapped onto different vocal responses).
Moreover, in addition to measuring the mean latencies of vocal responding, gaze 
shifting, and manual responding, we analyzed whole latency distributions. Following D. 
E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a), Roelofs (2007, 2008a) assumed that participants 
strategically set a criterion for when the shift between two stimuli (here, letter and arrow) 
should occur. This criterion concerns an event during the course of the vocal task 
processes, such as the completion of response selection. That is, the criterion is set in the 
information domain (i.e., a particular type of processing has to be done) rather than the 
temporal domain (i.e., a deadline). The position of the shift criterion within the processes 
related to the first stimulus (here, the flanker stimuli) serves to maintain acceptable levels 
of speed and accuracy, to minimize resource consumption and to avoid crosstalk between 
aspects of the tasks, and to satisfy instructions about task priorities. In the present 
experiment, participants were instructed to give the vocal response before the manual one 
in dual-task performance, or to execute or withhold the vocal response depending on the 
go/no-go signal. This account of gaze shifting predicts that the flanker effect should shift 
the whole latency distribution toward slower responding on incongruent as compared 
with congruent trials (cf. Roelofs, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). This prediction was tested for 
the gaze shift latencies in the present experiment.
In summary, participants had to vocally respond to congruent and incongruent 
flanker stimuli and shift gaze to left- or right-pointing arrows. The arrows required a 
manual response (dual task) or determined whether the vocal response to the flanker 
stimuli had to be given or not (go/no-go). If the nature of the task situation (dual task vs. 
go/no-go) determines whether gaze shifts occur before or after response selection, then 
gaze shifting should reflect the flanker effect in dual-task performance but not in go/no- 
go performance. However, if the response modality is responsible, then gaze shifting 
should reflect the flanker effect in both dual-task performance and go/no-go performance. 
To assess whether the flanker effect arises at the level of response selection, we included 
two types of conflicting stimuli, one to assess stimulus conflict and the other to assess
154
response conflict. Moreover, to assess whether participants strategically set a criterion for 
when the shift between the flanker and arrow stimuli should occur, we examined whether 
the flanker effect is present as a shift of the entire latency distribution.
6.3 METHOD
6.3.1 Participants
Eighteen Dutch students from Radboud University Nijmegen (13 of them female) 
volunteered to participate in the experiment. Their age varied from 17 to 30 years with a 
mean of 22.7 years. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were 
either paid 15 euro or received partial course credit for their participation.
6.3.2 Materials and design
The display consisted of two simultaneously presented stimuli. For the flanker stimulus 
presented on the left of the screen, four letters were used as central target: H, N, P, and S. 
These letters were also used as flankers (two on each side of the target letter, e.g., 
HHSHH) for each of the four targets, resulting in 16 different flanker stimuli. For the 
arrows presented on the right of the screen, only two stimuli were used: XX>XX and 
XX<XX. All letters were written in white capital letters, Arial font size 24. The letter 
strings were centrally placed in an invisible rectangle that was 30 mm x 9 mm 
(corresponding to 2.86° x 0.86° of visual angle at a viewing distance of approximately 60 
cm). The horizontal distance between the middle of the flanker stimulus and the arrow 
was 25.2 cm (22.8°). The background of the computer screen was black.
In half of the trials, the flanker stimulus was congruent (i.e., target and flankers 
are associated with the same response), whereas in the other half they were incongruent 
(i.e., target and flankers evoke competing responses). In order to be able to differentiate 
response conflict from stimulus conflict, we used a design in which two target letters 
were mapped onto the same response. In particular, H and P were associated with one 
response, whereas N and S were associated with the alternative response. This target-to- 
response mapping was counterbalanced across participants. Due to this 2-to-1 design, the 
eight congruent stimuli were divided into two groups of equal size. For the congruent
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stimuli containing no conflicting information (henceforth CON-NC), the flankers were 
identical to the target (e.g., HHHHH). For the congruent stimuli containing stimulus 
conflict (henceforth CON-SC), the flankers were different from the target, but associated 
with the same response as this target (e.g., PPHPP). For the incongruent stimuli 
(henceforth INC), the flankers and the target evoked different responses (e.g., HHSHH). 
The arrow stimuli pointed equally often to the left as to the right.
Two different task conditions were employed, a dual-task condition and a go/no- 
go condition. In the dual-task condition, participants responded vocally to the target 
letters of the flanker stimuli by saying either “rood” (red) or “groen” (green) and 
manually to the arrow. If the arrow pointed to the left (i.e., XX<XX), a left key response 
was required, and vice versa if the arrow pointed to the right (i.e., XX>XX). In the go/no- 
go condition, only a vocal response was required to the flanker stimuli and the direction 
of the arrow indicated whether the response had to be executed or not. All participants 
were given both the dual-task and the go/no-go conditions. The order of task conditions 
was counterbalanced across participants.
The dual-task condition consisted of 32 practice trials, 12 dummy trials (i.e., 3 
startup trials at the beginning of each block), and 256 test trials. The go/no-go condition 
consisted of 32 practice trials, 12 dummy trials, and 320 test trials (256 go-trials and 64 
no-go trials). The presentation of the stimulus combinations was pseudo-randomized 
within a block of 64 trials (dual task) or 80 trials (go/no-go) with the following 
restrictions to reduce stimulus feature and response priming effects: For the flanker 
stimuli, each of the 16 stimuli was never immediately repeated and both the distractor 
condition (CON-NC, CON-SC, and INC) and the vocal response could never be the same 
on more than three consecutive trials.
6.3.3 Apparatus
The experiment was conducted on two microcomputers. The subject PC (Intel 82443 BX 
Pentium II processor) ran the software package Nijmegen Experimental Setup Utility 
(NESU) version 2006.11.22, which generated the visual displays and collected the 
experimental vocal and manual data. Vocal responses were measured by an electronic 
voice key and manual responses by a NESU button box with two buttons, with an
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accuracy of 1 ms (1000 Hz). Two CRT color monitors were connected to this subject 
computer. A 17 in. VGA monitor showed the stimuli displays to the participants. Infra­
red display markers mounted on this subject monitor sensed the subject’s head position, 
for adjusting the estimated gaze positions. The second (14 in.) monitor showed control 
information to the experimenter, such as the participant’s response latencies, the button 
that had been pressed, and the correct response. A third color CRT monitor was 
connected to the second (operator) PC (Intel 82443 LX/EX Pentium II processor) which 
controlled the eye tracker device. Eye movements were measured using an SMI EyeLink- 
HiSpeed 2D headband-mounted eye tracking system (EyeLink I 2.11 SR Research Ltd. 
Mississauga, Canada) with two high-speed eye cameras and one high-speed head position 
compensation camera.
6.3.4 Procedure
The participants took part individually in a dimly illuminated, quiet room, separated from 
the experimenter by a large, sound-reducing curtain. The walls were painted black to 
prevent any distracting light-sources for the eye tracker cameras. The participant was 
seated in front of a computer monitor, at a viewing distance that was kept at 
approximately 60 cm. As the vocal responses made the use of a chin support undesirable, 
the experimenter verified the viewing distance by means of a measuring rod that was 
placed between the participant’s forehead and the computer screen (this was repeated 
occasionally in the breaks). The button box and voice key microphone were placed on a 
table in front of the participant. Participants were given written instructions for the first 
task condition (dual task or go/no-go), which were repeated orally by the experimenter.
Next, the eye tracker headband was mounted on the participant’s head and the eye 
tracker device was calibrated and validated. For pupil-to-gaze calibration, a grid of three 
by three positions had been defined. During a calibration trial, a fixation target (i.e., a 
small black circle) appeared once, in random order, in each of these positions for one 
second. Participants were asked to fixate upon each target until the next target appeared. 
After the calibration trial, the estimated positions of the participant’s fixations and the 
distances from the fixation targets were displayed to the experimenter. Calibration was 
considered adequate if there was at least one fixation within 1.5° of each fixation target.
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When calibration was considered poor, the procedure was repeated, sometimes after 
adjusting the eye cameras. Successful calibration was followed by a pupil-to-gaze 
validation trial. For the participants, this trial did not differ from the calibration trial, but 
the data collected during the validation trial were used to estimate the participant’s gaze 
positions, and the error (i.e., the distance between the estimated gaze position and the 
target position) was measured. Validation was considered completed if the average error 
was below 1.0° and the worst error below 1.5°. Depending on the result of the validation 
trial, the calibration and validation trials were repeated or testing began.
Upon completing the eye tracker setup procedures, the light was switched off and 
32 practice trials were given. The experimenter verified that the gaze reflected the 
instructed order, that is, moved from the flanker stimulus on the left to the arrow on the 
right. Then, any remaining questions about the task were answered by the experimenter 
together with feedback about the performance in the practice trials. Next, either 256 test 
trials (in the dual-task condition) or 320 test trials (in the go/no-go condition) were 
presented, divided in four blocks of equal size, with a short break in between. Each block 
started with three additional dummy trials to reduce startup effects. After completing the 
first task, the eye tracker head band was removed from the head, the light was switched 
on, and a break of about 10 min was given. Then, the instruction for the second task 
condition was given both written and orally. The eye tracker head band was mounted for 
a second time, the viewing distance was checked, the calibration and validation processes 
were repeated and the light was switched off. After finishing the second task (trials 
composition the same as described above for the first task), participants received some 
feedback on their performance and the general purpose of this experiment.
The instructions for the dual-task condition were as follows. At the start of each 
trial, participants had to focus on the left (empty) side of the screen. As soon as the 
stimuli appeared, the participant had to vocally respond to the central letter of the flanker 
stimulus by saying “rood” or “groen”, move the gaze to the arrow, and indicate the 
direction of the arrow by pressing either the left or the right button. The instructions for 
the go/no-go condition were slightly different. As with the dual-task condition, each trial 
started with focusing on the left side of the screen. When the stimuli appeared, the 
participant had to process the central letter of the flanker stimulus and move the gaze to
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the right (go/no-go) stimulus. An arrow pointing to the left (i.e., XX<XX) indicated a go- 
trial in which the prepared vocal response to the flanker stimulus had to be given. If the 
arrow pointed to the right (XX>XX), the participant had to countermand the prepared 
response (a no-go trial). Participants were instructed to move the eyes in the order just 
described (that is, not starting with the arrow and moving the gaze to the flanker 
stimulus) and encouraged to react as quickly and accurately as possible.
Each trial took 5 s and went as follows: An empty screen was presented for 2 s. 
Then, the stimulus display was shown for 3 s. The latencies of the vocal responses, gaze 
shifts, and manual responses (in the dual-task condition) were measured from stimulus 
onset. Voice key errors and incorrect vocal responses to the flanker stimuli were 
registered on-line by the experimenter. The beginning of a break was indicated by the 
Dutch wordpauze (pause) for 1500 ms. The beginning of a block was preceded by the 
word attentie (attention) for 1500 ms. An experimental session lasted about 2 h.
6.3.5 Analyses
The participants’ gaze shifts were analyzed using a computer program written by the first 
author. The gaze shift from flanker stimulus to the arrow was defined as the saccade from 
left to right in which the horizontal gaze position passed the (invisible) vertical line 
through the center of the computer screen. In each trial, the stimulus onset was subtracted 
from the start time for this particular saccade to obtain the duration for fixating on the 
flanker stimulus. Although viewing was binocular and the positions of both eyes were 
tracked, only the data of the left eye was analyzed. Because the stimuli were always 
presented at the same spatial positions on the screen, there was no fixation point to 
indicate the position of the flanker stimulus before stimulus onset. Indeed, as anticipated, 
participants were virtually always fixating this position at the beginning of a trial.
The following data-trimming procedure was used. First, the three dummy trials 
that were added at the beginning of each block to reduce startup effects were omitted 
from data analyses. Second, a manual response was considered incorrect when the wrong 
button was pressed (0.3% of the dual-task trials), whereas a vocal response was incorrect 
when it included a speech error or when a wrong word was produced (1.2% of the dual­
task trials and 0.5% of the go/no-go trials). These incorrect response trials were
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discarded. Third, to reduce post-error slowing effects (Rabbitt, 1966), also each trial 
immediately following an incorrect response was omitted from analyses (1.4% of the 
dual-task trials and 0.4% of the go/no-go trials). Fourth, trials in which the voice key 
malfunctioned, was triggered inappropriately, or the measured vocal RT s were shorter 
than 300 ms or longer than 3000 ms were discarded (2.3% of the dual-task trials and 
2.1% of the go/no-go trials). Fifth, trials in which the measured gaze duration was shorter 
than 200 ms, in which the gaze started at the right side of the screen, or in which the gaze 
position did not cross the vertical axis through the screen center from left-to-right were 
classified as gaze errors and omitted from analyses (1.1% of the dual-task trials and 0.8% 
of the go/no-go trials). The latencies were analyzed for the remaining 93.8% correct trials 
in the dual-task condition and 96.2% correct trials in the go/no-go condition. Because 
there were virtually no differences in incorrect responses among flanker conditions, the 
errors were not further analyzed.
For the dual-task condition, mean latencies were subjected to a two-way repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with measure (gaze, vocal, and manual) and 
distractor type (CON-NC, CON-SC, and INC) as within-subjects factors. The same held 
for the go/no-go condition, except that this task has no manual responses. As the absolute 
mean latencies for the different measures (vocal, gaze, and manual) were expected to 
differ substantially, standard scores (z) with zero mean and unit standard deviation 
(Winer, Brown, & Michels, 1991) were used for comparisons of the magnitude of effects 
between measures.
To compare gaze shift latencies between the two task conditions, a two-way 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the mean gaze shift 
latencies for the correct trials, with distractor type (CON-NC, CON-SC, INC) and task 
condition (dual task, go/no-go) as within-participants factors. An alpha level of .05 was 
used for all statistical tests.
The gaze shifts were not only analyzed in terms of mean latencies but also at the 
level of distributional characteristics by performing Vincentile and ex-Gaussian analyses. 
Vincentile analyses do not depend on prior distributional assumptions and examine the 
raw distributions directly (Ratcliff, 1979). To obtain the distributions, the rank-ordered 
gaze shift latencies for each participant were divided into deciles (10% quantiles) and
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mean latencies were computed for each decile, separately for each task condition and 
distractor type (for a similar approach, see Lamers & Roelofs, 2007; Lamers, Roelofs, & 
Rabeling-Keus, 2010; Roelofs, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Schneider & Verbruggen, 2008).
By averaging these decile means across participants, Vincentized cumulative distribution 
curves were obtained. Vincentizing the data across individual participants provides a way 
of averaging data to obtain group distributions while preserving the shapes of the 
individual participant distributions. Ex-Gaussian analyses characterize a latency 
distribution by assuming an explicit function for the shape of the distribution. The ex- 
Gaussian function consists of a convolution of a Gaussian (i.e., normal) and an 
exponential distribution, which generally provides good fits to empirical latency 
distributions (e.g., Luce, 1986; Ratcliff, 1979). The analyses provide three parameters 
characterizing a distribution: p (mu) and a (sigma) reflecting the mean and standard 
deviation of the Gaussian portion, and x (tau) reflecting the mean and standard deviation 
of the exponential portion. The mean of the whole distribution equals the sum of p and x. 
Thus, ex-Gaussian analyses decompose mean latencies into two additive components, 
which characterize the leading edge (p.) and the tail (x) of the underlying distribution. An 
effect in p indicates a shift of the entire distribution, whereas x reflects effects on 
skewing.
The ex-Gaussian parameters p, a, and x were estimated from the data using the 
quantile maximum likelihood estimation method proposed by Brown and Heathcote
(2003). The parameters were estimated per task condition and distractor type for each 
participant individually using the QMPE software using ten quantiles (Brown & 
Heathcote, 2003). All estimations converged within 25 iterations. The ex-Gaussian 
parameters were then submitted to ANOVAs with the crossed variables task condition 
and distractor type.
6.4 RESULTS
Figure 6.1 shows for each distractor type (CON-NC, CON-SC, and INC) the mean 
latencies for the vocal responses to the flanker stimuli, the gaze shifts, and the manual 
responses to the arrows as well as the percentages of incorrect responses for the dual-task
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Figure 6.1. M ean latencies for the vocal responses, gaze shifts, and m anual responses per 
distractor condition for dual-task and go/no-go perform ance. N um bers betw een 
brackets denote the percentages o f  incorrect (vocal and m anual) responses for 
each condition. CON-NC = congruent w ith no conflict, CON -SC = congruent 
w ith stimulus conflict, INC = incongruent. Error bars indicating the standard 
error o f  the m ean are too small to be clearly visible in the figure.
(left panel) and go/no-go (right panel) conditions. The figure shows that for both task 
conditions, a flanker effect is present in the vocal response latencies. Vocal responding 
took longer in the incongruent condition than in both types of congruent conditions. 
Importantly, the gaze shift latencies also showed this flanker effect, regardless of the task 
condition. Moreover, the flanker effect was present in the manual response latencies in 
the dual-task condition. The figure shows that there is no effect of stimulus conflict in the 
flanker task. That is, for each measure in both task conditions, latencies appear to be
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similar in the CON-SC and CON-NC conditions. Thus, the flanker effect appears to be 
one of response conflict.
The statistical analysis of the standard (z) scores comparing the flanker effects 
among the vocal responses, gaze shifts, and manual responses in dual-task performance 
yielded a main effect of distractor type, F(2, 34) = 33.86, p  < .001, which did not differ 
among measures, F(4, 68) = 2.16, p  = .105. Pairwise comparisons revealed that latencies 
were longer on INC trials than CON-NC and CON-SC trials, both ps < .001, whereas the 
latter two did not differ, p  = .51, suggesting that the flanker effect arises at the level of 
response selection rather than stimulus identification.
The statistical analysis of the z -scores comparing the flanker effects between the 
vocal responses and gaze shifts in go/no-go performance yielded a main effect of 
distractor type, F(2, 34) = 15.07, p  < .001, which was similar for both measures as 
indicated by the absence of a measure x distractor type interaction, F(2, 34) = 3.25, p  = 
.053. Pairwise comparisons revealed that latencies were longer on INC trials than CON- 
NC and CON-SC trials, p  = .002 andp  < .001, respectively, and that there was no 
difference between the latencies in the two congruent conditions, p  = .186, suggesting 
that the flanker effect arises at the level of response selection rather than stimulus 
identification.
The statistical analysis of the gaze shift latencies showed a main effect of task 
condition, F(1,17) = 38.35, p  < .001, indicating that the gaze shift latencies were much 
shorter in the go/no-go condition (i.e., 509 ms, on average) than in the dual-task condition 
(694 ms, on average). The significant main effect of distractor type, F(2,34) = 21.02, p  < 
.001, mirrors the above mentioned finding that the flanker effect was present in the gaze 
shift latencies, whereas the nonsignificant interaction between task condition and 
distractor type, F(2,34) = 2.10, p  = .141, indicates that this effect of distractor type is 
similar across tasks.
Figure 6.2 shows the distributions of the gaze shift latencies for the three 
distractor types in the dual-task and go/no-go conditions. The figure shows that the 
flanker effect was present throughout almost the entire latency range regardless of task 
condition, except for the shortest latencies in the go/no-go condition. The latter may 
reflect a floor effect. Table 6.1 gives the ex-Gaussian parameter estimates for the gaze
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shift latencies per task condition and distractor type. The table reveals that the task and 
distractor effects on the Gaussian parameters ^ and a are similar to the pattern observed 
in the mean latencies, whereas there are no effects in the exponential parameter x.
Statistical analyses revealed that for there were main effects of task condition, 
F(1, 17) = 33.54, p  < .001, and distractor type, F(1, 17) = 3.63, p  = .037. There was no 
interaction between task condition and distractor type, F(2, 34) = 1.25, p  = .30. This 
suggests that the effect of task condition and distractor type was to shift the entire latency 
distribution. Pairwise comparisons revealed that ^ was larger on INC trials than on CON-
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Figure 6.2. Vincentized cumulative distribution curves for the gaze shift latencies per 
distractor condition in go/no-go and dual-task performance. CON-NC = 
congruent with no conflict, CON-SC = congruent with stimulus conflict, INC = 
incongruent.
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Table 6.1 Mean Ex-Gaussian Parameter Estimates (¡a, a, r) fo r  the Gaze Shift Latencies 
as a Function o f  Task Condition and Distractor Type
Task condition/distractor type a x
Dual task
CON-NC 539 98 128
CON-SC 535 82 140
INC 573 104 147
Go/No-go
CON-NC 369 45 119
CON-SC 385 51 106
INC 396 71 115
Note. Mean ex-Gaussian parameters estimates are given in milliseconds. CON-NC = congruent 
with no conflict, CON-SC = congruent with stimulus conflict, INC = incongruent.
distribution. Pairwise comparisons revealed that ^ was larger on INC trials than on CON- 
NC trials (p = .005) and on CON-SC trials (p = .044), whereas the latter two did not 
differ, p  = .62, suggesting that the flanker effect arises at the level of response selection 
rather than stimulus identification. For a, there were main effects of task condition, F(1, 
17) = 7.59, p  < .01, and distractor type, F(1, 17) = 6.11, p  < .005. There was no 
interaction between task condition and distractor type, F(2, 34) = 1.44, p  = .25. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that a was larger on INC trials than on CON-NC trials (p = .005) 
and on CON-SC trials (p = .008), whereas the latter two did not differ, p  = .20, 
suggesting that the flanker effect arises at the level of response selection rather than 
stimulus identification. For x, there was a marginally significant main effect of task 
condition, F(1, 17) = 4.17, p  = .057, but no effect of distractor type, F(1, 17) < 1, p  = 
.747. There was no interaction between task condition and distractor type, F(2, 34) < 1, p  
= .52.
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To summarize, the task and distractor effects were present in Gaussian parameters 
^ and a, but not in the exponential parameter x. This suggests that task condition and 
distractor type shifted the entire latency distribution. These results support the assumption 
of D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a) and Roelofs (2007, 2008a, 2008c) that participants set 
a criterion for when the shift between flanker and arrow stimuli should occur.
6.5 DISCUSSION
Evidence from go/no-go performance with manual responding suggests that individuals 
gaze at stimuli just as long as needed to identify them (e.g., Sanders, 1998). In contrast, 
evidence from dual-task performance with vocal responding suggests that gaze shifts 
occur after response selection (e.g., Roelofs, 2007, 2008a, 2008c). This difference in 
results may be due to the nature of the task situation (go/no-go vs. dual task) or the 
response modality (manual vs. vocal). We examined this issue by having participants 
vocally respond to congruent and incongruent flanker stimuli and shift gaze to left- or 
right-pointing arrows. The arrows required a manual response (dual task) or determined 
whether the vocal response to the flanker stimuli had to be given or not (go/no-go). If the 
nature of the task situation, dual task versus go/no-go, is responsible for the difference in 
results between Sanders and colleagues (Sanders, 1998; Sanders & Lamers, 2002;
Sanders & Van Duren, 1998; Van Duren & Sanders, 1995) and Roelofs (2007, 2008a, 
2008c), then gaze shifting should reflect the flanker effect in dual-task performance 
(replicating Roelofs, 2007, 2008a, 2008c) but not in go/no-go performance (replicating 
Sanders & Lamers, 2002). However, if the response modality, vocal versus manual, is 
responsible for the difference in results between studies, then gaze shifting should reflect 
the flanker effect in both dual-task performance (replicating Roelofs, 2007, 2008a,
2008c) and go/no-go performance (contrary to what Sanders & Lamers, 2002, observed 
for manual responding). The results of the present experiment revealed that vocal 
response and gaze-shift latencies were longer on incongruent than congruent trials in both 
dual-task and go/no-go performance. In dual-task performance, the flanker effect was 
also present in the manual response latencies for the right (arrow) stimulus, reflecting a 
propagation of the distractor effect in the vocal responses to the flanker stimulus. Our
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pattern of results suggest that gaze shifts occur after response selection in both dual-task 
and go/no-go performance with vocal responding.
Since the delay between the gaze shift onset and the manual response in the dual­
task condition was rather constant (699, 684, and 709 ms for the CON-NC, CON-SC, and 
INC conditions, respectively), our results support the claim that a gaze shift indexes an 
attention shift. Our results indicate that conclusions about attentional processes derived 
from experiments with visual displays showing multiple stimuli should take into account 
the fact that the chosen response modality may influence the precise point at which the 
eyes start moving.
Although it has been generally assumed that the flanker effect arises in response 
selection (see Sanders, 1998, for a review), recent research (Verbruggen et al., 2006) 
suggested that the effect may stem not only from response conflict, but also from 
stimulus conflict due to greater difficulty in perceptual processing of the target in the 
incongruent condition than in the congruent condition. Thus, the presence of a flanker 
effect (incongruent vs. congruent) in the gaze shift latencies in the go/no-go condition 
may reflect a conflict in stimulus identification, in agreement with the view that gaze 
shifts happen after stimulus identification and before response selection. To exclude this 
latter possibility, we used a design in which response conflict and stimulus conflict could 
be distinguished. We used two target letters per response, so that targets and flankers 
could be same and require the same response (CON-NC), targets and flankers could be 
different but require the same response (i.e., CON-SC, indexing stimulus conflict), and 
targets and flankers could be different and require different responses (i.e., INC, indexing 
response conflict). Our findings show that for the vocal responses and the gaze shifts in 
both task conditions (dual task and go/no-go), there was an effect of response conflict 
(i.e., a latency difference between CON-SC and INC), but no effect of stimulus conflict 
(i.e., no latency difference between CON-SC and CON-NC). This suggests that the gaze 
shifts depend on the time to plan a vocal response and not on the time to perceptually 
separate the central target from the surrounding flankers.1
The present findings support the view of Roelofs (2007, 2008a) that gaze shifts 
occur after response selection in vocal responding, and the findings challenge the view of 
D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997a) and Sanders and colleagues (Sanders, 1998; Sanders &
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Lamers, 2002; Sanders & Van Duren, 1998; Van Duren & Sanders, 1995) that gaze shifts 
generally occur before response selection. Importantly, with vocal responding, gaze shifts 
occur after response selection both in dual-task performance (contrary to what Meyer & 
Kieras, 1997a, assumed) and in go/no-go performance (contrary to what Sanders, 1998, 
assumed). The present results indicate that response modality (vocal, manual) provides 
sufficient explanation for the difference in results between the studies of Roelofs (2007, 
2008a) and Sanders and colleagues (Sanders, 1998; Sanders & Lamers, 2002; Sanders & 
Van Duren, 1998; Van Duren & Sanders, 1995). The present results show that the 
difference in task situation (dual task vs. go/no-go) cannot be responsible for the 
difference in results, because otherwise the results of Sanders and colleagues should have 
been replicated for go/no-go performance with vocal responding in the present study, 
which was not the case. However, it remains possible that an interaction between 
response modality and task situation can also explain the difference between studies. If 
so, manual responding (as opposed to the present vocal responding) to the flanker stimuli 
in a dual-task situation should yield a flanker effect on the gaze shift latencies, whereas 
such an effect should not be present in go/no-go performance (as observed by Sanders et 
al.). This may be tested in future research. Importantly, the present study indicates that 
response modality provides sufficient explanation for the difference in results between 
earlier studies, which we aimed to assess. The current findings on vocal responding agree 
with earlier observations made on gaze shifting and vocal response planning, as we 
explain next.
Research on vocal response planning has shown that there is a close link between 
the duration of word planning and gaze shifts in object naming (e.g., Korvorst, Roelofs,
& Levelt, 2006; Meyer & Van der Meulen, 2000). For example, when participants are 
asked to name two spatially separated objects (e.g., one to the left and the other to the 
right), they gaze longer at first-to-be-named objects with disyllabic names (e.g., lion) than 
with monosyllabic names (e.g., cat) even when the object recognition times are the same 
(Meyer et al., 2003). The effect of the phonological length suggests that the shift of gaze 
from one object to the other is initiated only after the phonological form of the name for 
the object has been planned sufficiently and the corresponding articulatory program is 
available. The phonology-dependent gaze shifts may promote naming speed and accuracy
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by preventing interference from the other object name. Moreover, the phonology- 
dependent gaze shift may diminish resource consumption. Articulating a word such as 
“cat” or “lion” can easily take half a second or more. If gaze shifts are initiated after 
identifying the first object, the planning of the name for the second object may be 
completed well before articulation of the name for the first object has been finished. This 
means that the second vocal response needs to be buffered for a relatively long time. By 
starting perception of the second object when planning the first object name has 
progressed sufficiently, the use of buffering resources can be limited (Levelt & Meyer, 
2000).
However, the phonology-dependent gaze shifts are also obtained when the second 
naming response is replaced by a manual response to a left- or right-pointing arrow 
(Roelofs, 2008a). That is, gaze shifts still depend on phonological encoding when 
participants name an object and manually respond to an arrow. This finding suggests that 
the avoidance of response buffering and the prevention of interference from the second 
response are not the only reasons for a phonology-dependent gaze shift. Rather, some 
aspect of vocal response planning itself would appear to be the critical factor. If attention 
is required until the word has been planned far enough, this would explain why attention, 
indexed by eye gazes, is sustained to word planning until the phonological form is 
planned (Roelofs, 2007, 2008a). This should hold regardless of the need for response 
buffering and the prevention of interference, as empirically observed (Roelofs, 2007, 
2008a, 2008c).
Evidence suggests that shifts of gaze occur closer to articulation onset in naming 
objects than in reading their names (Roelofs, 2007). Participants were presented with 
picture-word combinations, displayed on the left of a computer screen, and left- or right- 
pointing arrows, displayed on the right of the screen. The tasks were to name the picture 
or word (depending on the task assignment) and to shift gaze to the arrow to indicate its 
direction by pressing a left or right response key. Mean latencies for the vocal responses 
and gaze shifts in object naming were longer in a semantic condition (e.g., a pictured cat 
combined with the word dog) than an unrelated condition (e.g., a pictured cat combined 
with the word house), whereas latencies did not differ between distractor conditions in 
word reading. The finding of a distractor effect in object naming but not in word reading
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suggests differences in attentional demands between the two tasks (Roelofs, 2003). Gaze 
shifts occurred about 66 ms before articulation onset in object naming, whereas they 
happened already about 156 ms before articulation onset in word reading. If attention is 
needed until the response word has been planned sufficiently, this explains why attention, 
as indexed by eye gazes, is sustained longer to word planning in object naming than in 
word reading.
Evidence suggests that the allocation of attention in dual-task performance is not 
fixed but strategically determined (cf. Meyer & Kieras, 1997a). Attention seems to be 
sustained to a task just as long as needed to achieve acceptable levels of speed and 
accuracy (e.g., Roelofs, 2007). How long attention is sustained may depend on the nature 
of the secondary task. When participants name pictured objects (primary task) and 
manually respond to arrows or tones (secondary task), a phonological manipulation of 
word planning affects the manual responses to the arrows but not to the tones. This 
suggests that participants shift attention earlier to the tones than to the arrows, 
presumably because vocal response planning hampers auditory perception (Roelofs, 
2008a). Consequently, the tone task needs to be protected against interference from 
speech planning. This might be achieved through attentional enhancement of the 
processing of the tones. However, there was a cost to the earlier shifts of attention to the 
tones, namely an increase in object naming errors. To conclude, evidence on picture 
naming and word reading in simple dual-task situations suggests that spoken word 
planning may require some attention. Moreover, it seems that attention may to some 
degree flexibly be allocated to vocal response planning to promote speed and accuracy.
Ex-Gaussian distributional analyses on the gaze shift latencies in the current study 
revealed that the distractor effect was present in the Gaussian parameters ^ and a, but not 
in the exponential parameter x. This suggests that distractor type shifted the entire latency 
distribution of the gaze shifts. These results support the assumption of D. E. Meyer and 
Kieras (1997a) and Roelofs (2007, 2008a, 2008c) that participants set a criterion for 
when the shift between flanker and arrow stimuli should occur.
The analysis of the latency distributions suggests that the complete distribution 
was shifted. However, Figure 6.2 shows that the flanker effect is absent for the fastest 
gaze shifts in the go/no-go condition. As indicated, we believe this is due to a floor effect
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in speeding up gaze shifts. For the flanker task that we used, Meyer and Kieras (1997a) 
estimated that the gaze shift latency is 335 ms when the shift is prepared and initiated 
immediately after stimulus onset. This may be a lower estimate, because the presence of a 
flanker effect in the go/no-go condition indicates that gaze shifting was dependent on 
response selection in the present study. Still, the estimate of 335 ms already comes close 
to the fastest gaze shift latencies in the go/no-go condition. This means that there is not 
much room for congruent flankers to speed up gaze shifting, explaining the absence of a 
flanker effect in the lowest deciles.
Although the vocal task was the same in the dual-task and go/no-go conditions in 
the present experiment (unlike Roelofs, 2007), the gaze shift latencies were on average 
185 ms shorter in the go/no-go condition than in the dual-task condition. Thus, although 
gazes shifted after response selection in both the go/no-go and the dual-task conditions 
(as suggested by the presence of the flanker effects in the gaze shift latencies), attention 
seemed to shift earlier in the go/no-go than the dual-task condition. D. E. Meyer and 
Kieras (1997a, 1997b) argued that the shift point in dual-task performance may be 
dynamically set by participants based on the relative difficulty of the tasks involved.
More specifically, D. E. Meyer and Kieras (1997b) made a distinction between cautious 
and daring strategies. The shift point may be set earlier for the daring than the cautious 
strategy. In the present experiment, the go/no-go task condition required only one 
response or none at all. Therefore, there was no conflict between responses to the flanker 
and arrow stimuli. In contrast, the dual-task condition required two successive responses 
and their planning might have interfered with each other (cf. Levelt & Meyer, 2000; 
Meyer et al., 2003). The present results show that the eyes moved to the arrow before the 
vocal response to the flanker stimulus had started (cf. Meyer et al., 2003; Roelofs, 2007, 
2008a). Consequently, preparing a response to the arrow might interfere with vocal 
response preparation (cf. Roelofs, 2007). To remain highly accurate in the dual-task 
condition, eye fixation on the flanker stimulus may be maintained until the vocal 
response planning process reaches a point where other responses can no longer interfere. 
This difference between dual-task and go/no-go performance may have resulted in a more 
cautious strategy for the gaze control in the dual-task than the go/no-go condition. A 
dynamical setting of shift point based on task difficulty may have caused the observed
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difference in gaze shift latency between the two task conditions in the present study. In 
line with this account, Sanders and Rath (1991) demonstrated that under extreme 
conditions of speed-accuracy trade-off, even perceptual variables (stimulus degradation) 
do not influence gaze shift latency.
To conclude, previous evidence from go/no-go performance with manual 
responding suggests that individuals gaze at stimuli just as long as needed to identify 
them. In contrast, previous evidence from dual-task performance with vocal responding 
suggests that gaze shifts occur after response selection. This difference in results may be 
due to the nature of the task situation (go/no-go vs. dual task) or the response modality 
(manual vs. vocal). We examined this by having participants vocally respond to 
congruent and incongruent flanker stimuli and shift gaze to left- or right-pointing arrows. 
The arrows required a manual response (dual task) or determined whether the vocal 
response to the flanker stimuli had to be given or not (go/no-go). Vocal response and 
gaze shift latencies were longer on incongruent than congruent trials in both dual-task 
and go/no-go performance. The flanker effect was also present in the manual response 
latencies in dual-task performance. Distributional analyses revealed that the flanker effect 
on the gaze shifts was present as a shift of the entire latency distribution. These results 
suggest that gaze shifts occur after response selection in both dual-task and go/no-go 
performance with vocal responding.
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CHAPTER 7
Summary and Discussion
“There are things known, and there are things unknown, 
and in between are the Doors.” (Jim Morrison, 1943-1971)

For most daily actions attention is required to avoid distractions and reach desired 
goals. As discussed in Chapter 1, theoretically, conflict can manifest itself at different 
stages in the process from perceiving the surrounding (e.g., an object to be grasped in the 
real world or a simple Stroop (1935) stimulus on a computer screen) to the planning and 
execution of the appropriate response (e.g., the motor response to grasp the object or a 
vocal response to the Stroop stimulus). Selective attention might be operative at a single 
stage in this perception-to-response chain, or instead, have its influence at different 
stages, both early when the information from the external world that reaches the senses is 
perceptually processed, and late, when the response is planned and executed. To 
investigate at what level(s) selective attention operates, several series of experiments 
were performed that focused on attention in visually guided action planning.
7.1 EARLY EFFECTS OF SELECTIVE ATTENTION
In Chapter 2, I provided a global overview of the literature on the control of visual 
attention in Stroop-like tasks, in which the relation between visual orienting, selective 
processing, and vocal response planning was studied. In particular, evidence was 
discussed that visual orienting is dependent on both visual processing and verbal response 
planning. Also, the issue of selective perceptual processing in Stroop-like tasks was 
discussed. The evidence suggests that space-based and object-based attention leads to a 
Trojan horse effect in the classic Stroop task, which can be moderated by increasing the 
spatial distance between color and word, and by making color and word part of different 
objects. Previous research (La Heij, Van der Heijden, & Plooij, 2001; Neumann, 1986) 
showed that reducing the presentation duration of the complete color-word stimulus 
reduces the amount of Stroop interference and that reducing the presentation duration of 
either the color or the word also reduces Stroop interference. This paradoxical finding 
that removing an ink color shortly after onset makes it easier to name that color, was 
correctly simulated by the WEAVER++ model (Roelofs, 1992, 2003). Finally, evidence 
was discussed on the neural correlates of executive attention, particularly the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC). It was argued that the ACC not simply signals the need for 
regulation of attention, but, instead, plays an active role in this regulation.
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7.1.1 A paradoxical duration effect with semi-integral color-word Stroop stimuli
In Chapter 3, the above mentioned paradoxical finding in selective perceptual processing 
of Stroop-like stimuli was investigated in more detail. Early effects of selective attention 
were studied using a modified version of the color-word Stroop task in which the target 
and the distractor were separated in time (cf. La Heij et al., 2001; Neumann, 1986). 
Earlier evidence has suggested that Stroop interference in naming the color arises partly 
because of visual attention sharing between color and word: Removing the target color 
after 150 ms reduced interference (Neumann, 1986). Moreover, removing both the color 
and word simultaneously reduced interference less than does removing the color only (La 
Heij et al., 2001). The hypothesis tested in Chapter 3 was that this “La Heij effect” could 
be attributed to Gestalt grouping principles, such as common fate. Three experiments 
were performed using words and color patches (e.g., the written word RED superimposed 
onto a green patch), instead of the more common integral stimuli (e.g., the word RED 
written in green ink). In Experiment 1, the color patch was removed 100 ms after 
stimulus onset. The results showed that the reduced interference effect that was observed 
by La Heij and colleagues was replicated using this class of semi-integral stimuli. In 
Experiment 2, the color patch was not removed but repositioned (< 2°) after 100 ms to a 
location just above or below the distractor word, which also reduced interference. In 
Experiment 3, the distractor word was repositioned while the (color patch) target 
remained stationary, again reducing interference. These results indicated a role for 
Gestalt grouping in selective attention, working at an early stage (within the first 100 ms) 
of stimulus processing.
At this point, it might be interesting to relate the data from some (unpublished) 
pilot experiments to the data presented in Chapter 3. The first experiment reported in 
Chapter 3 was designed to replicate the basic La Heij finding (i.e., Stroop interference 
diminishes when the color duration is reduced), with just one modification: The original 
integral Stroop stimuli (La Heij et al., 2001) were now replaced by color patches with 
superimposed distractor words. Removing the color patch 100 ms after stimulus onset 
reduced Stroop interference. My initial pilot study was somewhat more ambitious. Apart 
from changing the stimulus class, I implemented two other modifications. First, to study 
the underlying nature of the paradox in more detail, a congruent distractor condition was
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added to the incongruent and neutral conditions used by La Heij et al. (2001). The 
prediction was that removing the color of a congruent stimulus should reduce Stroop 
facilitation, just as removing the color of an incongruent stimulus reduces Stroop 
interference. Second, to study the temporal dynamics of the La Heij effect, five different 
exposure durations were employed. The color was displayed for 100 ms (i.e., matching 
the color-removed condition in Experiment 1 of Chapter 3), for 200 ms, for 300 ms, for 
400 ms, or for the entire 1500 ms period that the distractor was present (matching the 
continuous condition in Experiment 1). The results showed that the exposure duration 
effect was not present in this pilot study. The Stroop interference effect (i.e., the RT 
difference between the incongruent and neutral conditions) was the same for all five 
exposure durations (about 60 ms), as was the RT difference between the neutral and the 
congruent conditions (about 25 ms). I hypothesized that the La Heij effect was washed 
out by the use of five different exposure durations. Therefore, in a somewhat less 
ambitious second pilot study, I tried to replicate the basic La Heij effect with semi­
integral Stroop stimuli and a congruent condition, but now using only two color durations 
(100 ms versus 1500 ms). This time, both the amount of Stroop interference and the 
amount of Stroop facilitation was reduced when the color was removed after 100 ms, but 
these reductions were far from significant. I concluded that either the presence of a 
congruent condition disturbs the paradoxical duration effect, or the semi-integral class of 
Stroop stimuli was not suitable for the effect to emerge. Leaving out the congruent 
condition in the next three experiments proved that the La Heij effect can in fact be 
clearly observed with semi-integral stimuli, as reported in Chapter 3. Future research 
could further investigate whether the effect is indeed diminished by the presence of 
congruent stimuli next to incongruent and neutral stimuli, or that the nonsignificant 
reduction of Stroop interference was simply due to a lack of statistical power. Using 
integrated stimuli, Roelofs (in press) observed that color removal reduces the Stroop 
interference on incongruent trials and the facilitation on congruent trials. This further 
supports the Gestalt grouping account and suggests that the presence of congruent stimuli 
does not eliminate the La Heij effect, at least with integrated stimuli.
177
7.1.2 Attentional control adjustments in the Eriksen flanker and the Stroop task
In Chapter 4, the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) was employed in 
addition to the color-word Stroop task, to study another attentional effect reported in the 
recent literature. Several studies (e.g., Botvinick et al., 1999; Kerns et al., 2004) had 
shown that the response time difference between incongruent and congruent trials is 
smaller following incongruent trials than following congruent trials, a phenomenon 
known as the “Gratton effect” (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). According to the 
prevailing conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), 
this Gratton effect reflects attentional control adjustments following response conflict on 
incongruent trials. However, because previous studies compared only incongruent and 
congruent trials (thus, without a neutral baseline), it remained unclear to what extent the 
Gratton effect is driven by incongruent rather than by congruent trials. To resolve this 
issue, I included neutral trials in addition to incongruent and congruent trials in the 
Eriksen flanker task (Experiment 1) and the Stroop task (Experiment 2). Participants 
responded manually and vocally in both experiments. For both tasks, the RT difference 
between incongruent and congruent trials was larger for postcongruent trials than for 
postincongruent and postneutral trials, whereas the latter two did not differ. These 
findings suggest that postincongruent trials are in fact not that special as was assumed in 
the literature. In Experiment 3, the Gratton effect was studied using a different approach. 
Participants responded to Stroop stimuli that were preceded by neutral cues or by 
incongruent- or congruent-predicting cues. Again, the RT difference between incongruent 
and congruent trials was larger for postcongruent trials than for postincongruent and post­
neutral trials. Together, these data suggest that control adjustments can be independent of 
response conflict (see also Erickson et al., 2004), challenging the conflict-monitoring 
theory (although, recently, a new version of that theory has been put forward in which the 
role of response conflict is reduced, see Botvinick, 2007).
To account for the above mentioned findings, I argued that expectations 
concerning the upcoming trial type determine the attentional width employed in 
processing the Eriksen flanker or Stroop stimuli. The attentional width determines to 
what extent distractor information in the stimuli is processed. Moreover, I proposed that 
response selection is generally slowed following an incongruent trial, reflecting the
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response caution adopted by participants. Thus, selective attention is assumed to operate 
before stimulus onset (when the attentional width is set), during perceptual processing of 
the stimulus (attentional width), and during response selection (caution).
7.2 LATE EFFECTS OF SELECTIVE ATTENTION
The experimental setups described above were designed to study aspects of human 
selective attention at early levels in the information processing chain, either during 
stimulus processing (the La Heij effect, Chapter 3) or before stimulus onset and during 
stimulus processing (the Gratton effect, Chapter 4), although response selection turned 
out to be a locus of selective attention as well (Chapter 4). This section will focus on 
experiments that were designed to examine aspects of selective attention operating at 
relatively late levels of action planning, namely during response selection and 
programming processes.
7.2.1 Response set membership effects in the Stroop task
In Chapter 5, a manipulation of selective attention in the Stroop task was studied that is 
known to have an effect on response selection, thus relatively late in the perception-to- 
response chain. In the literature, it was observed that response set membership 
contributes much to the interference in the color-word Stroop task (for an overview, see 
MacLeod, 1991). Already in the 1960s, Klein (1964) observed that color words that were 
eligible responses in an experiment produced approximately two times more interference 
than color words that were not used as responses. For example, if the ink colors were red 
and green, color naming responses were much slower for the word GREEN in red ink 
than for the word BLUE in red ink. This response set membership effect has been 
replicated in several studies (e.g., Glaser & Glaser, 1989; Proctor, 1978), but lately, 
effects of response set have been a bit neglected in the literature on human attention.
Two possible explanations for the response set effect in the Stroop task were 
evaluated in Chapter 5. First, slower color-naming responses for stimuli in which the 
distractor word is inside the response set may be due to selective allocation of attention to 
eligible responses at the response selection level (cf. Broadbent, 1970, 1971; Deutsch,
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1977). In a prominent model of the Stroop task (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990), 
attention to particular responses is achieved by placing eligible responses in a more 
responsive part of their activation curve. Likewise, in the WEAVER++ model of Roelofs 
(1992, 2003), selective allocation of attention at the response level is achieved by 
restricting the ‘selection space’ to eligible responses. Only responses within this selection 
space are competing for selection. The second explanation holds that response set effects 
may arise if noneligible responses are inhibited before trial onset, or alternatively, if 
noneligible responses are more strongly inhibited than eligible ones during target 
processing (cf. Aron, 2007; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Ridderinkhof, 2002a, 
2002b; Tipper, 2001; West & Alain, 2000). According to this inhibition hypothesis, 
distractor words belonging to the response set will interfere more with the color-naming 
task than do the inhibited distractors that are not part of the response set. Selective 
allocation of attention to eligible responses or inhibition of noneligible responses may 
arise either by instructions (i.e., by informing the participants of the stimuli to which they 
have to respond) or through experience with the stimuli in the course of the experiment 
itself.
In the first experiment reported in Chapter 5, I manipulated membership on a 
trial-by-trial basis by cueing the possible responses for each trial. RTs were longer for 
distractors that corresponded to a cued eligible response than to an noneligible one. This 
cueing effect was independent of the number of different responses. Instead of cueing 
two possible responses, in Experiment 2, one single color patch cued the upcoming 
distractor word on half the trials, while giving no information in the other half (a neutral 
white color patch). Cueing the distractor decreased RTs on both incongruent and 
congruent trials. Vincentile analyses in both experiments revealed that the effects were 
constant throughout the entire RT distributions. The combined results from these two 
experiments suggest that response set effects arise because of selective allocation of 
attention to eligible responses rather than the inhibition of noneligible responses.
7.2.2 Attention and gaze shifting in dual-task and go/no-go performance
In Chapter 6, another late locus of selective attention was investigated using an eye- 
tracking device in a dual-task paradigm. Earlier evidence from go/no-go performance on
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the Eriksen flanker task with manual responding has suggested that individuals attend to 
-  and gaze at -  stimuli just as long as is needed to identify them (e.g., Sanders, 1998). Put 
differently, stimulus factors that influence response planning aspects do not determine the 
point at which attention and the eyes move away from the stimulus. In contrast, recent 
evidence from dual-task performance with vocal responding suggests that attention and 
gaze shifts occur after response selection (e.g., Roelofs, 2007, 2008a). Thus, delays in 
vocal responding due to response competition are also mirrored in the gaze durations for 
this stimulus. This difference in results could be due to the nature of the task situation 
(go/no-go vs. dual task) or the response modality (manual vs. vocal).
The experiment reported in Chapter 6 was designed to answer the rather 
fundamental question of which factors determine whether an attention and gaze shift 
from one stimulus to another is determined by response planning aspects for the first 
stimulus, or not. Participants responded vocally to congruent and incongruent flanker 
stimuli on the left. On the right side of the computer screen a second stimulus was 
displayed (a left- or right-pointing arrow flanker by Xs). In the dual task, these arrows 
required a manual response. In the go/no-go task, they determined whether the vocal 
response to the flanker stimulus on the left had to be given or not. Given the large 
distance between the two stimuli, the participants had to make a saccade from the flanker 
stimulus to the arrow. Critically, not only the vocal response latencies were longer on 
incongruent than on congruent trials, but also the gaze shift latencies. This held for both 
the dual task and the go/no-go task. The flanker effect was also present in the manual 
response latencies (in dual-task performance), indicating that a gaze shift indexed an 
attention shift. Ex-Gaussian analyses revealed that the flanker effect on the gaze shifts 
consisted of a shift of the entire latency distribution. Together, these results suggest that 
gaze shifts occur after response selection in both dual-task and go/no-go performance 
with vocal responding.
7.3 LEVELS OF SELECTIVE ATTENTION
7
The studies reported in this thesis indicate that selective attention may be operating at 
both early (perceptual) and late (response selection) processing levels and not at just a
181
single locus. Thus, control can be exerted at different loci, depending on the specific task 
that has to be performed, see Figure 7.1. During the preparation phase, before the 
imperative stimulus appears, attentional processes can already be put in an “optimal 
setting” for the task, either by recent experience (Chapter 4, Experiments 1 and 2), or by 
a formal cue that gives some information about the upcoming stimulus (Chapter 4, 
Experiment 3).
Expectations about the upcoming trial type determine the attentional width used 
for that stimulus. In addition, responding is generally slowed following an incongruent 
trial. Immediately after stimulus onset, at a very early stage in visual processing (within 
100 ms), we saw that attentional processes are influenced by perceptual processes that
OUTPUT
Figure 7.1. The levels in stim ulus processing and response planning and the hypothesized 
loci where selective attention operates in the experim ents reported in this thesis. 
C h  3: G estalt grouping principles play a role during stimulus processing.
C h  4: Expectations concerning upcom ing trial type determ ine the attentional 
width. M oreover, responses are generally slowed follow ing an incongruent trial. 
C h  5: D istractors that are also eligible responses interfere m ore during response 
selection than do distractors that are not part o f  the response set.
C h  6: Late attention shift (planning and execution o f  a saccade) depending on 
response selection aspects.
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group objects according to Gestalt principles such as common fate (Chapter 3). Cueing 
the eligible responses for a certain trial some hundreds of milliseconds before the 
stimulus is displayed, influences the time needed for selecting the correct response in that 
trial (Chapter 5). And finally, I observed that the gaze durations for a certain object and 
the subsequent saccade to another object are dependent on the vocal response planning 
aspects to the first stimulus, representing a late attention shift (Chapter 6).
In short, the experiments reported in this dissertation suggest that selective 
attention is operative at multiple loci, both at early perceptual levels and at late response- 
preparation and -execution levels.
7.4 CONTRIBUTION OF THE FINDINGS
Although my initial goal of fully understanding critical aspects of the human attentional 
system and implementing them in a working simulation model turned out to be a little 
overambitious, the present findings contribute to our growing body of academic 
knowledge about this important psychological function. The experiments in Chapter 3 
shed new light on the factors that contribute to the efficiency of selective attention, 
namely the role of Gestalt grouping principles. As discussed in Chapter 4, my findings on 
the Gratton effect strongly indicate that the presence of response conflict is not the only 
determinant of our attentional width, thereby challenging a dominant theory in the 
literature. Chapter 5 indicates that attention researchers should not focus solely on 
stimulus set factors, but also consider response set factors. Finally, the eye-track study in 
Chapter 6 gives an explanation for the existing discrepancy between observed gaze 
durations in language production studies and the go/no-go paradigm used by Sanders 
(1998) and colleagues. The response modality (vocal vs. manual) appeared to determine 
whether attention shifts occur early or late in processing. Together, the findings of 
Chapters 5 and 6 strongly indicate that selective attention is not only operating early in 
processing, when a stimulus is perceptually processed, but also later in processing, when 
a response is selected and programmed.
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7.5 C O N C L U SIO N S
The work reported in this dissertation clearly indicates that selective attention in human 
performance is not accomplished at a single locus in the chain from perceptual stimulus 
processing to response planning and execution, but instead influences both early 
(perceptual) and late (response selection) levels, depending on the specific task and 
instructions.
CHAPTER 8
Nederlandse samenvatting / Summary in Dutch
“Beknoptheid is de ziel van de wijsheid” 
(William Shakespeare, 1564-1616)

In het dagelijkse leven lijken de meeste mensen zich op een coherente manier te 
gedragen. Voordurend moeten er acties uitgevoerd worden om gestelde doelen te 
bereiken, zoals een ijsje halen uit de diepvries of met de auto van huis naar kantoor 
rijden. Het plannen van zulke acties lijkt vaak eenvoudig, aangezien het meestal foutloos 
en relatief onbewust verloopt. Maar de vloedgolf aan informatie uit de buitenwereld die 
onze zintuigen bereikt is enorm en vraagt daarom om uitgebreide onderliggende 
functionele verwerkingsprocessen. Om goed te kunnen functioneren moeten we continu 
de zintuiglijke invoer filteren, onze aandacht verplaatsen van het ene object of locatie 
naar een andere (zie bijvoorbeeld Figuur 1.1) en soms de strategie bijstellen hoe de 
vergaarde informatie moet worden verwerkt. Dit proefschrift richt zich op niveaus van 
selectieve aandacht bij het plannen van acties.
8.1 CONTROLE VAN AANDACHT
Hoewel de zintuigen veel stimuli tegelijkertijd kunnen registreren, laat onze selectieve 
aandacht slechts een paar hiervan door tot de diepere niveaus van cognitieve verwerking, 
waar ze overte reacties kunnen bepalen of opgeslagen worden in het langetermijn- 
geheugen. Er is een mate van controle nodig om de bijbehorende cognitieve processen te 
coördineren, welke kan afhangen van de exacte taak die uitgevoerd wordt. Deze 
vaardigheid van het menselijke aandachtssysteem om zichzelf dynamisch aan te passen 
aaaann ddee vveerraannddeerreennddee oommggeevviinngg oomm ttoott hheett bbeessttee rreessuultaaaat tee kkoommeenn, wwoorrddt vvaaaakk 
executieve controle of aandachtscontrole genoemd.
Aandachtscontrole kan exogeen zijn, waarbij de detectie wordt gestuurd door de 
externe wereld, zoals wanneer een rood verkeerslicht wordt waargenomen en het gedrag 
hierop wordt aangepast. Aandachtscontrole kan ook endogeen zijn, waarbij de controle 
bepaald wordt door de concentratie van de waarnemer, zoals op een bepaalde manier 
reageren op een stimulus op een scherm, conform de taakinstructies of interne motivaties. 
De verwerking van de stimuli kan worden verdeeld in automatische en gecontroleerde 
verwerking. Automatische verwerking heeft zich ontwikkeld door oefening en kost 
slechts weinig aandacht. Voor gecontroleerde verwerking is aandacht vereist om de 
minder geoefende algorithmen uit te voeren.
187
8
Het fenomeen van selectieve aandacht wordt sinds een aantal decennia intensief 
bestudeerd door psychologen. Een centrale vraag was oorspronkelijk of selectieve 
aandacht opereert op vroege of late niveaus in de verwerking. Zoals afgebeeld in Figuur
1.2 kunnen er meerdere functionele stappen worden onderscheiden wanneer men moet 
reageren op een visuele stimulus. Allereerst zou bij sommige taken zelfs nog vóór de 
stimulus verschijnt een soort cognitieve beperking kunnen worden gesteld op de 
stimulusverwerking en bepaalde taakinstellingen worden geactiveerd. Dit is de 
voorbereidingsfase, waarin controle-instellingen kunnen worden gezet die gebaseerd zijn 
op de taakinstructie. Daarna, als de stimulus verschijnt, moet de taak worden onthouden 
(taakhandhaving) tijdens de verdere verwerkingsstappen. De stimulus (bijvoorbeeld een 
plaatje van een hond met het woord KAT eroverheen) wordt perceptueel verwerkt om 
deze te kunnen identificeren. Vervolgens wordt er een antwoord geselecteerd, dat afhangt 
van de taak (bijvoorbeeld “hond” voor plaatje benoemen, “kat” voor woordlezen). Ten 
slotte wordt de bijbehorende motorresponse voorbereid (de response programmerings­
fase), zoals het opbouwen van een articulatieprogramma voor verbale responsen of het 
programmeren van vingerbewegingen voor het indrukken van de juiste knop. Een 
fundamentele kwestie is onderwerp van debat gebleven: Wordt selectieve aandacht in 
menselijk functioneren op een enkel functioneel niveau bepaald, of in plaats daarvan op 
verschillende niveaus in de reeks processen van waarneming tot reageren?
8.2 ONDERZOEKSPARADIGMA’S EN METHODOLOGIE
Voor het bestuderen van selectieve aandachtsmechanismen gebruiken cognitieve 
psychologen vaak taken die problemen oproepen in (het behouden van) controle. Voor dit 
proefschrift heb ik met name de Strooptaak (1935) en de Eriksen flankertaak (1974) 
gebruikt. Bij de Strooptaak moet de proefpersoon zo snel mogelijk de inktkleur van een 
woord benoemen. Het is een robuuste bevinding dat reacties trager zijn bij kleurwoorden 
waarbij het woord niet overeenkomt met de inktkleur (bv. BLAUW in rode inkt, de 
zogenaamde incongruente conditie) dan in de neutrale conditie (bv. X X X X X  in rode 
inkt). Het verschil in reactietijd (RT) geeft een indicatie voor de hoeveelheid hinder die je 
van het woord ondervindt (zie Figuur 1.3). Het snelst zijn de reacties in de congruente
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conditie, waarbij woord en inktkleur overeenkomen (bv. ROOD in rode inkt). Merk op 
dat in de drie voorbeelden hierboven, zowel de taak (benoem de kleur) als de inktkleur 
die het antwoord bepaalt (rood) gelijk zijn, maar dat de verschillen in RTs een beeld 
geven van de (aandachts)processen die een rol spelen in de verwerking van de stimulus. 
Het verschil in RT tussen incongruente en congruente stimuli wordt het Stroop effect 
genoemd. Dit kan worden opgedeeld in twee componenten: een interferentie effect (RT 
verschil tussen neutraal en incongruent) en een -  gewoonlijk kleiner - facilitatie effect 
(RT verschil tussen neutraal en congruent).
Bij de Eriksen flanker taak krijgt de proefpersoon een reeks karakters te zien 
(bv. SSSHSSS) en moet hierbij de identiteit van het centrale karakter aangeven. Net als 
bij de Stroop taak zijn RTs korter in een congruente conditie (bv. HHHHHHH) dan in 
een incongruente conditie (bv. SSSHSSS). Dit flanker effect (zie Figuur 1.4) geeft aan dat 
we niet in staat zijn om onze aandacht enkel op de relevante informatie te richten. De 
distractoren verstoren het verwerken van de centrale target, maar het is onduidelijk in 
hoeverre dit wordt veroorzaakt door perceptuele factoren (het focussen van de visuele 
aandacht op een kleine spatiele positie) versus response selectie aspecten.
Bij onderzoek naar selectieve aandachtsprocessen zijn twee metingen belangrijk 
voor het vaststellen van de mate van hinder die een bepaalde distractor veroorzaakt in een 
conflicttaak. T en eerste zullen omstandigheden met een hogere graad van afleiding leiden 
tot een langere RT. Ten tweede zijn condities waarin aandachtscontrole vereist is, 
ggeevvooeelliiggeerr vvoooorr hheett mmaakkeenn vvaann ffoouuteenn ddaann ccoonndditieess wwaaaarinn ddee bbeetrrookkkkeennhheeidd vvaann 
controle processen niet noodzakelijk is. Daarom vormt het vergelijken van de RT en 
foutenpercentages in zorgvuldig ontworpen taakcondities, een methode om de processen 
te bestuderen die betrokken zijn bij selectieve aandacht. Naast een voice key voor het 
registreren van vocale reacties en een button box voor het meten van manuele reacties, 
heb ik een eye tracker gebruikt die nauwkeurig de oogbewegingen van proefpersonen 
registreert. De experimentele data heb ik in sommige gevallen vergeleken met computer­
simulaties van het WEAVER++ model (Roelofs, 1992, 2003).
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8.3 V R O E G E  E F F E C T E N  V A N  SE L E C T IE V E  A A N D A C H T
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een globaal overzicht van de literatuur over de controle van visuele 
aandacht in Stroopachtige taken, waarin de relatie tussen visuele oriëntatie, selectieve 
verwerking en vocale planning werd bestudeerd. Ook de kwestie van selectieve 
perceptuele verwerking in Stroopachtige taken werd bediscussieerd. De bevindingen 
suggereren dat locatie-gebaseerde en object-gebaseerde aandacht leiden tot een Trojaans 
paard effect in de klassieke Strooptaak, dat kan worden beïnvloed door de spatiële 
afstand tussen kleur en woord te vergroten en door kleur en woord onderdeel van 
verschillende objecten te maken. De paradoxale bevinding dat het weghalen van de 
inktkleur net na het verschijnen van de stimulus er toe leidt dat het makkelijker wordt om 
die kleur te benoemen (La Heij, Van der Heijden, & Plooij, 2001; Neumann, 1986), werd 
correct gesimuleerd door het WEAVER++ model. Ook werden de neurale correlaten van 
uitvoerende aandacht besproken, in het bijzonder de anterieure cingulaire cortex (ACC).
In Hoofdstuk 3 werd het hierboven genoemde vroege effect in selectieve 
perceptuele verwerking van Stroopachtige stimuli in meer detail bestudeerd, door target 
en distractor te scheiden in de tijd. De hypothese was dat het “La Heij effect” zou kunnen 
worden toegeschreven aan Gestalt-groeperingsprincipes, zoals common fate  (een 
gezamenlijke lotsbestemming). Drie experimenten werden uitgevoerd met woorden en 
kleurbalkjes (bijvoorbeeld, het geschreven woord ROOD bovenop een groen 
kleurbalkje). In Experiment 1 werd het kleurbalkje 100 ms na het verschijnen van de 
stimulus weggehaald. De resultaten toonden aan dat het verminderde interferentie-effect 
dat eerder door La Heij en collega’s was waargenomen, werd gerepliceerd met deze 
categorie van semi-integrale stimuli. In Experiment 2 werd het kleurbalkje niet 
weggehaald, maar na 100 ms verplaatst (< 2°) naar een locatie net boven of onder het 
distractor woord. Ook deze manipulatie verminderde de interferentie. In Experiment 3 
werd het distractor woord verplaatst, terwijl de (kleurbalk) target stationair bleef. Ook dit 
verminderde de gemeten hoeveelheid interferentie. Samen wijzen de resultaten op een rol 
van Gestaltgroepering in selectieve aandacht, die werkzaam is in een vroeg stadium 
(binnen de eerste 100 ms) van de stimulusverwerking.
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In Hoofdstuk 4 werd een ander vroeg aandachtseffect bestudeerd. Diverse 
recente studies hebben aangetoond dat het RT-verschil tussen incongruente en congruente 
trials kleiner is volgend op incongruente trials dan volgend op congruente trials, een 
fenomeen bekend als het “Gratton effect” (Gratton et al., 1992). Volgens de heersende 
conflict-monitoring theorie (Botvinick et al., 2001), weerspiegelt dit Gratton effect 
aanpassingen in de controle van aandacht als reactie op waargenomen response conflict 
in de voorgaande incongruente trial. Echter, omdat de vorige studies geen neutrale 
baseline hebben gebruikt, blijft het vooralsnog onduidelijk in welke mate het Gratton 
effect wordt gedreven door incongruente in plaats van congruente trials. Daarom heb ik 
naast incongruente en congruente trials ook neutrale trials gebruikt in de Eriksen flanker 
taak (Experiment 1) en de Stroop taak (Experiment 2). Proefpersonen reageerden 
manueel en vocaal in beide experimenten. Voor beide taken gold dat het verschil in RT 
tussen incongruente en congruente trials groter was voor post-congruente trials dan voor 
post-incongruente en post-neutrale trials, terwijl die laatste twee niet verschilden. In 
Experiment 3 werd een andere benadering gebruikt om het Gratton effect te bestuderen. 
Proefpersonen reageerden op Stroop stimuli die voorafgegaan werden door ofwel een 
neutrale cue ofwel door een incongruent- of congruent-voorspellende cue. Opnieuw was 
het RT verschil tussen incongruente en congruente trials groter voor post-congruente 
trials dan voor post-incongruente en post-neutrale trials. Gezamenlijk suggereren deze 
data dat post-incongruente trials toch eigenlijk niet zo speciaal zijn als in de literatuur 
werd aangenomen en dat aanpassingen in controle onafhankelijk van response conflict 
kunnen optreden, een uitdaging voor de conflict-monitoring theorie. Als verklaring voor 
mijn bevindingen stelde ik dat verwachtingen betreffende het aanstaande type trial de 
aandachtsbreedte bepalen, die wordt toegepast om de stimuli te verwerken. De 
aandachtsbreedte bepaalt in welke mate de distractorinformatie die in de stimulus 
aanwezig is ook daadwerkelijk wordt verwerkt. Daarnaast stelde ik dat response selectie 
in zijn algemeenheid wordt vertraagd na een incongruente trial, hetgeen de door de 
proefpersoon gekozen responsevoorzichtigheid weerspiegelt. Dus, de huidige aanname is 
dat selectieve aandacht al opereert vóór de stimulus onset (wanneer de aandachtsbreedte 
wordt bepaald), tijdens de perceptuele verwerking van de stimulus (effect van de 
ingestelde aandachtsbreedte) en gedurende de response selectie (voorzichtigheid).
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8.4 L A T E  E F F E C T E N  V A N  SE L E C T IE V E  A A N D A C H T
Deze paragraaf zal focussen op experimenten die ontworpen waren om aspecten van 
selectieve aandacht te onderzoeken die op relatief late niveaus in de planning van actie 
opereren, namelijk tijdens processen die betrokken zijn bij responseselectie en response- 
programmering.
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt een manipulatie van selectieve aandacht in de Stroop 
taak -  responseset lidmaatschap -  waarvan bekend is dat het een effect heeft op de 
responseselectie, dus relatief laat in de perceptie-tot-response reeks. Klein had al in 1964 
geconstateerd dat kleurwoorden die mogelijke responsen vormden in een experiment 
ongeveer twee maal zoveel interferentie veroorzaakten als kleurwoorden die niet als 
response gebruikt werden. Ik heb twee mogelijke verklaringen voor dit responseseteffect 
geëvalueerd. Allereerst zou de langere kleurbenoemingstijd voor stimuli, waarvan het 
ddisstrraacctoorrwwoooorrddbbinnnneenn ddeerreessppoonnsseesseetzzit,vveerroooorrzzaaaakktkkuunnnneennwwoorrddeennddoooorrsseeleecctieevvee 
toekenning van aandacht aan toegestane responsen op het niveau van responseselectie 
(zie Broadbent, 1970, 1971). De tweede verklaring voor het response set effect stelt dat 
niet-toegestane responsen worden onderdrukt vóór de start van een trial, of tijdens het 
verwerken van de target (Ridderinkhof, 2002a, 2002b). Volgens deze inhibitiehypothese 
interfereren distractorwoorden die tot de responseset behoren meer met de kleurbenoe- 
mingstaak dan de onderdrukte distractoren die er geen onderdeel van zijn. In Experiment
1 werd lidmaatschap op een trial-tot-trial basis gemanipuleerd, door de mogelijke 
responsen in iedere trial via een cue aan te geven. De RT was langer voor distractoren die 
overeenkwamen met een gecuede toegestane response dan voor niet-toegestane 
responsen. Dit effect van cues was onafhankelijk van het aantal responsen. In Experiment
2 werd slechts één kleurbalkje getoond, dat in de ene helft van de trials als cue fungeerde 
voor het distractorwoord, terwijl het geen enkele informatie gaf in de andere helft. Het 
aangeven van de distractor met een cue verkorte de RT op zowel incongruente als 
congruente trials. Vincentile analyses onthulden dat de effecten constant waren voor de 
hele RT distributieverdelingen. De resultaten van deze twee experimenten samen 
suggereren dat het response set effect ontstaat door selectieve toekenning van aandacht 
aaaann ttooeeggeessttaannee rreessppoonnsseenn,, iinn ppllaaaattss vvaann oonnddeerrddrruukkkkiinngg vvaann nniieett--ttooeeggeessttaannee rreessppoonnsseenn..
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In Hoofdstuk 6 werd een andere late locus van selectieve aandacht onderzocht 
met gebruikmaking van een oogbewegingsmeetapparaat in een dubbeltaak paradigma. 
Eerdere aanwijzingen uit go/no-go experimenten met manuele responsen in een Eriksen 
flankertaak, suggereerden dat individuen slechts zolang naar stimuli kijken als nodig is 
om ze te kunnen identificeren (bijvoorbeeld, Sanders, 1998). Anders gezegd, stimulus 
factoren die response planningsaspecten beïnvloeden zijn niet bepalend voor het punt 
waarop de aandacht en de blik weggaan van de stimulus. Anderzijds wekt recent 
dubbeltaak onderzoek met vocale responsen de suggestie dat aandacht- en blik- 
verschuiving pas plaatsvinden na responseselectie (bijvoorbeeld, Roelofs, 200']?, 20(38a). 
Dus vertragingen in vocalp responsen die ontstaan door responsecompetitie ‘worden ook 
weerspiegeld in de tijdsduur dat de stimulus wordt bekeken. Dit verschil in resultaten zou 
toegeschreven kunnen worden aan de aard van de taaksituatie (go/no-go vs. dubbeltaak) 
of aan de responsemodaliteit (manueel vs. vocaal). Het experiment dat in Hoofdstuk 6 
gerapporteerd is, was ontworpen om antwoord te krijgen op de fundamentele vraag welke 
factoren bepalen of een aandachts- en blik-verschuiving van de ene stimulus naar de 
andere, wel of niet afhangt van response planningsaspecten voor de eerste stimulus. 
Metingen van het moment waarop de saccade (oogsprong) van de stimulus aan de 
lliinnkkeerrkkaanntt vvaann hheett ccoommppuutteerrsscchheerrmm nnaaaarr ddee rreecchhtteerrkkaanntt wweerrdd ggeemmaaaakktt ssuuggggeerreeeerrddeenn ddaatt 
de blikverschuiving pas plaatsvindt na responseselectie in zowel de dubbeltaak als de 
go/no-go taak en dat deze (zichtbare) verschuiving van de blik een index is voor de 
((oonnzzicchhtbbaarree)) vveerrsscchhuuivvinngg vvaann ddee aaaannddaacchht.
8.5 CONCLUSIES
Het werk dat in dit proefschrift staat beschreven toont duidelijk aan dat selectieve 
aandacht in menselijk handelen niet bereikt wordt op één enkel niveau in de keten van 
ppeerrcceeppttuueellee ssttiimmuulluuss vveerrwweerrkkiinngg ttoott rreessppoonnsseeppllaannnniinngg eenn uuiittvvooeerriinngg,, mmaaaarr ddaatt sseeleecctieevvee 
aandacht in plaats daarvan zowel vroege (perceptuele) als late (response selectie) niveaus 
beïnvloedt, afhankelijk van de specifieke taak en de instructies (zie Figuur 7.1).
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